Conclusion:Legitimation and Accountability in Energy Transitions Research by Sareen, Siddharth et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Conclusion
Legitimation and Accountability in Energy Transitions Research
Sareen, Siddharth ; Moss, Timothy; Lund, Christian; Haarstad, Håvard ; Sovacool, Benjamin ;
Wolf, Steven
Published in:
Enabling Sustainable Energy Transitions
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-030-26891-6_10
Publication date:
2020
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
CC BY
Citation for published version (APA):
Sareen, S., Moss, T., Lund, C., Haarstad, H., Sovacool, B., & Wolf, S. (2020). Conclusion: Legitimation and
Accountability in Energy Transitions Research. In S. Sareen (Ed.), Enabling Sustainable Energy Transitions:
Practices of legitimation and accountable governance (pp. 117-135). Palgrave Macmillan.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26891-6_10
Download date: 10. sep.. 2020
Enabling Sustainable 
Energy Transitions
Practices of legitimation and 
accountable governance
Edited by 
Siddharth Sareen
“If we are to close the gap between words and deeds on decarbonisation, emission 
reductions need to go much faster and further than at present. Enabling Sustainable 
Energy Transitions steps directly into this gap, arguing that inadequate action rela-
tive to the scale of the problem constitutes a crisis of accountability. This crisis is 
sustained, the authors propose, by four ‘practices of legitimation’ through which 
states, firms and other key actors are effectively insulated from the political and 
economic consequences of inaction. In tune with the recent pivot in energy 
research from innovation to incumbency, and the post-Paris challenge of rapidly 
dismantling fossil energy regimes, this compact book argues that ideas about 
accountability and legitimation—drawn from work on environmental gover-
nance—can open up new analytical perspectives on what is holding back effective 
energy system transformation. With bite-size chapters and illustrative cases that 
draw on the work of five expert witnesses, this is a novel intervention into debates 
over the politics of energy transition.”
—Gavin Bridge, Professor, Department of Geography, Durham University
“In this comprehensive and much-needed book, Dr. Siddharth Sareen with col-
leagues provides a compelling analysis of the sustainable energy transition and the 
role of legitimation practices and accountability therein. The book theorizes and 
advances the research frontier on legitimation practices and accountability with a 
carefully crafted analysis bridging scholarly fields of environmental governance, 
political economy, energy research and democratic theory. Enabling Sustainable 
Energy Transition presents a novel empirical analysis of the politics of energy tran-
sition across the world through rich case studies of countries such as Portugal, 
Germany, Norway, USA as well as cities such as Berlin. This book is a must-read 
for all students and scholars interested in shaping more legitimate, democratic and 
accountable energy transition from the local to global context.”
—Karin Bäckstrand, Professor, Department of Political Science, 
Stockholm University
Enabling Sustainable Energy Transitions
Siddharth Sareen
Editor
Enabling Sustainable 
Energy Transitions
Practices of legitimation and accountable 
 governance
ISBN 978-3-030-26890-9    ISBN 978-3-030-26891-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26891-6
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 This book is an open access 
publication, corrected Publication 2020
Open Access  This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits 
use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative 
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the book’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly 
from the copyright holder.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this 
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are 
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information 
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the 
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The 
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-
tional affiliations.
This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature 
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Editor
Siddharth Sareen
Department of Geography  
Centre for Climate and Energy Transformation
University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
The original version of this book was revised. Copyright holder has been 
updated. Author has acknowledged their funder in the book. The correction 
to this book can be found at  
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26891-6_11
vii
When I was 11, I lived in the river plains of northern India, a region 
poorer than sub-Saharan Africa (Alkire and Santos 2014). It was before 
the turn of the millennium, and while the mercury routinely went past 
45 °C, my household struggled to cope with frequent power cuts totalling 
a dozen hours a day. We had the relative luxury of a diesel generator and 
an inverter, cooked using gas cylinders and a parabolic solar cooker, used 
electric water heaters, and the nightwatchman burnt charcoal to stay warm 
on winter nights and cooked his morning meals on a woodstove.
When I was 21, I lived on an elite university campus where the govern-
ment ensured round-the-clock power supply so the lights never went out. 
Months before Copenhagen hosted the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties (CoP) 
15, I was an invited student delegate at a global sustainable development 
summit. Midway through, during a plenary session with the then-head of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a leading 
British Broadcasting Corporation news anchor, I posed a question in the 
limelight. In two days of discussions on how to address the climate change 
challenge, why had nobody discussed the role of the United States of 
America (Christoff 2010), since our prospects looked bleak without its 
geopolitical backing and political economic will?
Now 31 years old, I live in Norway, one of the richest countries in the 
world with a fortune built on oil, with hydropower its predominant 
domestic energy source. My home runs almost entirely on electricity, from 
heating to cooking to hot water. Our transport systems are increasingly 
electric, except air travel which continues to be carbon emissions intensive 
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and popular. During the CoP 24 in Katowice, the centre of coal in Europe, 
someone half my age spoke truth to power. Greta Thunberg said that our 
political representatives have failed us and that we must act now to address 
the climate crisis for today’s youth and the vulnerable to have liv-
able futures.
Those three decadal conjunctures of material configuration, institu-
tional context and relative privilege reveal a great deal about the spatio-
temporally contingent nature of how we experience the deeply entangled 
climate and energy crises. My concern with these contemporary crises has 
continued and increased in my transition from childhood to mid-career 
researcher; and so has the associated urgency. We live in a time of many 
crises—local, national and global; short-, medium- and long-term; social, 
environmental and economic—and the heart of each one is political. This 
book concerns the greatest crisis of our times, which spans generations. It 
is about addressing the drivers and impacts of climate change, which 
means rapidly decarbonising our energy systems, and deeply changing 
whom they benefit (Bickerstaff et al. 2013). This is a mammoth task with 
competing stakes, too vital to be left to privileged sets of decision-makers 
who have already failed to safeguard and secure public interest for decades, 
and much too big for a modest book. Rather, its envisaged contribution is 
to show how to make this crisis visible for what it truly is—a crisis of 
accountability—opening up space to discuss and establish anew (Dowdle 
2017) the terms for more accountable governance to enable sustainable 
energy transitions. For the purpose of this book, the term ‘sustainable 
energy transitions’ signifies changes to our energy systems that enhance 
both decarbonisation and social equity.
I undertake this ambitious task in good company. That of countless 
excellent scientists past and present who have furnished a rigorous basis in 
knowledge and whose work I draw on—we already know much of what 
we need to know for sustainable energy transitions. Your company as a 
reader, as someone interested in understanding and addressing this cri-
sis—this book is accessible to laypersons and experts, and aspires to be an 
engaging, inspiring read. The company of environmental governance 
researchers who have spent a great deal of their eminent careers examining 
various aspects of energy transitions and kindred subjects, which span 
many sectors and domains. And finally of the many people these colleagues 
and I have interacted with in the field—for our research is empirically 
informed—who help keep our work grounded and relevant. This 
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 combination is key in making an argument that at its crux concerns prac-
tices of legitimation.
What is legitimation, why does it feature practices, and what does it 
have to do with a crisis of accountability? Notably, an accountability crisis 
is distinct from the Habermasian notion of a legitimation crisis, which 
refers to a confidence deficit in leadership, institutions or administrative 
functions among the subjects of the state in an era of late capitalism. To wit:
The state can avoid legitimation problems to the extent that it can manage 
to make the administrative system independent of the formation of legiti-
mating will. To that end, it can, say, separate expressive symbols (which 
create a universal willingness to follow) from the instrumental functions of 
administration…. The scope for manipulation, however, is narrowly delim-
ited, for the cultural system remains peculiarly resistant to administrative 
control. There is no administrative creation of meaning, there is at best an 
ideological erosion of cultural values. The acquisition of legitimation is self- 
destructive as soon as the mode of acquisition is exposed. Thus, there is a 
systematic limit for attempts at making up for legitimation deficits by means 
of well aimed manipulation. This limit is the structural dissimilarity between 
areas of administrative action and cultural tradition. (Habermas 1973: 657)
This book adopts a similar premise but a different point of entry. Taking 
forward an approach developed by Kraft and Wolf (2018), legitimation is 
a relationally produced artefact that can be empirically scrutinised to char-
acterise accountability. Where an accountability crisis occurs, it need not 
manifest as breakdown (a legitimation crisis) but can be upheld through 
practices of legitimation even as things run aground. In this sense, we have 
been in an accountability crisis for centuries, and in the case of many actors 
knowingly so for decades, extracting and consuming resources with deeply 
inequitable distributions and emitting carbon (and other greenhouse 
gases—this book uses ‘decarbonisation’ as shorthand) that far exceed sus-
tainable limits. Legitimation refers to the process through which an act 
(by its doer) is recognised as valid (by its authoriser and its public) in rela-
tion to societal norms. This process involves a set of distinct practices. 
Practices of legitimation are social relations premised on accountability 
and constitutive of it. Sectoral changes manifest in and through them. 
Thus, practices of legitimation embody the very means by which an act 
becomes legitimate and normalised (Luckmann 1987). They are necessar-
ily also the relational sites where such normalisation can be laid bare and 
challenged. Such informed exposure represents Habermas’ systematic 
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limit, beyond which manipulation cannot make up for legitimation deficit. 
In the contemporary context of increasing right-wing authoritarian ten-
dencies and climate scepticism, informed exposure is not straight-forward 
but tautly contested and requires rigorous evidence.
Questioning a practice of legitimation is a way of bringing an act to 
account, by holding accountable its doer, its authoriser, or both, to the 
broader publics affected by their actions. There is no singular public or 
normative standard (West and Davis 2011), as scholarly theorisations of 
institutional orders and orders of worth remind us (Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006; Patriotta et al. 2011). Yet environmental governance and political 
ecology research have made inroads into questions of power and represen-
tation, and a normative goal such as sustainability has secured broad, albeit 
not uncontested, social legitimacy in terms of the desirability of decar-
bonisation that also enhances social equity. Nation states—and, in a poly-
centric world, trans-local networks of multi-scalar actors—have made 
strong verbal, political, policy and in some cases even legal commitments 
to achieving substantive transitions to sustainability. Nonetheless, global 
carbon emissions continue to increase, and human-made disasters are 
becoming normed into the anthropocene, with exacerbated threats of 
wildfires and floods causing widespread loss of human life, infrastructure 
and biodiversity. With a crisis of accountability of this magnitude—where 
societal foundations such as the energy system must open up to question-
ing—being increasingly recognised with public demands to address it, 
practices of legitimation occur wherever action is observable, whether to 
resolve the crisis or to profit by prolonging it. These practices are our win-
dows to institutional change in the making (Dansou and Langley 2012), 
and our points of entry to not only examine and understand but also to 
inform and intervene.
To me, this is both a professional and personal quest: 45 °C summer 
days with no electricity for half the day is not just a memory from my 
childhood; it embodies the reality of the current lives of mind-bogglingly 
many people. We continue to shy away from some of the most pressing 
and difficult questions when it comes to acting on climate change: how is 
it that the powerful continue to act in unacceptable, unabashedly consum-
erist ways without being held to account, while highly vulnerable groups 
bear the brunt of the impact with precious little say?
We cannot change everything at once; what is in place keeps the world 
as we know it in play and nourishes very powerful parts of it. But we must 
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pick it apart (through informed analysis) to improve upon it (for 
 constructive change); for if we let things continue as they are, we are con-
demning billions of people and many other organisms besides to the suf-
fering entailed by runaway climate change (Wallace-Wells 2019).
The energy system is not only a huge contributor to climate change, it 
is also humankind’s greatest accomplishment and most devastating horror 
all rolled into one. Nothing has enabled greater human achievement and 
progress; nothing has led to more pronounced inequity and irreversible 
destruction. Consider the sophisticated command over resources to sup-
ply the energy needs of billions on the one hand, and the ruination of 
entire ways of life in extracting resources and setting up supply chains to 
do so on the other hand. Or a transatlantic jetplane for a millionaire versus 
a habitation flooded by damming respectively; or a neon-lit city versus a 
fracking landscape—the list is endless.
This book, then, seeks to provide a pick-axe of sorts. It offers an ana-
lytical approach to cut into practices of legitimation and examine how 
things are propped up, what must yield, and who is pushing for the sorts 
of changes that will enable sustainable energy transitions. A scientific way 
to evidence common-sense (Jovchelovitch 2008), get an empirical handle 
on the opportunities to decarbonise and render equitable our changing 
energy systems, and provide a basis for the public to put its feet down 
against the acts and actors who would rather watch the world burn, liter-
ally, than lose the untenable privileges of a small but powerful group 
of elites.
Part I of the book frames what research has already conclusively shown 
about feasible and necessary energy transitions, and puts forward an ana-
lytical typology of practices of legitimation to make headway towards sus-
tainability in any given instance of energy transition. Part II explains the 
invitation to five colleagues to reflect on their varied cases related to energy 
transitions in terms of accountability and legitimation, and comprises their 
responses to this invitation in the form of five case chapters. Part III syn-
thesises our reflections on how to take forward energy transitions analysis 
along such lines. We thus aim to pave a pathway for enmeshed empirical 
and theoretical studies of practices of legitimation towards accountable 
governance that can enable sustainable energy transitions.
Bergen, Norway Siddharth Sareen
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CHAPTER 1
Reframing Energy Transitions as Resolving 
Accountability Crises
Siddharth Sareen
Abstract Using the concrete case of solar energy uptake in Portugal, 
Chap. 1 illustrates how energy transitions can be regarded as attempts to 
resolve crises of accountability. While Portugal is among the countries that 
lead globally on energy transitions, close attention to its apparently prom-
ising solar energy prospects reveals a paradox: progress has been slow and 
modest. Yet, there seems to be a major change on the horizon, and a 
potentially powerful explanation for these dynamics is premised on rela-
tions of accountability amongst stakeholders in Portugal’s energy sector. 
Having argued that such a reframing of energy transitions has explanatory 
power, the chapter deconstructs accountability as an underlying relation-
ship which is produced by various practices that manifest as legitimation. 
It argues for an analytical typology of legitimation.
Keywords Accountability crisis • Legitimation • Energy transitions • 
Solar • Portugal
S. Sareen (*) 
Department of Geography, Centre for Climate and Energy Transformation, 
University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
e-mail: Siddharth.Sareen@uib.no
41.1  SuStainable energy tranSition aS a reSponSe 
to an accountability criSiS
In terms of national performance on energy transitions, few countries are 
more remarkable than Portugal. Already among Europe’s leaders on 
renewable energy, its carbon mitigation from 2017 to 2018 was 9 per 
cent, the highest rate on the continent and over thrice the European aver-
age.1 This small and relatively isolated country bordering Spain in the 
western part of the Iberian Peninsula with ten million residents has, thus, 
exceeded expectations.
Solar energy uptake in Portugal poses a surprising paradox: despite 
Portugal’s leadership on renewable energy in the progressive energy policy 
context of Europe, with strong wind and hydro power assets and some of 
the continent’s best solar irradiation conditions for cost-competitive low- 
carbon generation (Krajačić et  al. 2011), till 2019, it has only installed 
modest solar energy capacity. Combined with no fossil fuel assets to speak 
of as an importer of coal, oil and natural gas, it would seem a no-brainer 
for Portugal to capitalise on remarkable global decreases in the price of 
solar energy infrastructure and promote a rapid solar uptake to move 
towards a largely decarbonised energy sector (Fortes et al. 2019).
Empirical research and mainstream media reports have unearthed 
numerous barriers for solar energy uptake, such as the lack of policy visibil-
ity, a restrictive regulatory framework, limited licences, grid constraints 
and limited credit access. These explain the relatively modest increases in 
installed solar capacity and surface some narratives of frustration. Emerging 
studies and reports, most notably Portugal’s National Energy and Climate 
Plan, convey a sense that eventually things will work themselves out and 
solar projects will increasingly go ahead (Coelho et al. 2017), especially at 
utility scale, meaning in the multi-million dollar range. There has been 
insufficient transmission grid capacity for the national energy regulator to 
allow very many new solar installation in the locations with highest irradia-
tion down south; till 2019, guidelines on how existing grid capacity should 
be allocated were unclear; and when transparent guidelines did emerge it 
was into a context with a little informed public debate on such crucial 
priorities regarding the country’s energy future and low-carbon transition 
1 Eurostat news release 81/2019, dated 08.05.2019. Accessed 24.05.2019 at https://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/9779945/8-08052019-AP-EN.
pdf/9594d125-9163-446c-b650-b2b00c531d2b.
 S. SAREEN
5(Sareen and Haarstad 2018; Vasconcelos 2018). Then, a scandal in another 
ministry ahead of a national election year led to a cabinet reshuffle. The 
emergence of a new ministry with a new minister of environment and 
energy transition, as well as European Commission mandates, prompted 
the launch of a national climate and energy policy and a national decar-
bonisation roadmap 2050 (Sareen in review). At the time of writing, 
Portugal had scheduled solar capacity auctions for over 2 Giga Watts dur-
ing 2019, and adopted a newly ambitious target that includes a tenfold 
increase in solar energy capacity within a decade.
To those well versed with energy sector dynamics, ‘incumbency’ and 
‘path dependence’ (Sovacool 2016; Lockwood et al. 2017) are terms that 
will suggest themselves easily given the particular trajectory up to 2019, 
and potentially also disruption to describe evolving circumstances (Winskel 
2018). Portugal has a history of a veritable monopoly in its energy sector 
by Energias de Portugal (EDP). Like many other countries, it moved from 
electricity being a largely publicly held sector to increased privatisation 
during the past quarter century. EDP remains an outsize vertically inte-
grated player in this sector but is multinational and privately held. A great 
deal of control over its own energy infrastructure has shifted out of 
Portuguese hands of late with sustained interest by Chinese investors 
(Pareja-Alcaraz 2017), not least during Portugal’s battle with economic 
recession and European Union pressure during 2009–2015.
The sector has changed, but the memory of a particular mode of func-
tioning maintains a stronghold in the mind of decision-makers (Delicado 
et al. 2016). EDP is a major player in renewables—hydro and wind power 
in Portugal—but its solar energy assets are held abroad rather than in 
Portugal. Here, it has leveraged its presence in fossil fuel generation and 
protected investments in thermal plants in the hope that these will turn 
over a tidy profit for years hence. Timing is thus crucial in terms of who 
stands to benefit from Portugal’s solar energy transition (Sareen et  al. 
2018). It is perhaps not all that surprising that so far there has been no 
particular rush to implement a dramatic increase in solar uptake. After all, 
things are running smoothly, Portugal is meeting European targets on 
renewable energy, and a cash-strapped economy has competing priorities, 
so why mess with a good enough energy sector? And yet, with the 
announcement of solar auctions for summer 2019 by the government of 
Portugal signalling a clear pathway, EDP publicly stated its interest in par-
ticipating and submitting bids.
1 REFRAMING ENERGY TRANSITIONS AS RESOLVING ACCOUNTABILITY… 
6It is crucial to unpack this tension between a ‘good enough’ status quo 
that has lingered for years and the promise of upcoming large-scale dyna-
mism in order to understand the changing energy sector and the adaptive 
behaviour of various stakeholders. What is the underlying normative com-
mitment—what suffices and why, and by contrast, what catalyses change 
and when? Does Portugal exemplify a sustainable energy transition under-
way? Or does it normalise something well short of reasonable action, sim-
ply because legal and discursive space permit it without sufficiently rigorous 
tests (Dansou and Langley 2012)? These questions approach the nub of 
the argument presented below: in the Portuguese case of gradual solar 
uptake as in most current energy transitions, we know what the problem 
is, we know a good deal about how to solve it and yet do little about it, 
and this disjuncture is a crisis of accountability (Mason 2008).
From the normative standpoint of decarbonisation, Portugal should be 
putting all the weight it can behind rapid, even exponential, solar uptake, 
dealing with its disruptive effects head-on in order to decarbonise quickly. 
Adding an equity dimension, it should be encouraging a vibrant public 
debate about how to ensure that such a sectoral transition enhances social 
equity or at least does not work against it. Till recently, these discussions 
barely existed, and as they emerge, they play out amongst ‘experts’ and 
those who often represent specific stakes in the sector (cf. West and Davis 
2011). There has been at best a fringe discussion on various public stakes 
in energy transitions and the necessity for a solar energy transition to hap-
pen rapidly and to produce public benefits (Delicado et al. 2014; Sareen 
and Haarstad 2018)—both in terms of enhancing current social equity 
and by way of securing improved intergenerational equity through climate 
change mitigation.
What does solar energy have to do with social equity? Within Europe, 
Portugal has one of the highest national rates of energy poverty, a condi-
tion whereby people cannot secure adequate home energy services. Some 
800,000 of the country’s ten million residents avail subsidised electricity 
tariffs. Yet, the current energy sector regime does not incentivise ‘prosum-
ing’, or selling solar energy back to the grid. It mainly promotes self- 
consumption (Camilo et al. 2017), which does not appeal much to small 
households considering installing rooftop solar panels when they are usu-
ally not at home during peak solar generation hours. Nor does the national 
framework support community energy, and Portugal’s first solar energy 
cooperative in Lisbon has struggled to gain recognition as an electricity 
supplier in order to increase the benefits its members can access from the 
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opers installing solar capacity in the Mega Watts (MW), with each MW 
corresponding to close to a million dollar investment, find themselves able 
to turn a tidy profit by trading on the wholesale market. This does help in 
terms of climate change mitigation, as it enlarges the percentage of low- 
carbon energy sources feeding the electric grid, and thereby lowers the 
carbon emissions associated with electricity generation. But, current fig-
ures constitute nominal progress, gradual increments, that benefit a few 
private developers; Portugal is not witnessing some disruptive revolution 
in the energy sector that benefits tens of thousands of small households 
and communities and moves rapidly towards a democratic, low-carbon 
energy future (Camilo et al. 2017; Jaegersberg and Ure 2017; Sareen and 
Haarstad 2018; see also Jacobson et al. 2017).
So, we find ourselves in a peculiar, but comprehensible, situation. Solar 
energy is cost-competitive with dirtier energy sources, can be installed in 
large parts of a country that does not have fossil fuels and, yet, continues 
to struggle to comprise a significant chunk of Portugal’s energy mix. What 
makes it understandable is the acceptance of a simple, horrifying fact: this 
is a crisis of accountability, one that flies under the radar even as we anima-
tedly debate sustainable energy transitions within a global system that 
legitimates pathways of carbon capitalism (Mitchell 2011). Lisbon has 
hosted some of the most prominent global meetings on such matters, such 
as Sustainable Energy for All in 2018, and has even been awarded the label 
of European Green Capital 2020. Do such overt public displays of com-
mitment to the ideal of sustainable energy transition serve as a spectacle 
that disguises or substitutes for a lack of ambition, action and implementa-
tion (Sareen and Grandin in review)? What other horrors lie in store if we 
extend our gaze to various energy transitions elsewhere, and would it help 
to call them out? What if we reframe energy transitions as a response to 
accountability crises? In order to do so, we must articulate how such 
accountability crises are upheld. What magic is this that keeps them going? 
I argue next that this ‘magic’ manifests as discrete practices of legitimation.
1.2  DeconStructing accountability into practiceS 
of legitimation
I claim above that we know what the problem is, that we know how to 
solve it and yet do little about it, and that this disjuncture constitutes a 
crisis of accountability. Commenting on our contemporary efforts to 
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Nations High Level Political Forum 2018  in New  York, Alex Steffen 
pointed out to the world that in this case, winning slowly is the same as 
losing (also see McKibben 2017), and underscored a predatory delay by 
powerful actors with entrenched interests, both commercial and political. 
Greta Thunberg addressed an audience of the rich in Davos stating that it 
is now time to panic. The IPCC released a special report on keeping global 
warming below 1.5 °C, showing that we have our work cut out and must 
make critical advances by 2030. The exponential climate action roadmap 
2018 highlighted proven technological solutions that already exist and can 
cut our emissions by half every decade till 2050, pointing out policy, polit-
ical will and other blocks as the chief barriers to overcome (Falk et  al. 
2018). But, how can dramatic action proportionate to current drastic cir-
cumstances be enabled, when those in corridors of power do not feel the 
same heat, when the privileged maintain the illusion of time while the 
poor burn in wildfires and suffer climate risk and uncertainty over already 
vulnerable livelihoods? The energy sector has long been regarded as tech-
nical, is often run bureaucratically and technocratically, and is financed in 
deeply entrenched ways that remain far from transparent (Szulecki 
2018)—is the first step towards decarbonising this sector (for decarbonise 
it we must) to bring it into public discourse as something that concerns us 
all, as a sector that we all have a stake in steering together?
These questions have answers. They have long been discussed by envi-
ronmental governance scholars as a matter of accountability in various 
cognate sectors and a range of academic disciplines. Who makes decisions 
about resource use and allocation, and how are they held to account (Kraft 
and Wolf 2018) and by whom? This is partly a question of formal institu-
tional authority—in whom society has vested the power to decide. But the 
world is rarely limited to formal structures alone. Authority is often con-
tested, raw power sometimes prevails and, sometimes, the powerful are 
simply too powerful to be held to account by the standards that might 
appease a moral philosopher (Sareen 2016). And yet, powerful actors and 
organisations always seek ways to legitimate their power to wider publics 
to create a new moral economy in which they can take on the roles of new 
institutional authorities (de Sardan 1999; Sareen 2017). This is not simply 
attributable to some assumed innate desire in these actors to be recognised 
as authoritative; the explanation is simpler. Authority makes it easier for 
power to endure without constantly battling resistance (Scott 1998; 
Sivaramakrishnan 2005).
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tical privilege of being able to claim recognition as the one with the right 
to make important decisions. Ordinary actors have to organise themselves 
and contest against the odds to secure outcomes that go against a systema-
tised norm—this is the stuff of public protest, legal appeals and riots on 
the streets. Institutional authority can claim to uphold the system in exe-
cuting its decisions; it need  only cloak them in the guise of what has 
already been deemed socially acceptable, what is already valid because it is 
an outcome of due process (Ferguson 1990). Power legitimated as author-
ity freezes legitimacy as embodied in action by virtue of the doer, rather 
than as a property of the act itself. The onus is on ordinary actors to vali-
date both their claims and an alternative morality in order to challenge 
particular acts, whereas authoritative institutions use a range of garbs to 
validate acts.
Such a de facto understanding of authority as not being limited to 
traditional formal structures complicates how one understands account-
ability. Emerging scholarship on polycentric climate governance has 
articulated some of the challenges—accountability cannot be construed 
as pertaining solely to the state along some vertical and horizontal rela-
tions within a centralised and delegated governance framework because 
this is not an accurate descriptor of how climate governance is, in fact, 
conducted (Jordan et al. 2018; Bäckstrand and Kuyper 2017). Rather, 
there are many actors in the folds, each hankering after their own version 
of what transitions to sustainability should look like. Intergovernmental 
bodies co-exist with city networks co-exist with aligned interests between 
business and politics co-exist with federated civil society organisations, 
each staking its claims (Coenen et al. 2012). Who is to be held account-
able for what? Each would have its success measured along customised 
metrics that favour its ability to showcase progress on sustainability 
(Kramarz and Park 2016), which runs the risk of double counting many 
successes that actors see as low-hanging fruit while sidelining attention 
to intractable problems nobody wants to be held responsible to address 
(Osofsky 2013).
As with climate governance, so is the case with transitioning energy sec-
tors, albeit these transitions more commonly concern national and regional 
scales rather than global ones. Fossil fuel actors have entrenched interests, 
usually complemented by deep political and financial reach, and many are 
transitioning into leveraged positions in the expanding renewable energy 
sector, which is also populated by new actors such as solar developers. 
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Traditional authorities like ministries are changing their names and struc-
tures, demonstrating a commitment to an energy transition or even an 
ecological transition, responding to and reshaping social imaginaries 
(Tidwell and Tidwell 2018). Regulatory bodies are grappling with more 
complex issues than ever before with the advent of the ‘smart grid’ and 
questions of big data, ownership and privacy alongside energy efficiency, 
dynamic tariffs and prosuming (Sareen and Rommetveit 2019). There is 
emerging excitement linked with energy storage and the prospects of a 
highly flexible grid where electricity can be stored at decentralised nodes, 
opening up options for massive shares of renewable energy sources to be 
integrated into the grid supply mix. This is as complicated and technical as 
it sounds, and traditional authorities do not readily have the expertise at 
hand to deal satisfactorily with these questions, let alone inform and con-
sult the wider public affected by the outcomes of these complex decisions. 
This is the recipe for an accountability crisis if ever there was one—tech-
nology is changing fast, institutional authority is being reconfigured and 
the basis for public oversight is lacking across key aspects of sectoral evolu-
tion (Jasanoff 2018; Delina and Janetos 2018). Energy futures are being 
decided but by whom, and how do those who will be affected—namely, 
the public—hold someone accountable, when both decision-making pro-
cesses and decisions themselves appear to be so fuzzy and fluid?
This book, like Kraft and Wolf (2018), suggests that a closer link 
between legitimacy and accountability will help. What the problem out-
lined above needs is a relational understanding of accountability that 
focuses on relations between entities rather than on essentialist, fixed defi-
nitions of entities themselves (Bouzarovski and Haarstad 2018). Such a 
relational ontology is suitable to the context of fluid authority over 
decision- making and the shifting population of actors described as charac-
terising contemporary energy sectors. How, then, are these relations of 
accountability constituted? In the present definition, this production of 
accountability takes place through discrete acts of legitimation. Practices 
of legitimation thus become relational constituents of accountability. They 
are empirically observable and contestable, as signifiers and enablers of 
deeper changes in institutional authority. A repertoire of these practices 
legitimates new acts and inflects accountability relations. It thereby serves 
as an adjustment mechanism for more embedded institutional logics (e.g., 
modest solar uptake to claim a commitment to sustainability while con-
tinuing reliance on fossil fuels), or as a transformational moment that 
alters these logics (e.g., exponential solar uptake as a response to the 
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emerging new economics of the energy sector). To understand, and even-
tually influence, accountability in transitioning energy sectors, we must, 
therefore, attend to practices of legitimation that embody changing rela-
tions between entities. We can thus examine and reveal in what instances 
and to what extent they signify accountable modes of governance to 
enable sustainable energy transitions or not.
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There is an endless variety of practices of legitimation. But they draw on a 
number of common registers. Four such registers surfaced clearly from 
empirical research on solar energy uptake in Portugal during 2017–2019. 
These empirically derived registers are put forward as a typology of prac-
tices of legitimation. They are:
• Discursive legitimation
• Bureaucratic legitimation
• Technocratic legitimation
• Financial legitimation
Without elaborating the empirical basis for this typology, detailed else-
where (Sareen in review), and without extending the initial foray into the 
Portuguese case, this chapter unpacks each of these four types of practices: 
what do they mean? Furthermore, it puts forward a few preliminary sug-
gestions for how this typology is supported by extant research on account-
ability and legitimacy within environmental governance. Environmental 
governance research has on the whole been rather laggardly in taking up 
the important question of sustainable energy transitions at disaggregated 
scales (Falkner 2014; Smith and Stirling 2010), so this connection between 
its treatment of accountability and legitimacy and their application to the 
energy sector is overdue (Szulecki 2018). It is a task that requires multiple 
perspectives and many person-years of research. This book enlists the sup-
port of select colleagues who have an appreciation of both environmental 
governance and energy transitions scholarship. This chapter kickstarts the 
conversation by laying out the types of practices of legitimation. Then, 
Part II opens with an explanation of the invitation (Chap. 3) issued to the 
authors of five subsequent case chapters, each of which presents a perspec-
tive on accountable governance under energy transitions, drawing on the 
case author’s own empirical research (Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8). The con-
cluding Part III synthesises learning about the analytical usefulness of 
practices of legitimation across the five cases (Chap. 9), then features col-
lective reflection on how future environmental governance scholarship can 
generate analytical insights on accountability (Chap. 10). The book seeks 
both to guide the uptake of accountability within theoretical and applied 
energy transitions research in a broad range of fields and disciplines, and 
to inform strategic action, thereby contributing to both analysing energy 
sector transitions and enabling accountable governance towards 
sustainability.
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With each type of practice of legitimation below, the intent is to fashion 
tools that can deconstruct what acts are being justified and validated (i.e., 
legitimated) by whom, to whom and in what manner. Each type of prac-
tice surfaces a specific register along which it evinces accountability rela-
tions that display commitment to sustainable outcomes. Within any given 
energy sector context, each type of practice is empirically observable to a 
sufficient degree to identify specific problem areas, accountability lacunae, 
scope for further gains and to challenge claims, and to pose normative 
questions of who gets to decide, and who should be consulted or other-
wise involved.
2.1  Discursive Legitimation
Discursive legitimation refers to a set of practices that normalise certain 
perspectives over others through textual and spoken interventions across a 
variety of forums. These forums range from highly technical discussions 
among a narrow group of actors to mainstream debates for audiences as 
wide as the general public in the pages of national newspapers. Practices of 
legitimation manifest in many ways on these platforms: speaking in favour 
of one choice over another, thus advocating for something; referring to 
some things as commonplace and thereby stabilising them as a public 
imaginary; talking down some possibilities as being a threat to other desir-
able outcomes, thus creating or strengthening cognitive links; repeating 
the need for something as a matter of social necessity and thereby building 
public support for it; and dismissing some options as wishful thinking 
uninformed by reality, thus tightening the discursive space that might 
allow their propagation. These practices are all relational in the sense that 
they are enacted by actors in relation to audiences, and also because they 
position ideas in specific relation to other ideas.
A politician backing continued reliance on fossil fuels may, for instance, 
decry renewable energy sources as posing a debt burden on the public. A 
federation of solar energy developers may issue a statement against this, 
pointing out that they are able to compete with coal thermal plants with-
out any public subsidies. Coal thermal plant owners may lobby national 
regulators to maintain the status quo in the energy sector, which has his-
torically rewarded their power source as relatively ‘reliable’. Energy mar-
ket analysts may point out that this logic has changed, as greater 
interconnections between electric grids allow for more flexibility in energy 
sources. Those concerned with energy security might contend that more 
2 A TYPOLOGY OF PRACTICES OF LEGITIMATION TO CATEGORISE… 
18
interconnections pose a threat to sovereignty due to increased reliance on 
neighbouring countries. Geopolitical experts might counter this argument 
by pointing out that greater interdependency can in fact foster regional 
cooperation. Each of these actors would be articulating their particular 
interests in relation to other competing or complementary perspectives, 
picking platforms and orders of worth that favour their message or ones 
that are crucial for securing particular desirable outcomes (von Benda- 
Beckmann 1981; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Patriotta et al. 2011), be 
it parliamentary hearings, newspaper columns, online blogs, public con-
sultations on new sectoral policies, electoral rallies, thematic conferences, 
annual expos or even urban festivals.
What makes these practices relevant for the examination of account-
ability in energy transition is that they lend themselves to empirical study 
(Moezzi et al. 2017). They allow a contextualised appreciation of different 
actors’ interests and how they articulate them in a disaggregated manner. 
This extends to actors within organisations as well, as a given organisation 
rarely consistently represents a single perspective on a complex issue such 
as energy transition. If one understands energy sector governance as com-
prising an assemblage of actors (cf. Rose 1999)—governmental institu-
tions, emerging authorities such as ad hoc commissions for specialised 
decisions, private companies, citizen associations, administrative bodies—
then practices of discursive legitimation offer insight into the numerous 
and shifting relations between this diverse mix of actors. Tweets by a key 
decision-maker, for instance, have lately emerged as a new way to keep up 
with the latest developments in a fast-changing sector, and offer new 
opportunities for public responsiveness—key figures can note and respond 
directly to comments by ordinary individuals—while also providing 
insight into the views of individuals within formal organisations (Morgan 
et al. 2018). Discursive legitimation is also susceptible to hegemonic ten-
dencies—particular accounts can ‘go viral’ and spread rapidly, often exer-
cising significant influence by shaping readers’ or listeners’ perceptions. 
Meanwhile, more detailed and often better substantiated claims such as 
those in academic articles can remain largely disregarded even by key 
decision- makers who usually have busy schedules and little time to access 
paywalled manuscripts that use heavy language.
Practices of discursive legitimation thus play a key role in energy transi-
tion: validating particular acts and shoring up the credibility of institu-
tional authorities and their decisions against critique; issuing challenges to 
specific decisions and even decision-making processes and suggesting 
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alternatives, thus opening up space for debate and the emergence of com-
peting actors; and closing down particular claims by pointing to counter-
vailing accounts, often more established ones with some formal backing. 
Observation and analysis of which actors legitimate what sort of action 
and on what basis, which actors level competing claims, and the platforms 
they pick to address specific target audiences, can furnish a telling picture 
of a given energy transition. Is it driven by a culture of informed public 
engagement, healthy debate, friendly critique and an effort at reflexive 
learning by authoritative institutions in the sector? Or are there several 
opposing camps, with those currently in a position of authority trying to 
maintain the status quo and others challenging their authority, vying to 
constitute their own authority, or to simply improve their position within 
structural limits they dare not challenge?
Discursive legitimation provides insight into this power interplay pre-
cisely because it serves as a means by which actors legitimate their own 
positions and decisions (Haarstad et al. 2018). In an ideal world, it enables 
deliberation along democratic lines to institute accountability in the man-
ner in which energy transitions are discussed and implemented (Späth and 
Rohracher 2010). Deliberative democracy remains hard to obtain in most 
political contexts, and a technical sector like energy hardly lends itself eas-
ily to informed public debate and engagement. Given its bureaucratic, 
often top-down history, a transition in this sector faces a real challenge to 
engender energy democracy, with the norm having long been to leave 
decision-making in the hands of narrow groups of experts (Sareen 2018). 
Examining discursive legitimation, then, is a sound approach to also iden-
tify specific opportunities to build public accountability into energy 
transitions.
2.2  Bureaucratic Legitimation
Bureaucratic legitimation pertains to practices, often codified and sequen-
tial, that validate some actions and actors and limit the range of possibili-
ties for other actors. Readers will be familiar with bureaucracy as a particular 
method of ensuring conformity with existing laws and regulations 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002). For instance, actors might have to furnish 
proof of a certain competence or qualification in order to secure approval 
necessary to take on a formal role, operate a private enterprise or maintain 
access to public services. Bureaucracy is ubiquitous; it is part of the para-
phernalia of daily life whereby we conduct our everyday affairs. It also 
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serves essential functions within society and is inevitable. But the flip side 
is that it accretes redundant requirements, conditions that are an artefact 
of old ways but remain embedded in current protocols due to inadequate 
adaptiveness by an organisation during sectoral change. Actors who have 
to meet such bureaucratic residue might protest and push for a change in 
formal requirements, an update, or they might find themselves in a posi-
tion where they are unable to appeal due to limited time, financial where-
withal or a legal framework that, in turn, poses its own bureaucratic 
challenges. Authorities imposing bureaucratic requirements are often 
painfully well aware of the privilege their position accords them; depend-
ing on internal mechanisms to ensure checks and balances, particular indi-
viduals might even seek to abuse this privilege for personal gain, which is 
usually referred to as petty corruption.
There are several other aspects to bureaucratic legitimation (cf. 
Suchman 1995), such as a likely bias in favour of incumbent actors, and 
against emergent actors, on whom falls the onus to validate themselves 
and fulfil numerous existing requirements—to learn the rules of the game 
(Geels and Schot 2007). This is a potentially desirable trait in a well- 
functioning system to ensure system reliability and security, but poses 
challenges when change is imperative as in the case of energy transitions to 
address the urgent climate challenge. Several other relational tendencies 
also surface: there are likely to be information flow asymmetries, as prac-
tices in most sectors and contexts tend to feature a partially informal com-
ponent. There is a risk that bureaucratic processes will extend processing 
time for critical decisions (Crawford 2015), lowering policy visibility dur-
ing sectoral change and disadvantaging actors who are worst affected by 
ensuing uncertainty. And there is a further question concerning time and 
positionality: those who are well placed to devise bureaucratic require-
ments have often been closely acquainted with a sector for a long period, 
and hence, their embodied memory is of a certain mode of conducting 
affairs that is liable to often resemble business as usual (Sareen 2018; 
Szeman 2013). The bureaucratic mechanisms they proffer might thus 
favour the status quo and incumbent actors, allowing tacit bias to creep in. 
This risk is exacerbated by the fact that entrenched actors often occupy key 
positions from which to lobby and influence decision-makers in their sec-
tor; they can challenge and effectively quash protests from emergent actors 
by pointing to their superior experience and historically stellar credentials. 
When changes do come about, such actors can again leverage their posi-
tions to modulate what new bureaucratic frameworks are put in play 
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(Grandin and Sareen in review). This not only equips them with a poten-
tial information advantage, it also suggests that key actors can orchestrate 
sectoral change to unfold in a manner that works to their advantage over 
others without being held to account for their self-serving exercise of 
undue influence.
For instance, during energy sector transitions, solar developers might 
find themselves faced with the need to secure a number of different 
licences: to lease land for up to three decades, to conduct basic environ-
mental impact assessments, to access grid infrastructure, to import solar 
modules and to gain the right to provide a certain quantum of stable sup-
ply to the electric grid over a stated period or to enter into bilateral con-
tracts with users, to mention a few examples. These constitute practices of 
bureaucratic legitimation, and actors who are unable to navigate such 
demands might find themselves shut out from being able to participate as 
solar developers. An appropriate amount of bureaucratic process is impor-
tant to secure requisite oversight over a number of interlocked functions 
in a technical sector like energy (Sareen and Kale 2018); a well-conceived 
bureaucratic system can feature in-built corrective measures that function 
as accountability mechanisms, internalised checks and balances. But what 
complicates matters is when bureaucratic requirements display overly zeal-
ous reach or are simply biased towards or against a particular technology 
or set of actors—especially emerging ones who tend to have less social 
capital—to an extent that interferes with the efficient functioning of 
the sector.
Sometimes such bureaucratic interference is expressly permitted and 
justified on normative grounds—renewable energy may be permitted to 
go ahead up to a certain component of the total energy supply, so as to 
meet clean energy targets as a percentage of the grid mix, consequently 
loosening up bureaucratic requirements for renewable producers up to 
this target. Yet, normative commitments are not always clearly articu-
lated—fossil fuels are accorded numerous subsidies, both historically in 
terms of existing energy infrastructure and directly at present, to an extent 
that other sources would find it impossible to secure through any number 
of bureaucratic processes (Asmelash 2015). Bureaucratic preferences are 
not always easy to discern. Wholesale energy trading markets, for instance, 
follow bureaucratic sets of rules that have evolved historically in energy 
sectors with relatively small components of renewable energy, and as this 
proportion changes, the rules do not necessarily change in ways that are 
optimal for the grid or fair in terms of their effects on various actors, not 
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least on the citizens and users whom the energy sector should serve in a 
manner responsive to their evolving needs. As part of energy transitions, 
these could include regulatory frameworks for individuals and communi-
ties to prosume and receive appropriate compensation for power sold to 
the grid from rooftop solar panels.
Studying such practices of bureaucratic legitimation can be challeng-
ing, but is an essential component of identifying whether and how energy 
transitions can proceed with public accountability (Kalkuhl et  al. 2013; 
Saltzstein 1979). Such examination must often be undertaken in several 
locations across multiple scales (Krause and Meier 2005)—down the cor-
ridors of power where bureaucracy is executed; in policy documents, 
where its formal contours are delineated; by listening to the accounts of 
actors who claim they are marginalised; through attention to emergent 
material changes that open new possibilities and how these possibilities are 
bureaucratised; and by triangulating between the various concurrent 
changes in bureaucratic requirements during sectoral evolution (Sareen 
and Kale 2018). Where such examination uncovers bureaucratic media-
tion that forecloses opportunities for energy transition to aid decarbonisa-
tion and social equity, these practices can be specifically challenged to 
build accountability gains within specific contexts of energy transition.
2.3  technocratic Legitimation
Technocratic legitimation refers to a set of practices that perform system-
atic checks and approval of actions that entail technical expertise. This is 
distinct from bureaucratic legitimation in that it extends beyond filling 
forms or ticking boxes to secure validation from a designated authority, to 
a practice that is itself substantive along the same register as the action that 
it evaluates for approval. This requires some clarification: practices of tech-
nocratic legitimation devise a method to assess whether specific actions by 
specific actors should be permitted or not, and this method itself exhibits 
a certain element of sophistication in order to lend credibility to the 
approval as something that takes place after due consideration of the tech-
nicalities involved.
Energy transitions raise many highly technical questions that require 
expert knowledge and do not always have existing scientific consensus 
around one answer. There may be several possibilities and a basis is needed 
to determine which ones to permit and prioritise, and which actors should 
be in charge of executing them and on what basis (Chilvers and Longhurst 
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2016). An important but relatively easy to resolve example is that of the 
debate between 80 and 100 per cent renewable energy-based systems. 
While there is still some disagreement on the possibility of complete decar-
bonisation despite highly detailed analyses of an impressive number of 
actual contexts in which this should work, it does not complicate too 
many current decisions, as most energy systems are well short of even 80 
per cent renewable energy sources; hence, decisions can be made to decar-
bonise rapidly, and the question of the final 20 per cent can be resolved 
later in the energy transition (Jacobson and Delucchi 2009). A more com-
plicated question and one that does require technocratic legitimation is 
whether a given quantum of new renewable energy capacity can be 
installed in a decentralised manner and added to an existing electric grid 
infrastructure. It is important not to overload transmission capacity 
beyond what the grid can withstand to ensure reliable energy supply and 
to consider the basis for ‘curtailment’, which refers to letting surplus 
power generation simply go unused, or to shutting it down when it runs 
into grid capacity constraints. Before giving the go-ahead to a number of 
solar projects, an energy regulator or national ministry would be keen to 
ensure that the terms on which this new capacity is installed are clear to 
everyone concerned, marking a clear instance of a case for technocratic 
legitimation. This is crucial not only to enable energy transitions, but to 
safeguard citizens against unreliable energy services and debt burdens in 
case support schemes are not designed to have equitable effects, as well as 
to prevent losses to the public exchequer, utilities and developers due to 
inadequate attention to aspects like grid stability and coordination.
This presents an interesting challenge for accountability in energy tran-
sitions. When matters are technical, they can hardly be left up to some sort 
of popular vote, as the public is rarely sufficiently knowledgeable to weigh 
in usefully on matters of such sophistication. But simply entrusting them 
to experts risks eventual public backlash, especially in contemporary con-
texts of rising distrust against authority and the rule of experts; history 
also bears evidence to the risk of elite capture and large-scale corruption 
under such conditions (cf. Lennon 2017). Practices of technocratic legiti-
mation present a reasonable compromise—devising a relatively sophisti-
cated system to secure technically appropriate decisions, but with an 
element of checks and balances and the participation of multiple types of 
actors who can hold each other accountable. Examples include standing 
committees, special taskforces and other such ad hoc measures; also more 
institutionalised mechanisms such as stringent public procurement rules, 
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well-defined guidelines for public tenders to ensure competitive bidding 
on various contracts, and algorithms that automate the allocation of par-
ticular opportunities to actors who best fulfil pre-specified and publicised 
criteria to secure optimal performance.
Yet, both ad hoc and more embedded mechanisms, when situated 
within a temporal perspective, can be appreciated as facing risks of co- 
optation and being reduced to an empty shell without securing the very 
accountable outcomes that their technocratic components are ostensibly 
put in place to ensure (Hendriks 2009). Actors often move between key 
organisations in the same sector over time, and collegial and personal net-
works overlap in complex ways that render secrecy almost impossible, so 
upcoming changes in assessment or selection routines often set off pre- 
emptive adjustments within organisations that are in the loop, even before 
they are formally announced (Hargreaves et al. 2013). Moreover, sectoral 
contexts often feature limited expertise within a region or country; hence, 
expertise is subcontracted in to furnish inputs for terms of reference. This 
again courts the risk that some well-networked actors may be tipped off in 
advance of any technocratic legitimation procedures and maximise their 
chances over competitors.
Probing these relational practices of technocratic legitimation in con-
crete instances can generate and advance a technically robust and politi-
cally informed understanding of energy transitions. Technocratic 
legitimation is perhaps most visible at times when a sector undergoes rapid 
change, as effort-intensive mechanisms are put in place to enable change 
while simultaneously maintaining stability (Pellizzoni 2011). Over time, 
these practices tend to be absorbed into reconfigured systemic practices 
and become part of bureaucratic legitimation, which is more routinised 
and embedded within existing organisational functions. In this sense, 
practices of technocratic legitimation offer a raw, direct opportunity to 
shape energy futures towards decarbonisation and enhancement of social 
equity—by examining, critiquing and adjusting specific practices, it is pos-
sible to impact how the energy sector reorientates itself in relation to cur-
rent changes. This translation function, between experts who are entrusted 
with framing and conducting technocratic legitimation and the public 
whose interests they should in principle safeguard, is one that researchers 
and analysts are well equipped to weigh in on (Fischer 1993). Those who 
inform themselves of the empirics of technocratic legitimation in a sectoral 
context can credibly provide policymakers with inputs on specific  measures 
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they should establish in order to move energy transitions towards sustain-
ability, with a clear basis in evidence.
2.4  FinanciaL Legitimation
Financial legitimation pertains to practices, often spatially remote and 
materially elusive, that enable actors to either block out scope for action, 
or to fulfil financial requirements and proceed with material actions in 
order to retain relevance within a sectoral context. They are perhaps the 
most crucial and telltale signifier of the characteristics of an energy transi-
tion—which actors are able to secure financial legitimation, through which 
practices, for what activities? By structuring the fields of action, capital and 
access to credit quite directly shape energy transitions (Hess 2014); thus, 
the practices that make up financial legitimation indirectly capture the 
core of any sectoral change. One of the refrains iterated by international 
agencies trying to steer towards rapid global decarbonisation and equita-
ble access to energy has been the need to make much more capital avail-
able for universal access to clean energy (also see Polzin et al. 2017); the 
global divestment movement is trying to push money out of fossil fuel 
energy to secure contractions of carbon-intensive sources and accelerate 
investment in renewable energy (Healy and Barry 2017).
Practices of financial legitimation thus render explicit the relevance of 
spatial and scalar connections. But what practices are observable and how 
can their study contribute towards more accountable energy transitions? 
At the household or individual scale, germane issues include determining 
the appropriate levels of compensation for flexibility added to the grid 
based on distributed storage, as batteries become affordable and electric 
vehicles proliferate, as well as disincentives to prevent users from loading 
the grid during peak demand periods (Sareen and Rommetveit 2019). 
Several aspects of financial legitimation can in fact be studied in great 
empirical detail: what are the challenges actors have to face in securing 
financial backing to install and operate different energy sources; how do 
these requirements vary across sources; how are these financial parameters 
set and by which authority? For instance, renewable energy projects face a 
rather different challenge than fossil fuel projects. Most of their lifetime 
project costs are concentrated up front: procurement of licences, land and 
infrastructure. Once equipment is set up and grid connected, operating 
costs are negligible compared to coal or gas thermal plants which consume 
a great deal of fuel throughout their lifespan, fuel that additionally often 
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has to be brought in from afar. Yet renewable energy projects are often 
characterised as variable sources and have up to recently faced considerable 
scepticism from financial institutions regarding their future revenue flows, 
making it relatively expensive to secure investment capital (Kim and 
Park 2016).
With the rapid decrease in costs of both wind and, especially, solar 
energy technologies, these dynamics have begun to shift, and even large 
fossil fuel majors are beginning to leverage their portfolios with some 
investments in clean energy. But the challenges are significantly different 
for relatively small entrants to the energy sector who do not have as much 
financial weight. By contrast, shell companies have also begun to emerge 
rapidly as vehicles for speculative financial investments in renewable energy 
projects. How to maintain an energy sector that remains open to smaller 
actors while also safeguarding against potentially risky short-term players 
is a challenge that can only be resolved through a keen appreciation of 
various practices of financial legitimation (Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2018).
Even tracking these observable practices, however, uncovers only the 
tip of the proverbial iceberg. When it comes to energy finance, there is 
little transparency, with large sums and many international organisations 
involved, leveraging their presence across several different legal regimes 
including global tax havens. There are thus intrinsic problems to contend 
with to usher accountability into financial legitimation, and part of the 
task is to better visualise these global metabolisms at lower scales like the 
urban and national (Goodman and Marshall 2018). Many cities, regions 
and countries have begun to track their territorial emissions and set targets 
at lower scales, including sector specific ones. It is possible that such 
attempts will be accompanied by fees on high carbon emitters and mass 
mobilisation of greater investment in renewable energy. Many such initia-
tives have already been promoted in recent years, but these attempts at 
alternative financial legitimation have faced stiff resistance in most parts of 
the world, most notably from the powerful and well-funded fossil fuel 
lobby that such practices, if successful, directly threaten.
Financial legitimation extends beyond project finance. These practices 
are also embedded within other processes intrinsic to the everyday opera-
tion of the energy sector, such as wholesale and retail market trade. On the 
wholesale market, fossil fuels such as gas secure high returns due to their 
flexibility, being available ‘on demand’, whereas market designs do not 
always favour renewable energy sources as their percentage of the total 
supply mix increases rapidly (Ueckerdt et al. 2015). This again is a  question 
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of what characteristics are seen as worth rewarding financially, and whether 
the decision is made by default or based on exhaustive public discussion. 
Likewise on the retail market, rules vary vastly across countries in terms of 
how much actors such as households and communities can benefit from 
installing small-scale solar capacity. Another practice of financial legitima-
tion embedded both deeply and historically in the energy sector pertains 
to investments in energy infrastructure, often made from the public purse, 
with major consequences for which actors and what energy sources gain 
support (Jerneck 2017). This support includes both being able to sell 
electricity to the grid and lowering costs for the energy producer, for 
instance by co-financing thermal power plant infrastructure by the sea to 
enable easy access to international coal shipments, a common practice that 
supports one of the highest carbon emitting sources. Studying the manner 
in which these issues of financial legitimation are discussed and settled, as 
well as whom they favour and penalise, can generate key insights into the 
nature of energy transitions.
Overall, then, practices of financial legitimation are possibly the tricki-
est to interrogate empirically; doing so is, nonetheless, vital in order to 
identify the points that warrant the most critical attention for moving 
towards accountable energy transitions. These practices take place across 
the spatial scale, but their effects are materialised in the sector, and various 
reporting mechanisms and mandates as well as investigations by civil soci-
ety watchdogs render overall trends visible. When it comes to specific 
actors in a given context, the contrasting demands that financial legitima-
tion places on them can often be clearly explicated, and serve as a basis to 
challenge and contest practices that maintain power differentials in favour 
of business as usual. Unpacking this can ease the way for financially com-
petitive renewable energy sources to expand rapidly in a market made 
more even by bringing accountability into energy sector transitions.
2.5  Linking hoLLow anD suBstantive 
accountaBiLity with sustainaBiLity outcomes
The articulation of the four types of practices of legitimation that relation-
ally constitute accountability, or the lack of it, in energy sector transitions, 
paves the way for the final step of the argument in Part I. Overall, any 
given transition comprises these practices, which can be disaggregated 
into performances of substantive or hollow accountability. At a 
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 disaggregated level, most acts can be empirically and relationally catego-
rised as aiding or opposing interlinked shifts towards decarbonisation and 
social equity under energy transition.
Acts that aid such shifts, and are held to account by practices of legiti-
mation in order to secure a durable outcome of this nature, can be charac-
terised as contributing to a sustainable energy transition. This is a case 
where practices of legitimation constitute substantive accountability rela-
tions. Conversely, acts that oppose such shifts are not substantively held to 
account by practices of legitimation in the service of sustainable outcomes 
(Blühdorn 2013). Rather, they are supported by practices of legitimation 
that constitute a performance of hollow accountability; they support the 
persistence or even expansion of unsustainable outcomes in the 
energy sector.
It follows that practices of legitimation provide the basis for a relational 
toolkit to identify substantive and hollow accountability through empirical 
study of energy sector transitions. This fine-grained evidencing and analy-
sis of the practices that constitute energy transitions can inform academics, 
and in turn policymakers, practitioners and the public, about acts that 
support sustainability and those that hold us back from it. Wielded well, 
this pickaxe can equip citizens with evidence for their own urgent axes to 
grind and create a strong push for public accountability to be instituted 
into energy transitions towards sustainability.
This intent—to contribute to rapid decarbonisation of our energy sys-
tems and deeply change whom they benefit, thus addressing climate 
change drivers and safeguarding public interest—is a guiding beacon. The 
logical next step after propounding a typology of practices of legitimation 
is to understand how to situate such an approach within scholarship on 
energy transitions, so that it can render accountability crises visible in con-
textualised ways that inform and enable action. To open up space for sus-
tainable outcomes through more accountable governance of energy 
transitions, it is relevant to take point of departure in the variety of ways in 
which scholarship on environmental governance approaches accountabil-
ity in energy transitions. The five case chapters in Part II capture a wide 
range of cases and different disciplinary perspectives.
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CHAPTER 3
Five Easy Pieces: Legitimation at Work 
in Cases Related to Energy Transitions
Siddharth Sareen
Abstract This chapter provides an overview of five energy transition cases 
by describing the questions posed to five authors to guide the flow of 
argument in their chapters and summarising case treatments with respect 
to accountability and legitimation. It links four proposed practices of legit-
imation with analytical takes on wide-ranging cases. The cases span urban 
energy transitions over time and space in Germany, forest and land con-
flicts over authority in Indonesia, urban climate targets based on carbon 
metrics in Norway, the modalities of Nordic electric mobility transitions, 
and biodiversity conservation and energy extraction in the USA. Pinpointing 
the relevance of each case to legitimation, this chapter explicates how 
questions of accountability are germane to how the energy transitions 
associated with these cases impact sustainability.
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It is imperative that we bear in mind the deep variation in how energy 
transitions are experienced by different actors, and that their ability to 
exercise their stakes in the outcomes differs by orders of magnitude. Part 
I reframed energy transitions as a response to accountability crises, decon-
structed accountability into practices of legitimation and presented a 
typology of those practices. The cases in Part II surface a number of com-
plex spatiotemporal conjunctures and deconstruct the climate and energy 
crises entangled therein.
If even privileged academics at Global North institutions, well- 
resourced and relatively free to choose our own research themes, were to 
shy away from attempts to mobilise knowledge to inform and steer action 
and hold power accountable, it would spell little hope for sustainable 
futures. These cases, and the collaborative project ensconcing them, con-
stitute an argument that we can in fact make a meaningful difference, that 
we have a crucial role to play in making energy transitions accountable and 
directed towards sustainable outcomes. This is our contribution to make 
in addressing the climate crisis for those at risk today to have livable futures.
Accordingly, this middle section of the book provides short overviews 
of cases relevant to energy transitions in a variety of sectors and regions, 
with a focus on legitimation and accountability in the governance of envi-
ronmental change. Each of the five chapters is authored by an accom-
plished environmental governance scholar working on energy transition 
cases and kindred subjects. Each has reframed their work on a particular 
case in terms of crises of accountability and practices of legitimation. The 
following questions guide their independently composed individual 
responses and constitute a general flow of argument:
• What is the case and why is it an energy transitions case?
• What crises of accountability are being maintained or challenged?
• How do environmental governance scholars characterise the case?
• What practices of legitimation appear to be at play in empirical work?
• What interventions could enable sustainable outcomes under 
transition?
Timothy Moss draws on the governance of urban energy infrastructure 
across time and space to unpack the changing relationship between energy 
transitions, accountability and practices of legitimation across the formi-
dable range of contextual variation in Berlin over the past century. His 
historical analysis of accountability in the changing contexts that drove 
 S. SAREEN
37
energy transitions in this city over the course of a century of political flux 
surfaces many potent concerns. Among these is the difficulty of evaluating 
past transitions in relation to sustainability, which only appeared in its 
familiar current form from the 1970s onwards and has gained notable 
attention beyond academia even more recently, mainly in the twenty-first 
century. He also foregrounds that accountability crises are not a new con-
cern but rather have deep roots. What is new, in this sense, is the relevance 
of sustainability as a concern linked with energy transitions, which directs 
our attention in this book to accountability crises that are only beginning 
to be sufficiently recognised. Moss’ historical analysis of Berlin’s energy 
transitions, moreover, emphasises the context specificity of accountability 
as relationally negotiated within a spatiotemporally shifting and histori-
cally contingent political economy.
Christian Lund probes a case of forest and land conflict that is, at base, 
about struggles over authority and accountability. He considers the gen-
erative potential of an accountability lens when applied to questions of 
land governance that remain under-addressed in energy transitions schol-
arship. In his handling, authority is relationally and reflexively construed, 
through active and tacit contestations between competing actors. Rather 
than a state and non-state binary, governance here revolves around ques-
tions of claims to statehood and their recognition at multiple scales. 
Citizens seek to have their claims met by recognising the state at the more 
local village scale rather than a distant central government and, in doing 
so, try to reconfigure relations of power and authority. Power is unequally 
distributed, but its legitimation is necessarily contingent, and is what 
bestows an organisation with institutional authority to control resources 
in more persistent ways that can subdue resistance. In Lund’s telling, this 
contingency is revealed as an opportunity for hitherto marginalised actors 
to not only vye over resources but to orchestrate a redefinition of where 
authority resides, and thereby of the state itself.
Håvard Haarstad examines the problematic of setting targets for carbon 
emission reduction at the urban scale both in general and specifically in 
Norway in terms of its pitfalls as well as potential. He first sets up a case for 
debunking urban climate and energy targets as the vanity projects of 
street-smart local politicians—the targets do not seem to be achievable 
and policies to realise them are not systematically deployed. Then he takes 
a step back to point out that the very act of target-setting has performative 
and discursive power, it imbues actors with the ability to point at a goal 
and orchestrate ambitious actions around it that might otherwise have 
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failed to get off the ground. This normalising of mitigation targets in vari-
ous forms at the urban scale, in Haarstad’s rendering, enables energy tran-
sitions. It does so by establishing new accountability relations in a 
graduated manner that imbricates them within existing routines of 
decision- making and configurations of power. For strategies to legitimate 
carbon reduction, discretion may well be the better part of confrontation 
in shifting policy-making over vital domains to the urban scale for imple-
mentation in line with climate target creep.
Benjamin Sovacool bases his reflections on engagement with electric 
vehicle roll-out in the five Nordic countries, a region that is in the global 
lead on this energy infrastructure and mobility decarbonisation transition. 
Drawing on an impressive range of empirical material, this case highlights 
the many urgent reasons for a shift to electric mobility. It engages closely 
with the materiality and political economic dynamics of how this transi-
tion actually pans out in order to throw into relief how electric mobility 
alone can hardly address the problems it is commonly portrayed as resolv-
ing; these problems are deeply embedded within systems of mobility 
themselves. Sovacool flags unfolding accountability crises linked with 
inequitable access to electric vehicles, exclusionary and elitist planning, 
global externalities, and exacerbated social vulnerabilities. The chapter 
problematises the perpetuation of car-centric mobility alongside planning 
centred on public transport electrification and points to the perils and 
promises of how roll-out interfaces with electric grid flexibility and the 
integration of renewable energy sources. His treatment spans sectoral 
actors from national authorities to vehicle dealerships and from those 
affected by extraction to those buying Teslas, in keeping with an apprecia-
tion of accountability relations as multi-scalar, multi-sited, polycentric and 
amorphous in a sectoral layering of regimes.
Steven Wolf thinks through a case of dysfunctional habitat exchange 
markets around the sage-grouse in Colorado to interrogate the construc-
tion of hollow accountability. On the one hand, science-based assessment 
presents energy extractive industries with clear costs associated with oil 
and gas extraction activities so as to compensate for the displacement of 
this endangered species by provisioning for habitat replacement. 
Institutional orchestration creates the requisite paraphernalia around this, 
including actors to execute compensatory habitat exchange, a quantifica-
tion tool and a market to facilitate these transactions. On the other hand, 
power trumps substantive assessment, as the extractive majors refuse to 
entertain the estimated costs and the habitat exchange fails to record a 
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single transaction. Wolf argues that these developments are rightly 
understood as situated within accompanying changes at the federal and 
state levels pertaining to regulation and political dynamics. Rather than 
a case of abject failure, he reads it as the construction of requisite institu-
tions to exercise accountability mechanisms that render energy extrac-
tion and biodiversity conservation not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
given political will and future enabling policy. This cross-sectoral analysis 
raises questions of legitimacy for the evolution of the energy sector in 
the American West, evidencing a lack of credibility to claims of energy 
transition.
After the five case chapters comes Part III, which comprises editorial 
reflections and a co-authored concluding synthesis. It takes a step back to 
revisit the cases at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter 9 draws out the 
various registers where practices of legitimation are at work in each case. 
Chapter 10 demonstrates application of the practices of legitimation 
within dimensions that are present in the five cases and highlights oppor-
tunities to cross-fertilise scholarship on energy transitions and environ-
mental governance. Part III thus brings together openings in the fields 
that are broached by the case chapters and by the framing of the book. 
With this in mind, the reader is invited into the wide-ranging world of 
energy transitions over the course of Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
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CHAPTER 4
Historicising Accountability: Berlin’s Energy 
Transitions
Timothy Moss
Abstract This chapter explores accountability and energy transitions 
through the lens of historical analysis. It reinterprets empirical research on 
the history of Berlin’s energy systems to illustrate how accountability and 
legitimacy are political constructs of a particular time and place. Three 
periods of reconfiguration to urban electricity and gas networks, chosen 
from across Berlin’s turbulent past century, illustrate this diversity. The 
chapter outlines each selected case and its pertinence to energy account-
ability. It then describes what crisis of accountability was prevalent in each 
instance and its treatment in the literature. The practices of legitimation 
enrolled to justify energy strategies are subsequently highlighted, as are 
forms of resistance and attempts to delegitimise the dominant discourse. 
The conclusion summarises the implications of historicising accountability 
for energy transitions research.
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4.1  What Is the Case and Why Is It an energy 
transItIons Case?
This chapter explores ways of contextualising accountability and account-
ability crises, both temporally and spatially. Using the case of Berlin over 
the past 100 years, it aspires to enrich debate on accountability in energy 
transitions—the focus of this book—by reflecting on historical precedents 
that can challenge some ‘presentist’ assumptions underpinning much of 
this work. Following the editor’s invitation (Sareen 2019), I reframe 
ongoing and published research on Berlin’s multiple energy transitions 
(Moss 2014, 2016; Becker et al. 2017) in terms of crises of accountability 
and practices of legitimation. In doing so, I hope to sensitise future 
research on this topic to the importance of time and space. The underlying 
question guiding the chapter is: how can historicising accountability con-
tribute to our understanding of energy transitions and ways of 
researching them?
Berlin lends itself to such an analysis in part because accountability has, 
today, become a key issue of contention over the future of the city’s energy 
infrastructures (Becker et al. 2015, 2017; Blanchet 2015). Over the past 
decade, criticism of the city’s electricity and gas utilities, which were both 
fully privatised during the 1990s, has targeted not only their reluctance to 
embrace the low carbon agenda but also—significantly—their resistance to 
public scrutiny and the democratisation of decision-making processes. A 
local referendum to remunicipalise Berlin’s electricity grid narrowly failed in 
November 2013, but the campaign generated two social movements. These 
have since managed to reframe energy policy debates in the city around 
issues of accountability, participation and transparency. The first is the Berlin 
Energy Roundtable (Berliner Energietisch), a coalition of approximately 50 
environmental, leftist and anti-gentrification organisations that calls for a 
democratic, ecologically oriented and socially just ‘citizens’ utility’. The sec-
ond is an energy cooperative, Citizen Energy Berlin (BürgerEnergie Berlin), 
that is at least partly owned by a collective of consumers. Pressure from 
both organisations has succeeded in changing the city government’s policy, 
which in its current red–red–green complexion has established a small pub-
licly owned energy utility in direct competition with the incumbent 
Vattenfall. This utility—Berlin Energie—is designed to be more account-
able not only to local politicians but also to local energy consumers.
While restricting attention to this ongoing experiment in urban energy 
democracy would be revealing enough about how accountability is being 
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framed and institutionalised today, it would say nothing about the histori-
cal context of energy accountability in the city. What makes Berlin inter-
esting in this context are the different kinds of energy transition it has 
witnessed during its turbulent recent history. In the course of the past 100 
years, Berlin has experienced political regimes of unparalleled range—from 
democratic to fascist to state-socialist—that each tried to mould urban 
energy policy in their own image. It is these multiple energy transitions, 
rather than the one, low carbon energy transition of today, which are the 
empirical focus of this chapter. The task is to compare the current with 
earlier phases of energy transition (in senso lato) in order to reveal how 
accountability has been variously invoked and what practices of legitima-
tion have been enrolled to justify action.
The challenges of this venture are considerable. Apart from investigat-
ing energy transitions very different to the one pursued today, the societal 
norms framing both form and content of legitimacy (cf. Bäckstrand et al. 
2018) underwent massive shifts during the course of the twentieth cen-
tury. Accountability under National Socialism was not about the govern-
ment serving the people, but the people serving Führer and Volk. In East 
Germany, the Socialist Unity Party established itself as the steward of the 
working class to which all citizens should pay obeisance. These extreme 
examples illustrate how much accountability and legitimacy are political 
constructs of their time, and indeed, of specific places. Although focusing 
on such undemocratic regimes could be instructive, this chapter instead 
selects examples of urban energy transitions drawn from Berlin’s more 
democratically constituted governance systems, in order to generate find-
ings of greater relevance to most contexts today. Three periods of transi-
tion have been chosen: (1) creating model municipal energy utilities for 
the new Greater Berlin in the 1920s, (2) sustaining energy autarky in an 
isolated West Berlin during the Cold War and (3) democratising urban 
energy governance in the city today. As argued later, they constitute cases 
of the politics of distribution, protection and representation, respectively.
4.2  What CrIses of aCCountabIlIty are beIng 
MaIntaIned or Challenged?
The crisis of accountability in 1920s Berlin revolved around who should be 
responsible for supplying the burgeoning metropolitan area with public 
services, including electricity and gas. Prior to 1920, Berlin was geograph-
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ically minute, surrounded by powerful bourgeois-led municipalities that 
had successfully resisted amalgamation, thanks to the restrictive suffrage in 
Prussia. The large cities around Berlin each had their own energy utilities, 
which they zealously protected. The German revolution of 1918–1919 
and the introduction of universal suffrage opened the floodgates for social-
ist schemes that were geared to substantiate the promise of democracy 
with more equitable and affordable public services for all. The creation of 
Greater Berlin in 1920 marked a milestone of this kind. Amalgamating 
seven cities, 59 smaller municipalities and 27 landed estates, the new 
Berlin grew 12-fold in size. It incorporated all existing municipal energy 
companies into its own electricity and gas utilities (Bewag and Gasag), 
which were, henceforth, entrusted with implementing territorial unifica-
tion by means of uniform service standards, tariffs and working condi-
tions. To the new government of Greater Berlin, it was of critical 
importance to have a single utility accountable to a single city authority in 
the provision of power or gas services. Equally important was the provi-
sion of electricity and gas produced by the city’s own utilities. This involved 
resisting persistent approaches by the major national energy providers of 
the day, Reichselektrowerke A.G. and Ruhrgas A.G., to supply the capital 
as part of their own programmes of territorial expansion and system cen-
tralisation (Fig. 4.1).
In West Berlin of the 1970s, a very different crisis of accountability 
emerged around the city’s energy provision. Ever since the Berlin block-
ade of 1948/1949 and the subsequent political division of the city, West 
Berlin had sought to minimise dependence on East Germany and East 
Berlin by generating its own electricity and producing its own (town) gas. 
This strategy of urban energy autarky required a huge number of power 
and gas plants to be built within the city limits, but this was tolerated—
indeed, celebrated—by West Berlin residents throughout the 1950s and 
1960s as a symbol of defiance of the ‘insular city’. Decisions by the city’s 
power utility to build ever more generating capacity were not questioned 
for fear of appearing to undermine West Berlin’s very existence. By the 
1970s, however, popular resistance to the serious environmental and 
 public health hazards posed by continuous infrastructure expansion—
especially to the city’s air quality and ecosystems—was posing a massive 
threat to the compact of non-accountability between utility and citizen. 
The more the energy utilities insisted on the need for additional plants to 
keep West Berlin functioning, the more the protestors questioned the fun-
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damental assumptions on which the call for increased capacity was based. 
The issue came to a head in 1976–1977 over a decision by the city govern-
ment and its power utility to build a new 600-Mega Watt power plant in 
the middle of one of the city’s remaining forests. Massive protests and 
prolonged court cases resulted in the planned power plant being stopped, 
but not before it had been revealed to the public how both Bewag and the 
city government were prepared to ride roughshod over legal constraints 
and societal norms in order to achieve their common goal. Bewag’s public 
image never really recovered from the damage this affront to public 
accountability caused amongst the population (Mielke and Weiß 1977). 
The case of the rejected power plant became a milestone of energy gover-
nance in Germany (Fig. 4.2).
Fig. 4.1 Map showing size of Berlin prior to 1920 (marked core area) and terri-
tory of municipalised power utilities by 1925 (vertically striped area). (Source: 
Bruno Thierbach, 1925, Die gegenwärtige Versorgung der Stadt Berlin und der 
Provinz Brandenburg mit elektrischer Arbeit. Elektrotechnische Zeitschrift, 46(39), 
1465)
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Today’s accountability crisis revolves around the ownership and control 
of the city’s energy systems. The renewal of the concession agreements for 
the electricity grid and gas network in 2014 provided a window of oppor-
tunity for the two grassroots initiatives—the Berlin Energy Roundtable 
and Citizen Energy Berlin—to challenge the position of the incumbent 
utilities: Vattenfall and Gasag. Whilst the Roundtable has campaigned for 
the city to take over the electricity concession in one form or another, the 
cooperative has sought to take it on itself in partnership with others. A 
very public contestation has emerged between Vattenfall and its oppo-
nents over the future of Berlin’s power grid. Vattenfall has argued that 
only it possesses the experience and expertise necessary to run a complex 
electricity system. The civil society organisations have countered that only 
an accountable municipal utility can deliver on policy targets for renew-
able energy and decarbonisation. The dispute landed in the courts and was 
only resolved—in favour of the new municipal utility Berlin Energie—in 
March 2019 (Fig. 4.3).
Fig. 4.2 Protest camp against the planned power plant in Spandau Forest, 1976. 
(Source: Landesarchiv Berlin, F Rep 290, No. 0194-662)
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4.3  hoW do envIronMental governanCe sCholars 
CharaCterIse the Case?
The story of Berlin’s energy policy in the 1920s has been told only by the 
author, and to date only from selective perspectives. These perspectives 
have highlighted interest in balancing electricity load curves with demand 
management measures (Moss 2014) and the rise and fall of alternative 
energy technologies in the interwar years (Moss 2016).
The impact of political division on West Berlin’s energy infrastructures 
and utilities was analysed initially by the political scientist Richard Merritt 
in the 1960s, but not with respect to environmental issues (Merritt 1968). 
The author of this chapter has explored how division nurtured a strategy 
of spatial reorientation and self-dependence of energy provision around 
the insular city (Moss 2009) that largely failed to entertain options for sav-
ing energy or using it more efficiently (Moss 2014).
Fig. 4.3 Campaign 
poster of the Berlin 
Energy Roundtable for 
the 2013 referendum, 
reading ‘Our municipal 
utility, our power grid, 
our Berlin’. (Source: 
http://www.berliner-
energietisch.net/
materialien)
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By contrast, in Berlin today, there is considerable academic interest in 
initiatives to reform energy governance and reconfigure energy infrastruc-
tures (Becker et al. 2015, 2017; Blanchet 2015). What captivates these 
environmental governance scholars is the novel kind of collective control 
and accountability being advanced by the two social movements. 
Remunicipalisation, to these initiatives, means much more than returning 
a privatised utility to municipal ownership. It is about creating a wholly 
new kind of utility that is transparent to public scrutiny, open to joint 
decision-making by consumers and obliged by protocol to serve the public 
interest in keeping energy affordable and protecting the climate. This 
agenda is, as recent research reveals (Becker et al. 2015), broadening the 
scope of debate on energy governance in the city and undermining the 
previously unchallenged hegemony of the incumbent providers, notably 
Vattenfall.
4.4  What PraCtICes of legItIMatIon aPPear 
to be at Play In eMPIrICal Work?
In the 1920s, the core issue of legitimacy was creating uniform and afford-
able public services for the enlarged municipal entity of Greater Berlin. 
This had been the principal rationale for expanding the city’s boundaries; 
after 1920, it needed to be put into practice. Municipal politicians never 
tired of emphasising the importance of the city’s own energy (and water) 
utilities as instruments to this end. Practices enrolled to deliver the prom-
ise came in three forms: first, unitary tariffs across the territories of the 
newly united utilities (if not the whole city); second, uniform service stan-
dards for access, supply and maintenance; and third, fair and equal wages 
for employees across the city. These improvements to public services pro-
vided the justification for massive investments in urban infrastructure. The 
argument of uniform and fair services for Greater Berlin was mobilised 
repeatedly to rally local support for building state-of-the-art power  stations 
(e.g., the Klingenberg plant) and experimenting with innovative technolo-
gies (e.g., heat storage for rapid power generation). The revenues gener-
ated from growing electricity sales, in particular, were used not only to 
fund these capital investments but also to support the beleaguered city 
budget, especially during the hyperinflation of 1922–1923 and depression 
during 1929–1933. The legitimacy of this policy of welfare expansionism 
did not go unchallenged. During the 1920s, the local Communist Party 
(KPD) criticised rising tariffs for hitting the poor hardest. Far more serious 
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was the campaign launched by the Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht 
against the foreign loans used to fund much of Berlin’s new energy infra-
structure. By 1931, this culminated in the forced sale of most of the city’s 
shares in Bewag to national and international energy conglomerates as a 
stop-gap measure to reduce the city’s burgeoning debt.
In West Berlin during the Cold War, security was the overriding argu-
ment used to legitimise urban energy policy. Successive city governments 
and utility directors proclaimed, when any network expansion was planned, 
that failing to act would jeopardise the local economy and undermine 
West Berlin’s capacity to provide its own electricity and gas. With the 
backing of the three Western Allied powers, high security standards were 
built into West Berlin’s energy systems. These were epitomised by two 
core practices: first, storing sufficient reserves of primary energy (coal and 
oil) to power the city for at least three months and, second, creating a 
cascade of generating capacity capable of avoiding power outages even in 
the event that the largest generating block failed. The massive capital 
investments required for this security-oriented strategy did not need legiti-
mising locally as they were heavily subsidised by the West German govern-
ment. It was only in the 1970s, when fresh expansionist plans confronted 
an emergent environmentalist movement, that these practices of legitima-
tion for West Berlin as an ‘electricity island’ were challenged seriously. For 
the first time, alternative models for energy provision in West Berlin were 
advanced by academics, activists and consultants. These revolved around 
reducing the need for new generating plant by promoting energy saving, 
using energy more efficiently (e.g., with small-scale co-generation), and, 
latterly, importing electricity from East German power plants upgraded 
with West German technology. These measures were deliberately framed 
to delegitimise the dominant narrative of build-and-supply.
The current conflict over Berlin’s energy future is characterised by com-
peting claims to legitimacy. On the one hand, the incumbent energy utili-
ties (primarily Vattenfall, but also Gasag) present themselves to the public 
as the experts who, by virtue of their long-standing experience in running 
Berlin’s energy systems, are the sole actors capable of managing the power 
grid and gas network. Technical expertise, track record and financial via-
bility are the arguments they mobilise to justify their claims and belittle 
their competitors. On the other hand, the social movements campaigning 
for their kind of accountable remunicipalisation argue that it is precisely 
this reliance on traditional management criteria that is blocking attempts 
in the city to reduce energy use, cut carbon emissions and promote renew-
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able sources of energy. They are advancing a very different logic of legiti-
macy which targets global sustainability and local accountability. 
Significantly, they have managed to induce a shift in city government pol-
icy, from supporting the incumbent utilities to embracing a new municipal 
utility and a strategy of decarbonising the city’s energy systems.
4.5  What InterventIons Could enable sustaInable 
outCoMes under transItIon?
Assessing historical examples in terms of sustainability norms is highly 
problematic, since sustainability—as currently understood—was not then 
an issue. Past interventions to reconfigure urban energy systems were 
made in the name of other overarching principles prevalent at the time, 
such as social equality or political security. What this brief foray into the 
past has revealed is, first, that crises of accountability over energy are not 
new. They have accompanied the emergence, consolidation and adapta-
tion of energy systems since their early beginnings. Second, we have illus-
trated that what accountability can mean, how it is invoked, to what ends 
and through what mechanisms varies hugely according to particular con-
texts of time and space. What passes without arousing public disapproval 
in one context can be highly controversial in another. This prompts us to 
pause and reflect, when recommending practices of legitimation or modes 
of accountability governance, on what temporality might mean for their 
shelf-life and future-proofing. Today’s accountability fix should not 
become tomorrow’s accountability trap (Kramarz and Park 2017). Finally, 
the examples drawn from Berlin’s history have shown how processes of 
legitimising energy transitions are inextricably bound up in much wider 
societal concerns, such as—in our three cases—the politics of distribution, 
protection and representation. Efforts to institutionalise sustainable energy 
transitions would, it follows, be well advised to heed, enrol or resist con-
current movements that are likely to influence—one way or another—the 
viability of a particular preferred pathway (Bouzarovski and Haarstad 2018).
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CHAPTER 5
A Few Reflections on Accountability
Christian Lund
Abstract Accountability is a form of communication between people 
and institutions where one is held to account by the other. Parts of the 
scholarship distinguish between upward and downward accountability. 
Upward accountability would involve acknowledgement of an authority 
to sanction or validate operations or claims, whereas downward account-
ability refers to the institution of authority being responsible to the gen-
eral public for their actions. While the directionality of accountability is 
important, a case from Indonesia suggests that they may indeed be co-
constitutive. By deliberately and publicly complying with the idea of 
state land ownership, and by being selective about what institutions rep-
resent ‘the state’, the farmers used their upward accountability to pro-
duce downward accountability in terms of recognition of their rights. 
The farmers exploited the separation of powers in their attempt to gain 
a new visibility.
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Akk ja, retten, retten; hva hjelper det at du har retten når du ikke har 
noen makt?
[Ah yes, rights, rights; what does it help that you have rights when you 
do not have any power?]
—Fru Stockmann in “En Folkefiende” (Henrik Ibsen 1882)
5.1  AccountAbility And SociAl contrAct
‘Everyone realizes how praiseworthy it is for a prince to honour his word 
and to be straightforward rather than crafty in his dealings; nonetheless 
contemporary experience shows that princes who have achieved great 
things have been those who have given their words lightly, who have 
known how to trick men with their cunning, and who, in the end, have 
overcome those abiding by honest principles. … There are two ways of 
fighting: by law or by force. The first way is natural to men, and the second 
to beasts. … a prince must know how to act according to the nature of 
both, … he cannot survive otherwise’ (Machiavelli 1961: 99). The can-
dour of this sixteenth-century Secretary and Second Chancellor to the 
Florentine Republic is refreshing. Moreover, his book is probably among 
the most concise of the 30,000+ offerings from Amazon.com when you 
punch in ‘accountability’. Google.com suggests a menu of 128,000,000 
items in less than 0.3 seconds. Power’s interest in power is obvious and 
unabashedly stated as a fact by Machiavelli. It is not cloaked in bureau-
cratic niceties and unrealistic assumptions about the common good, and 
as a self-help book for politicians, The Prince remains unsurpassed.
The principle of power stands in tension with the principles of its divi-
sion. Montesquieu’s idea about the separation of powers (1977), Locke’s 
suggestion to rein in tyranny (1980) and Rousseau’s doctrine that govern-
ment must rest on a social contract (1977) all recognise the truths of the 
drive for power described by Machiavelli, and they all share a concern for 
the danger of power’s concentration. Each, in their own way, suggests 
checks and balances in the system of government, and within the European 
history of enlightenment, they may be the first to articulate concern with 
power’s accountability. While Montesquieu focuses on the mutual 
accountability among institutions of power, Locke and Rousseau direct 
their attention to the relationship between the governors and the gov-
erned. In a nutshell, Rousseau argues that government (or the sovereign) 
derives its legitimacy to govern from the power freely surrendered by the 
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governed in a social contract where the government is elected by the peo-
ple as a representation of the general will and is therefore accountable to 
it. The social contract rests on an understanding of mutual recognition 
between state and citizenry when the population is subject to the laws of 
the state, and the state is subject to popular political franchise. This figure, 
however, is as abstract as it is beautiful.
In actual societies, and maybe especially in post-colonial societies, the 
number of institutions that operate in the name of the state approaches 
the infinite, and citizenship itself is fraught with intersecting qualifications 
derived from gender, race and caste, as well as class, creed and conviction 
(Lund 2016). In terms of social contract, this raises the question: as what 
are the contractual partners recognised? Who is visible to what institution, 
and what institution commands authority in what domain? A way to access 
the empirical complexity may be on offer from a broad philosophical tradi-
tion that takes recognition as a fundamental human expression of acknowl-
edgement of the ‘other’ (Arendt 1973; Fraser 2001; Honneth 1996; 
Taylor 1989, 1994). Honneth, in particular, talks about visibility among 
and between actors, and I believe it can be extended to institutions. Social 
contracts of recognition require mutual visibility between actors and insti-
tutions. Actors must have a social, legal, fiscal or cultural presence visible 
and acknowledged by an institution, and the institution must legitimately 
appear capable of providing the desired recognition of a claim (Weber 
1958). What actors are therefore comprises not individual features but 
relational, politically visible attributes. So, who is the actor? A tax payer, a 
peasant, or a red troublemaker, an indigene, a businessman, or a person 
without paper? And who defines the categories? And, similarly, we must 
ask what is the specific institution? Executive, legislative or judiciary, or 
can it be re-purposed to fit the task at hand?
This may seem a somewhat grandiose introduction to what is often seen 
as a governance routine question. I, however, suggest that any granular 
analysis of relations of accountability (Latour 2009; Strathern 2000) could 
do worse than to focus on power, its separation, the mutual recognition of 
claims and authority, and the representation of rights subjects (or citizens) 
and government. In the following, I present a summary case from my 
work in Indonesia to illustrate relations of mutual recognition  (Lund 
2020). While the case itself relates only indirectly to energy transitions, it 
surfaces concerns of conflict over land and forest that are germane to any 
discussion of energy transitions, not least given Indonesia’s participation 
in a global carbon forestry programme (cf. Hein 2018).
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5.2  ViSibility And recognition in indoneSiA
Harumandala is a village in West Java in Indonesia. The village consists of 
several sub-villages or kampungs and is located within a steeply sloped 
landscape. After independence in 1945, the area saw many confrontations 
over land control between the Indonesian army and Communist group-
ings. The confrontations died down around 1961. The area was formally 
under the territorial authority of the Provincial Forestry Service of West 
Java, and the entire area was classified as ‘forest’. However, most of the 
area was, in fact, populated with villages and kampungs. Generally, people 
were farming paddy rice on terraces, as well as different crops on forest 
plots. In practice, people could clear land for paddy rice farming and other 
activities without much interference from the authorities. No legal rights 
ensured people’s access to land, but the Provincial Forestry Service toler-
ated farming and people regarded the land as their own.
In 1978, all the forestland controlled by the Provincial Forestry Service 
in West Java—close to a million hectares—was transferred to the State 
Forestry Corporation which had previously operated only in Central and 
East Java (Peluso 1992; Rachman 2011). As a parastatal institution with 
its own uniformed ‘forest police’, and as a part of an authoritarian regime, 
the State Forest Corporation was inaccessible to ordinary people seeking 
to argue or negotiate their case. The Corporation established boundaries 
to create teak and mahogany plantations, clearing the area of any farmed 
fields that might be in the way. Moreover, it started to act as a landlord 
charging rent for the fields people cultivated within the area. These farm-
ers thus became tenants of the Corporation, and in the process consoli-
dated its land control. The rent consisted of 33 per cent of the villagers’ 
rice production: There was no legal basis for this rent, and it was never 
registered as official income of the company.
During the late 1990s, agrarian protest became ever more frequent as 
the Suharto regime spiralled into decline and crisis. Different social organ-
isations, groups and movements were formed in a period of political trans-
formation in Indonesia. Democratisation and decentralisation appeared to 
offer opportunities to transform society, and not least the agrarian struc-
tures. The protests were accompanied by land occupations, where farmers 
seized land from state forests or private and government plantations. The 
occupations were controversial. On the one hand, they were condoned 
and even hailed by popular movements as the realisation of the long-
awaited land reform. On the other hand, government condemned occupa-
tions as theft (Lucas and Warren 2013).
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In 2006, farmers and their organisation, Sundanese Peasant’s Movement 
(Serikat Petani Pasundan [SPP]) realised that the Forest Corporation’s 
collection of rent was illegal, and actions towards land reform could be 
launched. The first move was to refuse to pay rent to the State Forest 
Corporation. Instead, people paid 10,000 Rupiah (equivalent to a couple 
of US dollars) per month to SPP and turned their presence into a land 
occupation.
The West Java police commander and the Corporation director in 
Jakarta decided to re-establish the Corporation’s control over the occu-
pied forestlands by launching a so-called forest security operation funded 
by the Ministry of Forestry. The operation was preceded by a joint recon-
naissance for forest security control conducted in March 2008. The State 
Forest Corporation provided the reconnaissance team with a detailed map 
that indicated ‘forest security disturbances’. The team reported that 
approximately 290 hectares of forestland were occupied by nearly 1600 
villagers from four villages within the district.
Three months after this reconnaissance report was issued, the West Java 
Police, the Ministry of Forestry and the State Forest Corporation launched 
a forest security operation. The main objectives of the operation were to 
re-establish control of the state forestland and to evict the people occupy-
ing it. The operation invoked the military terms, Security Operation and 
Dangerous Area, echoing the Suharto era. Similarly, the use of terms like 
‘illegal loggers’, ‘illegal occupiers’, ‘subversive’ and ‘anti-state’ established 
an association between land occupation and organised crime. For a coun-
try the size of Indonesia, 290 hectares may seem trivial, but the signifi-
cance of a successful occupation could be earth-shattering, literally 
breaking new ground for further challenges to state authority.
Officers from the State Forest Corporation and the Provincial Police 
came to Harumandala and its six kampungs, and more than 300 police 
officers set up camp and began to prepare the evictions. The operation was 
initiated by a ceremony, in which the police commander, the head of the 
Corporation’s forest police and representatives from the local government 
Forestry and Plantation Unit went through the objectives of the opera-
tion—namely, to find evidence of illegal logging, to evict illegal occupants 
and destroy their farms and to remove any illegal construction from the 
area. First, the police and the Corporation officers made house-to-house 
searches for timber. Then, fields were ravaged and houses were burnt to 
the ground. Some houses were left standing, but the police marked them 
with chalk ‘This house must be destroyed by yourself ’, or ‘This house and 
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land is not yours but the property of the state’. Finally, the police forced 
the villagers to sign a statement in which they renounced their member-
ship of SPP and declared they would never join again. It is well worth 
recalling that this took place almost a decade into the post-New Order 
democratic era, and that SPP was a legal organisation.
After the police operation, people resumed the cultivation of their plots 
within the area but moved to kampungs outside of the State Forest 
Corporation area for a couple of years. By 2010, people had begun to 
move back to the abandoned kampung of Pasir Pilar within the 
Corporation-controlled area. People reconstructed their houses; and 
within six months, some 34 families had re-established themselves in the 
kampung. The local SPP chapter drew up a map of the area, registering 
each plot and its owner.
The State Forest Corporation contacted the settlement, but now with 
a new approach. They announced a planting ceremony of mahogany trees 
and invited villagers to witness. An area was cleared and 1000 seedlings 
were planted in rows. Each row was publicly named after a government 
institution. Thus, the first row was named, ‘the row of the provincial gov-
ernor’, the next, ‘the row of the police commander’, ‘the row of the 
Indonesian army’ and so on. The intention, no doubt, was to impress 
upon the people of the area that these resources belonged to and were 
under the protection of the entire government structure of Indonesia. The 
State Forest Corporation had the whole episode filmed. The following 
night, however, all 1000 mahogany seedlings were uprooted. People 
remained in their kampungs on the disputed land; they resumed farming 
their plots and rice fields, and they continued not to pay rent to the State 
Forest Corporation. They were not beholden to the Corporation or the 
Indonesian government for their land rights. Instead, they held land 
thanks to ‘the republic’ of SPP, with the opportunities and dangers 
this implied.
As people moved back into their settlement, they asked the official local 
territorial administration—the village office—for new ID cards that would 
reflect this change. This was done. By that token, the settlement became 
an official kampung, situated within the area that the State Forest 
Corporation claimed to control as forest. Moreover, as people registered 
to vote for the 2014 elections, officials from the sub-district would visit all 
houses and place an official government sticker on the door with the name 
of the voter, and place of residence—their new official kampung.
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The system of payment to SPP remained provisory, but with the small-
holders’ return to the contested lands in 2010, all kampungs of 
Harumandala also began to contribute to the Village Office to the tune of 
1,000,000 Rupiah annually. At first, the Village Office, its mayor and its 
elected parliamentarians were reluctant to receive the funds. They were 
unsure whether they were entitled to recover tax, and what it would mean 
to accept it, but after some negotiation the Village Government of 
Harumandala accepted the money at a public ceremony. While still per-
ceived as illegal occupants by the State Forest Corporation, smallholders 
were also beginning to be seen as taxpaying, voting, registered, Indonesian 
citizens. Their ‘contribution’, or tax, established a new substantive rela-
tionship between them as landholders and the formal structures of the 
Indonesian government at its lowest level, the Village Office. It remains to 
be seen what this new relationship represents. One might argue that this 
relationship not only established the SPP landholders as owners of prop-
erty in the eyes of the Village Office; it also established the Village Office 
as a public authority on questions of property in land that was classified as 
forest. As the smallholders made claims to resources, they also invoked 
public authority in the Village Office. Tax collection attributed to it gov-
erning capacity and the authority to validate land claims. This may, even-
tually, put the Village Office in competition with other statutory 
institutions.
5.3  reflectionS
Accountability is a form of communication between people and institu-
tions where one is held to account by the other. Parts of the scholarship 
distinguish between upward and downward accountability (Fox 2018). 
Upward accountability would involve acknowledgement of an authority 
to sanction or validate operations or claims, whereas downward account-
ability refers to the institution of authority being responsible to the gen-
eral public for their actions. While the directionality of accountability is 
important, the case from Indonesia suggests that they may indeed be co- 
constitutive. When the villagers shifted from payment of rent as tenants to 
one part of government (the Corporation), to payment of a community 
tax to another part of government (the lowest level assembly and govern-
ment), they not only morphed from undercover tenants to enfranchised 
citizens, but also invoked capacities in the village government that it had 
not had before. By deliberately and publicly complying with the idea of 
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state land ownership, and by being selective about what institutions repre-
sent ‘the state’, the farmers used their upward accountability to produce 
downward accountability in terms of recognition of their rights. The farm-
ers exploited the separation (or multi-location) of powers in their attempt 
to gain a new visibility.
The power to define subjectivity—to define it for oneself or to impose 
it on others—is essential in any relation of accountability, because it defines 
actors’ visibility and, consequently, the possible fields of engagement and 
contracts of recognition. The Ministry of Forestry and the State Forest 
Corporation had been long established as the consequential authorities 
holding the power to define who is entitled and who is a thief. Yet, the 
active re-orientation by the farmers re-drew the map of mutual recogni-
tion. To be sure, this relied on people’s capacity and political space to re- 
cast themselves as responsible citizens and rights subjects rather than 
passively being defined as subversive squatters and enemies of the state.
Actors have different capacities to engage in the field of politics. 
However, the field itself is a result of engagement, not only by the power-
ful but also by those who resist and want change. This desire for change—
expressed through local politics of land—may, in E.P. Thompson’s words 
(1963: 12), be foolhardy. But the desire for change defines agency and is 
hardly inconsequential for the relations between people and institutions.
referenceS
Arendt, H. (1973 [1951]). The origins of totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt 
Brace Janovich.
Fox, J. (2018). The political construction of accountability keywords. IDS Bulletin, 
49(2), 65–80.
Fraser, N. (2001). Recognition without ethics? Theory, Culture and Society, 
18(2–3), 21–42.
Hein, J. I. (2018). Political ecology of REDD+ in Indonesia: Agrarian conflicts and 
forest carbon. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
Honneth, A. (1996). The struggle for recognition. The moral grammar of social 
conflict. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Ibsen, H. (1882). En Folkefiende [An Enemy of the People]. Oslo: Gyldendal.
Latour, B. (2009). The making of law: An ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat. 
Cambridge: Polity.
Locke, J. (1980 [1689]). Two treatises of government. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
 C. LUND
61
Lucas, A., & Warren, C. (Eds.). (2013). Land for the people: The state and Agrarian 
conflict in Indonesia. Columbus, OH: Ohio University Press.
Lund, C. (2016). Rule and rupture. State formation through the production of 
property and citizenship. Development and Change, 47(6), 1199–1228.
Lund, C. (2020). Nine-tenths of the law. Enduring dispossession in Indonesia. New 
Haven, Yale University Press.
Machiavelli, N. (1961 [ca. 1532]). The Prince. London: Penguin.
Montesquieu, C.-L. (1977 [1748]). The spirit of the laws. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Peluso, N. L. (1992). Rich forests, poor people. Resource control and resistance in 
Java. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rachman, N. F. (2011). The resurgence of land reform policy and Agrarian move-
ments in Indonesia. PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley.
Rousseau, J.-J. (1977 [1762]). Du contrat social. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Strathern, M. (2000). Audit cultures. Anthropological studies in accountability, eth-
ics and the academy. London: Routledge.
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self. The making of modern identity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, C. (1994). The politics of recognition. In A.  Gutmann (Ed.), 
Multiculturalism (pp. 107–148). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Thompson, E. P. (1963). The making of the English working class. London: Penguin.
Weber, M. (1958). From Max Weber. Essays in sociology (H. Gerth & C. W. Mills, 
Eds.). New York: Oxford University Press.
5 A FEW REFLECTIONS ON ACCOUNTABILITY 
62
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright 
holder.
 C. LUND
63© The Author(s) 2020
S. Sareen (ed.), Enabling Sustainable Energy Transitions, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26891-6_6
CHAPTER 6
Do Climate Targets Matter? 
The Accountability of Target-setting 
in Urban Climate and Energy Policy
Håvard Haarstad
Abstract Climate-related targets abound, but are they important drivers 
of policy action? Given the apparent gap between ambitious targets and 
concrete actions to reach them, climate-related targets can easily be seen 
as representative of a crisis of accountability. At the same time, this chapter 
argues, there are practices of legitimation at work that can help overcome 
this crisis, and translate abstract and arbitrary targets into concrete policy 
implementation. Norway’s Zero Growth Objective in transport policy 
represents a case of this. From its first formulation as a target around 2006 
and until 2019, it has materialised as a “hard” target shaping funding 
streams and concrete policy interventions, and most likely, emission levels. 
Under certain conditions, abstract targets play important roles in legiti-
mating transition policy. 
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6.1  IntroductIon
A casual observer of the official fight against climate change may get the 
impression that it is primarily about setting quantitative targets for emis-
sions reduction. Who has committed to the 2 °C target? How did the 
world’s leaders discuss the 1.5 °C target at the latest high-level meeting? 
Who has the most ambitious target for cuts in CO2-emissions, or for 
growth of renewables? It may seem that setting targets is what climate 
policy consists of.
Cities have certainly entered this game. Since the city council of 
Freiburg in 1996 decided to cut 25% of its CO2-emissions by 2010 (Leal 
and Azevedo 2016), cities all over the world have set ambitious and cele-
brated targets for a range of climate-related challenges such as emission 
cuts, renewable energy use, energy efficiency, electric vehicle uptake and 
growth of bicycle use and infrastructure. More than 7700 local and 
regional authorities have signed up to the Covenant of Mayors and thereby 
committed themselves to achieving and exceeding the EU climate and 
energy targets. The Covenant of Mayors initiative is one of many examples 
of how governance entities are organising themselves in networks rallying 
around particular targets.
The key question is, of course, what all this targeting and goal-setting 
means for actual climate policy. From a bird’s-eye view of urban climate 
policy, it is tempting to conclude that these targets are not followed by 
policies that may realistically ensure that they are met.
It is not that cities are ignoring the climate challenge—on the contrary, 
many commentators view cities as leading the fight against climate change 
(Rosenzweig et al. 2010). Yet, considering the drastic transformations that 
many of these targets involve—for example, 72 cities have committed to 
the C40 network’s Deadline 2020 programme of cutting CO2 emissions 
in line with the Paris Agreement—one might suspect that the current 
practices of target-setting are unconnected to any realistic programme of 
delivering on what they promise. It would follow that the ambitious 
target- setting are exercises of vanity, wherein cities compete for the most 
ambitious targets but not the most transformative policies. And thereby 
that targets help politicians appear to be doing something when they are 
actually not. In this sense, we are faced with a crisis of accountability in 
which politicians can capitalise on climate-sensitive rhetoric but escape 
being held to account for that same rhetoric.
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At the same time, the question of what all this targeting and goal- 
setting means for actual climate policy may also generate a different set of 
answers. What if target-setting is more important and substantive than it 
looks? Even if not all the rhetoric is translated into substantive policy, 
could there be ways in which target-setting actually percolates into sub-
stantive policy-making practices?
This chapter reflects on the nature of target-setting, focusing in par-
ticular on climate and energy policy in cities. I recognise that target-setting 
is a political-rhetorical practice, and therefore not necessarily representa-
tive of actual processes of transformation—we should expect a lot of hot 
air. But I aim to go beyond the readily-at-hand analysis that suggests tar-
gets are simply vanity exercises without practical implications, and to look 
deeper at the ways in which target-setting may in fact “trickle” up and 
down in governance systems and—in a gradual way—facilitate transitions.
6.2  clImate Governance as PolItIcal-rhetorIcal 
PractIce
Scholars have often taken a sceptical view of official climate discourses, 
including their ambitious targets. It is common to see this discourse as 
evading or purposely obfuscating the conflicts of interest and difficult 
choices involved in meeting the climate challenge. Swyngedouw (2010), 
for example, holds that the policy discourse on climate change is charac-
teristic of the “post-political condition.” He has argued that reduction of 
CO2 emissions is inserted into a vast techno-managerial apparatus, “rang-
ing from new eco-technologies of a variety of kinds to unruly complex 
managerial and institutional configurations, with a view to producing a 
socio-ecological fix to make sure nothing really changes” (p.  220, 
italics mine).
In other words, instead of addressing the underlying substantive politi-
cal challenges, conflicts of interests and difficult trade-offs of climate- 
friendly transformation, official climate discourse manages to produce a 
set of interventions that harmonise with economic growth, the fossil econ-
omy, and so on, thus perpetuating business-as-usual practices. This is why 
climate governance is, in the words of Methmann, an “empty signifier”—
it serves to integrate climate protection into the global hegemonic order 
“without changing the basic social structures of the world economy” 
(Methmann 2010: 348). Hegemonic governmental agents have been able 
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to remake almost any policy—free trade, continued oil exploration, eco-
nomic growth—into being part of the solution.
A similar critique has been levelled against the entire sustainable devel-
opment discourse, in a debate too vast to enter into here (but see While 
et al. 2010).
At the urban scale, these trade-offs and conflicts of interests may be 
harder to conceal. Yet even here, scholars have pointed to the contrast 
between rhetorical aspects of governance and substantive transformative 
interventions. In terms of rhetoric, cities generate and circulate high- 
profile stories and “best practice” narratives that highlight claims about 
achievements and successes (Bulkeley 2006; McCann 2011). In terms of 
substantive change, however, real effects may be more elusive. Grandin 
and Sareen (forthcoming) describe urban governance arrangements as 
“often characterised by voluntary action, weak institutions, non-binding 
commitments and uncoordinated efforts,” and argue that it can be diffi-
cult to determine the substantive and enduring transformative impact of 
their interventions.
More concretely, researchers have also criticised the targets that cities 
are operating with. Leal and Azevedo (2016) reviewed the targets for local 
energy planning for a number of case cities, and found them to show a lack 
of standardisation of methodologies, “leading to a diversity that may not 
only hamper the comparison between different municipalities’ action but 
also prevent a consistent assessment of their global impact.” In similar 
vein, Kramers et al. (2013) found a wide variety of accounting methodolo-
gies, system boundaries, time frames and source of emissions included 
behind relatively similar targets. There is moreover limited awareness of 
these methodological limitations among city administrators.
In short, one can find grounds for deep scepticism against the practice 
of target-setting in the climate governance literature. In an abstract sense, 
these targets are often part of a post-political and techno-managerial cli-
mate governance discourse that simultaneously appears climate-friendly 
without addressing the underlying contradictions that produce the climate 
problem in the first place. At the urban level, target-setting can be seen as 
a part of the circulation of “best practice” and rhetorical competition to be 
the most sustainable city, while the actual commitments remain largely 
non-binding and voluntary.
In this sense, target-setting registers on several of the types of legitima-
tion Sareen outlines in Chap. 2 of this book, but perhaps particularly dis-
cursive legitimation. These are legitimation practices that normalise 
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particular ways of seeing, stabilising them in the public imaginary. In the 
worst-case scenario, targets are stabilising the idea that our decision- 
makers are tackling the climate challenge in an ambitious way, while actu-
ally, very little gets done.
However, what if we put aside the worst-case scenario for a moment, 
and consider the flip side of the coin? Is it possible that targets, even seem-
ingly overly ambitious ones, may have real and substantive effects that 
contribute to a sustainable transition? Could there be mechanisms through 
which targets—even unrealistic ones—influence, push or nudge urban 
politics and processes of change? This is not to cast aside the critical per-
spectives outlined above, but to suggest that analogous mechanisms of 
legitimation may also work in the opposite direction.
6.3  metrIcs that can leGItImate 
the sustaInabIlIty transItIon
My starting point for thinking about ways targets may legitimate transi-
tions is to consider the carrying power of numbers (or “metrics”). It is 
widely recognised that quantifying a phenomenon impregnates it with a 
particular type of force, transforming it from the particular and provincial 
into the language of the universal. Foucault, for instance, showed how 
scientific knowledge—where metrics play a central role—is the foundation 
for the birth of the modern state (Foucault 1991). Metrics is what we use 
to make the unknown knowable, and thereby, governable. Foucault’s work 
showed how scientific knowledge advanced our ability to govern society 
and its individuals. Now, we are progressively using scientific knowledge 
to govern nature as well. As Jasanoff (2010) puts it, “Increasingly, how-
ever, the politics of nature occurs under the rubric of ‘environment’—a 
domain of ideas and entities accessible only with the aid of science and 
technology.”
In this sense, it is quite conceivable that climate targets take on a similar 
type of carrying power as other metrics have done in our governance of 
nature. Climate change is knowable and measurable in precise ways, 
through global aggregate temperatures traced far back in time, parts per 
million of CO2 in the atmosphere, and carbon budgets, among many oth-
ers. Measures to deal with climate change are also knowable and measur-
able in detailed ways, through percentage of rise in renewable energy 
uptake, energy efficiency measures, numbers of electric vehicles sold and 
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so on. This means that policies can be assessed, scenarios can be crafted, 
decision-makers can—in principle—be held to account. And in the seduc-
tive ways that metrics work in governance, targets may work themselves 
into mind sets and documents even after they have been shed of their 
methodological and substantive attire.
It has been argued that due to this metrical legibility of carbon, climate 
change is actually more open to politicisation than the sustainable devel-
opment discourse was. Sustainable development has of course also been 
subject to quantification (Miller 2005), but has lent itself too easily to 
being incorporated in the growth paradigm and neoliberal modes of gov-
ernance. By contrast, argue While and co-authors (2010), the discourse of 
carbon control represents “a harder edge to state environmental regula-
tion via non-negotiable target setting…”. Shifting focus from the ambigu-
ous and co-optable idea of sustainability towards the more measurable 
problem of carbon control, they argue, opens up for a harder type of 
regulation.
Carbon control may introduce a new set of values into state regulation, 
which could open possibilities for challenging mainstream modes of urban 
development in ways not possible under the sustainable development dis-
course (While et al. 2010). Jonas et al. (2011) suggest that the ranking of 
cities on the basis of carbon emissions is becoming part of the competition 
between cities for investment capital, headquarter locations and attraction 
of educated workers. In other words, carbon control and its target are 
becoming part of the calculus behind “rational” urban governance.
We are probably not quite there yet. But at least target-setting is becom-
ing normalised, which in turn legitimates a whole set of practices that may 
advance sustainable energy transitions. The next section examines a con-
crete chain of events to illustrate how this may occur. Given the scope of a 
short chapter, this case study is cursory. Yet it seeks to identify certain 
mechanisms for how climate targets are legitimated.
The concrete case I look at traces the 2 °C target through the Norwegian 
Zero Growth Objective for urban transport. Within this, I am interested 
in how the climate problem, which has been distilled into a universal 
object of knowledge (as in the 2 °C target), cascades downwards in scale 
from the national to the local level.
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6.4  FollowInG the tarGet—norway’s Zero 
Growth objectIve
Norway’s Zero Growth Objective for transport in urban areas is a useful 
illustration of how climate-related targets work their way into concrete 
policy-making. The goal itself states that all growth in personal traffic in 
the largest cities will be covered by public transport, walking and cycling. The 
“zero growth” aspect implied in this is of course that there will be no 
growth in private car traffic.
The legitimation of the target has been incremental, and involves mul-
tiple actors with divergent interests. Still, the progression from abstract 
target formulation towards a tangible foundation for concrete policy 
implementation is traceable by examining a series of key documents 
over time.
The contours of the Zero Growth Objective can be traced back at least 
to the 2006 White Paper on Norwegian Climate Policy [Meld. St. 34, 
2006–2007]. There the government put forward some initial goals for 
climate-related policy in the transport sector, writing that there is a “need 
to shift the use of transport modes towards public transport, walking and 
cycling.” The overarching reference for this White Paper was the interna-
tional 2 °C target, adopted by the Norwegian government a year prior. 
While the 2 °C target is somewhat arbitrary and has been a source of con-
troversy (Randalls 2010), it is referred to here and in most climate-related 
Norwegian national policy documents in a way that sets the level of ambi-
tion and points to the global urgency. The 2 °C target, notwithstanding 
the controversy over its origins and usefulness, is providing the framing for 
Norwegian policy, including the Zero Growth Objective back in 2006.
That formulation—“shift the use of transport modes towards public 
transport, walking and cycling”—can be found in all the key national cli-
mate policy documents from then on. The 2008 Climate Accord between 
all parties in Parliament minus one, the 2012 White Paper on Norwegian 
Climate Policy, and the 2012 Climate Accord, all use that same formula-
tion with miniscule variations. Notably, however, the context in which 
that formulation is placed gets increasingly concrete and binding. In the 
2012 White Paper, it is actually formulated as a target (“The Government 
has the goal that…”). Around the same time, the National Transport Plan 
Working Group put forward a proposition as an official goal of Norwegian 
transport policy, that the large cities should have zero growth except in 
“public transport, walking and cycling,” and simultaneously coined the 
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“Nullvekstmålet”—Zero Growth Objective. The leader of the Working 
Group has been quoted as saying “We wanted to find a target that was easy 
to measure, that would be ambitious and not least reachable” (quoted in 
Strand 2016).
Since then, the Zero Growth Objective has been mentioned, integrated 
and discussed in innumerable briefs, policy documents, talks and newspa-
per articles on transport policy in Norway. The way the target is formu-
lated—with its simple quantification: “zero”—may account for some of its 
carrying power. And as a climate-related target, it has attained enormous 
success. It is an important element of the structural conditions for trans-
port and mobility planning (Tennøy and Øksenholt 2018). We can quite 
concretely follow the process through which this occurs, through budget 
documents and funding agreements between the government and cities.
From 2014 onwards, the National Transport Plan adopted the Zero 
Growth Objective as the key target for transport policy in cities. The gov-
ernment, in launching the Urban Environment Agreements, also it was 
translated to a concrete agreement framework tied to a funding scheme 
for cities. It then transpired that the Government would negotiate with 
the largest cities in Norway and other regional authorities with responsi-
bility for transport, to create “greater coherence in urban policy” by hav-
ing these authorities collectively “commit to common goals written into 
the Urban Environment Agreements.” Now, all relevant authorities are to 
sign a binding agreement on how to meet the Zero Growth Objective, 
and this agreement will be the basis for government funding for local 
transport.
From this point onwards, the amount of funding cities received for 
local transport infrastructure became tied to how well they worked towards 
meeting the Zero Growth Objective. This includes specific indicators that 
measure whether or not car traffic decreases. In 2016 and 2017, such 
Agreements were signed with Oslo, Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger 
(Jæren); in short, the largest Norwegian cities.
Subsequently, the Zero Growth Objective has been mainstreamed and 
absorbed into the planning and land use regulation of the cities them-
selves. It is a ubiquitous condition for decision-making within the wide 
range of issues that affect the abilities of cities to reach the goal, such as 
location of housing, retail, transport infrastructure, congestion charging 
and much more. It introduces a simple calculus for decision-makers in cit-
ies: failure to meet the target will affect the amount of government money 
available in the next round of negotiations. Even beyond this, the 
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 effectiveness of the target transcends this simple calculus. It has become a 
standard reference point for ambitions in the climate field, and percolated 
into the urban policy discourse at many levels. Trends in actual traffic pat-
terns are following suit—all cities mentioned above underwent a reduc-
tion in private car traffic in 2018 (Miljødirektoratet). Arguably, the target 
has contributed to normalising and routinising a way of thinking about 
transitions in cities that was considered highly ambitious only a few 
years ago.
6.5  leGItImatInG sustaInable transItIons
Are climate-related targets representative of a crisis of accountability, as 
pillars in a bureaucratic apparatus of governance that gives the appearance 
of climate action while little substantive change happens? Or are there 
mechanisms at work that translate abstract and arbitrary targets into con-
crete policy implementation? Most likely, a mix of these outcomes is at 
play. But the case of Norway’s Zero Growth Objective illustrates some of 
the processes that legitimate and normalise an ambitious climate-related 
target. This involved soft mechanisms—inserting itself in the discourse on 
urban policy and moving its goal posts—and hard mechanisms—the con-
ditioning of funding flows from national to local levels. To enable a sus-
tainable energy transition, we need practices to legitimate the interventions 
that advance this transition. Under certain conditions, metrics and targets 
can play a constructive role in this.
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Abstract The chapter draws from empirical data collected across 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden to examine some of the 
differing policy regimes and electric mobility pathways in the Nordic 
region, especially for electric vehicles (EVs). The chapter identifies emerg-
ing crises of contestation, accountability, and participation, and it consid-
ers whether electric mobility entrenches or challenges automobility. This 
last point is not a given, with EVs in some situations leading to greater 
amounts of driving and shifting mobility practices towards automobility, 
yet in others, EVs seem to promote more sustainable patterns of transport 
as well as shifts in values. The chapter lastly offers possible policy sugges-
tions for a more just and equitable transition.
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7.1  IntroductIon
Conventional forms of automobility, with their dependence on privately- 
owned, petroleum-powered vehicles used primarily by single occupants, 
are a significant source of major social ills including traffic jams and acci-
dents, climate change, air pollution, and negative impacts on land use 
(Urry 2004). For example, the World Health Organization (2018a) esti-
mates that every year 1.25 million people are killed and 20–50 million 
injured in traffic road crashes involving cars or motorcycles; globally, road 
traffic injuries are also the leading cause of death for those between the age 
of 15 and 29 years. In the realm of climate change, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) notes that the transport sector produces 
about 7 billion tonnes of direct greenhouse gas emissions each year, mak-
ing it responsible for almost one-quarter (23%) of total energy-related 
carbon dioxide equivalent emissions (Sims et al. 2014). With regard to 
ambient air pollution, emissions of particulate matter and other hazardous 
pollutants from road traffic contribute to hundreds of thousands of pre-
mature deaths each year (World Health Organization 2018b). Even in 
Europe, some 40 million people across 115 of the largest cities in the 
European Union are exposed to air exceeding health guidelines (for at 
least one pollutant); in particular, children who reside close to roads with 
heavy-duty vehicle traffic have twice the risk of respiratory problems as 
those living near less congested streets (World Health Organization 2018b).
The race for more sustainable forms of passenger mobility has, there-
fore, commenced, with innumerable policymakers and other stakeholders 
exploring electric mobility and electric vehicles (EVs) as a promising path-
way. This chapter draws on extensive empirical research in the five Nordic 
countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—looking at 
the transition to electric mobility there, as part of a project known as 
Nordic Vehicle-to-Grid, or NV2G (Noel et al. 2019b). This data includes:
• 257 expert interview participants across 17 cities in Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (almost one million words of 
transcribed text) (Sovacool et al. 2018b, c);
• Eight focus groups in Aarhus, Bergen, Copenhagen, Gothenburg, 
Helsinki, Reykjavik, Stockholm, and Tampere (Noel et al. 2019c);
• A representative survey of 5000+ adult participants (Sovacool et al. 
2018a) as well as an online choice experiment of preferences (Noel 
et al. 2019a);
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• 126 visits to car dealerships across the Nordic region (Zarazua de 
Rubens et al. 2018);
• Scenarios and simulations to capture co-benefits and determine sys-
tems optimisation (Noel 2017; Noel et al. 2017, 2018);
• Content analysis of standards for charging and grid interaction 
(Kester et al. 2019).
The chapter draws from this data to examine some of the differing 
policy regimes and electric mobility pathways in the Nordic region; iden-
tify emerging crises of contestation, accountability, and participation; con-
sider whether electric mobility entrenches or challenges automobility; and 
offer possible policy suggestions for a more just and equitable transition.
7.2  dIfferIng PolIcy regImes and socIotechnIcal 
Pathways In the nordIc regIon
Within the transport studies literature, an abundance of terms are often 
used to describe electric mobility, including eco-mobility, electric vehicles, 
and micro-mobility (when referring to smaller cars or e-bikes and scoot-
ers). For the purposes of our project, we defined electric mobility as any 
form of mobility that uses energy drawn from the electric power grid, stor-
ing it on board for propulsion (She et al. 2017). This definition encom-
passes electric vehicles of all varieties—battery electric vehicles, plug-in 
hybrid electric vehicles, fuel-cell electric vehicles, and so on—but also elec-
tric bikes and scooters as well as the occasional trucks for freight or buses.
Despite this broad definition, the most popular form of electric mobil-
ity in the Nordic region remains the passenger electric vehicle, or 
EV. According to Kester et al. (2018), the Nordic countries do indeed 
have very different regimes for automobility and thus EVs and electric 
mobility. As Table 7.1 overviews, these differences begin with electricity 
markets, with Iceland not belonging to Nord Pool and great variation in 
the other four countries for consumers in terms of various fixed and flexi-
ble schemes, including an increasing number of hourly flexible plans based 
on the Nord Pool spot market. These differences on the electricity side 
continue on the respective car markets. The geography and differing 
income levels seems to lead to different car turnover rates ranging from 
8.5 to almost 13 years. Regarding EVs, the countries have radically dis-
tinct levels of EV incentive programmes and markets. The all-inclusive 
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programmes of Norway are well known, but Iceland is also offering strong 
tax reductions, Sweden offers a cash subsidy (as it has fewer car taxes to 
reduce), Denmark recently halted the phase out of its earlier strong tax 
reductions for EVs (currently at 40% instead of 150%) in an attempt to 
reinvigorate its EV sales and consumer trust in EVs, and in the case of 
Finland the EV incentives are fairly recent, in part due to Finnish compara-
tive advantage in biofuels.
As Fig. 7.1 shows, these different support schemes are reflected in a 
different uptake of EVs as they lead to lower—in some cases competi-
tive—consumer prices and time savings. And while Denmark stands out 
with its wind energy production, Norway stands out with its generous EV 
incentives, Finland has a large biofuel industry, and Sweden is the only 
country with a domestic automobile industry. All in all, the Nordic coun-
tries are different enough so that many of the major questions around 
electric mobility and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) come up, while they simulta-
neously offer flexible and modern electricity systems and a serious political 
concern about smog (Norway), oil imports (Iceland), and climate change 
(all of them) to take these developments seriously.
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Fig. 7.1 Diffusion of electric vehicles in the five Nordic countries, 2009 to 2017. 
(Source: Kester et al. 2018)
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The Nordic region is thus a clear-cut example of where the transition to 
electric mobility is underway. For example, the International Energy 
Agency (2018) notes that across the five Nordic countries, the total stock 
of EVs reached 250,000 cars at the end of 2017 and accounted for 8% of 
the global total, the third-largest share after China and the United States. 
The per capita diffusion of EVs across the Nordic region is highest in the 
world at 10.6%; the growth rate the highest in the world (up 57% from the 
previous year); and Norway in particular features a 39% market share of 
electric cars sales.
7.3  contests over faIrness, PartIcIPatIon, 
envIronmental governance, and vulnerabIlIty
However, even though the Nordic transition is underway, it has not been 
without its crises and contestations. Drawing from the empirical data from 
the NV2G project presented in Sovacool et al. (2019), this section explores 
these four challenges: inequitable access to EVs, exclusion and elitism in 
national planning, the creation of global externalities, and the worsening 
of some social vulnerabilities.
By far the most frequently mentioned injustice attribute across the 
entire sample of interview statements was that access to electric mobility 
technologies are not distributed evenly across Nordic society. As one 
respondent put it succinctly:
The most common EV in the Nordic Region is a Tesla. That’s only for rich 
people and companies. It is not a mainstream car, it is not for everyone. It is a 
beautiful car, cool to have. But almost nobody can afford to.
Another was more elaborate in their reflection and highlighted the 
equity and justice challenge with electric mobility:
Tesla owners in Norway on average have a quite high income. The Tesla is not 
their only car, they can have it as maybe their second or third or fourth or fifth 
car. It’s the wealthy getting in front of the common people so they can just pass 
them in the queue in the morning, and that’s irritating … A recent newspaper 
found that the typical, single Tesla Model X owner received subsidies in 2016 
worth the same amount you can hand out to provide 30,000 trips on the buses 
and the subway system of Oslo.
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If accurate, such a statement even quantifies the equity issues, placing a 
single EV adopter above the needs of thousands of public transport 
users—it privileges one “wealthy” person over 30,000 potential “com-
mon people.”
In the domain of energy democracy and public participation, respon-
dents raised concerns that EVs only created (or were backed by) exclu-
sionary policies and reflected elitism in national planning and policymaking. 
Essentially, these comments draw on or connect with some of the distribu-
tive justice issues mentioned above, such as equity, but relate it back to 
procedures and the regulatory process. In this way, issues of unfair access 
and elitism become reflected and entrenched in policy, which then further 
perpetuate inequity across mobility systems. For instance, one respondent 
suggested that:
In the beginning, I thought the negative reactions to Teslas was related to envy 
or jealousy. But after thinking more about it, it’s a rational and emotional 
reaction. Why should we lose a lot of money for rich people getting a cheap, 
expensive, luxury car? The politicians …are [being] controlled.
Another framed this as a procedural justice issue about policy, rather 
than one purely of distributive justice:
People see EVs as only for the upper class. They find them very unfair. To the poli-
ticians, electric mobility sounds very good and they remain convinced that EVs 
can help store energy, decarbonize transport, and balance the grid.
Yet another elaborated that:
In Finland, government policy for EVs has been socially catastrophic, because 
only rich people buy new Teslas (laughs).
Other respondents mentioned the problem as one of “politicians priori-
tising between hundreds of goals,” and perhaps lacking the “political will” 
to make controversial decisions or challenge entrenched interest.
At another level, respondents mentioned that the widespread adoption 
of electric mobility systems, especially in a vehicle-to-grid (V2G) configu-
ration, could potentially erode democratic processes, and undermine peo-
ple’s autonomy or liberty. One respondent, for example, noticed a 
reluctance among consumers to “become dependent on some distant 
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 infrastructure for their daily travel.” Another illustrated another part of 
the logic of this vision when noting “people are afraid that the batteries will 
not last long enough and it is very costly to get new ones.” This last statement 
underscores the potential for a V2G system to become more easily con-
trolled by profiteering companies—creating an exclusionary innovation 
system or policy regime.
The global externality issues connected to electric mobility largely 
touch on externalities—in various domains (environmental, community, 
market) and scales (local, national, global). In the environmental domain, 
some literature has noted that EVs, in particular, can lead to externalities 
such as greenhouse gas emissions from electricity use, toxic pollution from 
battery manufacturing and disposal, and water consumption. In terms of 
climate change, for EVs to actually deliver well-to-wheels carbon reduc-
tions, the carbon content of electric power generation must be low. 
Otherwise, EVs will simply shift the exposure to air pollution away from 
urban areas and towards rural populations located closer to the power 
plants that provide electricity for recharging EV batteries in the city. One 
respondent offered an illustrative statement underscoring environmental 
concerns in the context of plug-in hybrid EVs. They noted:
The problem with plug-in hybrid EVs in the region is that they can switch 
between fossil fuels (gasoline or diesel) and all electric mode. Many of such cars 
are bought by rich people not bothering to plug it in, driving it in pure fossil 
mode all the time only to save 100,000 to 200,000 kroner in taxes. They buy the 
car but never intend to use the environmental package, so that’s obvious that 
you need some scheme to stimulate the real zero emission driving.
In addition, some research has suggested that EVs shift pollution from 
local places and make it more regional; it also depends on local fuel mixes 
whether a net benefit to health or greenhouse gas emissions occur. 
Furthermore, the production of EVs requires equipment and material 
inputs that raise concerns about toxicity and recycling. Electric drivetrains, 
motors, and batteries need lithium, nickel, copper, and aluminium, as well 
as critical materials, somewhat harder to find, such as cobalt and indium. 
In this context, the possible environmental benefits of an electric mobility 
transition—fewer greenhouse gas emissions and improved air quality in 
urban environments—may come at the cost of greater pollution from fac-
tories making components and the landfills and junkyards where obsolete 
models end up. A final issue falls in the community domain, where 
 externalities to greater electric mobility adoption include greater risk of 
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accidents and traffic congestion, given that vehicles and e-bikes can still 
promote an automobility paradigm that transportation should be private, 
rather than public, and motorised rather than human-powered.
A final area of contestation relates to vulnerability, especially jobs (nota-
bly small and independent fuel providers and maintenance firms) and 
impacts on rural residents. In the Nordic region, many petrol and fuel 
stations would need to instal electric charging infrastructure, a prohibi-
tively costly endeavour. Automotive dealerships and maintenance firms 
would also see a potentially large loss of revenue, as well as those selling 
alternatives to electric vehicles such as small-scale biofuel or hydrogen 
companies, a growing industrial segment at least in Denmark. Within 
Nordic automotive dealerships specifically, Zarazua de Rubens et  al. 
(2018) found that salespersons generally articulate that EVs take a longer 
time to sell, take more effort to sell, and result in less revenue for mainte-
nance—which can all result in negative impacts on profitability for auto-
motive companies and dealerships, and consequently jobs, in the 
short term.
7.4  legItImatIng or challengIng automobIlIty?
A deeper concern, separate from contests and challenges to accountability 
or equality, concerns whether EVs are in fact a radical, transformative 
innovation that challenges automobility, or an incremental, supportive 
innovation that only further entrenches it. In Table 7.2, for example, we 
show all of the positive and negative synergies electric mobility can have 
with sustainability. As that table highlights, electric mobility can poten-
tially displace large amounts of carbon for passenger vehicles and even 
fleets, but also run the risk of further embedding motorised, private auto-
mobility as well as increased driving. Graham-Rowe et al. (2012) note for 
example that because adopters perceived their EVs to be more 
“environmentally- friendly,” they drove them 1.64 times further than cars 
they did not see as “eco-cars.” Some drivers even attempted to recharge 
their vehicles not by plugging in at home or at work, but by running the 
internal combustion engine and then using the re-generative braking sys-
tem to “charge” their vehicle—“thereby negating the carbon savings” 
(Graham-Rowe et al. 2012: 148). This underscores that EVs can entrench 
automobility without necessarily decarbonising.
Part of this tension stems from the material, discursive and cultural ele-
ments that re-perform the core elements of the automobility regime. On 
7 GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMATION IN THE TRANSITION TO NORDIC… 
84
both landscape and regime level, for example, the system locks itself in 
through constructed infrastructure, traffic rules and regulations, expertise 
(in terms of personnel and beliefs), travel routines, cultural values around 
enjoyment, status and freedom, and incumbent industries.
7.5  PolIcy suggestIons for a more Just 
and sustaInable transItIon
Nonetheless, the sustainability credentials of EVs can be captured by an 
aggressive and proactive policy. If EVs are determined by policymakers to 
play an essential role in national climate change mitigation plans, our data 
Table 7.2 Positive and negative synergies with electric mobility and 
sustainability
Dimension Reinforces sustainable 
automobility
Reinforces unsustainable 
mobility
Intermodality Use of EV within systems of 
intermodality, in combination 
with measures to discourage car 
use
Use of EV in systems that 
encourage excessive driving 
and EVs as second or third 
(luxury) cars
Desire for motorised 
transport
Substitution of cars and scooters Increase in car-based mobility
Organised car sharing Use of EVs in car sharing/
ride-sharing schemes
Increase in preferences for 
private, single-occupancy 
driving practices
Increases in mobility Implemented in tandem with 
active transport planning 
(walking, cycling)
Extra car trips, multiple car 
ownership, displaces 
enthusiasm for cycling
Zero-carbon and low 
carbon electricity
Use of EV in countries with 
decarbonised electricity grids
Use of EV in countries with 
coal-based electricity
Smart grids Charging at off-peak times and 
storage for peak demand
Charging at peak times with 
no storage
Critical materials 
scarcity
Efficient manufacturing 
techniques with an appreciation 
for externalities with battery 
recycling
Inefficient and polluting 
manufacturing techniques with 
no battery recycling
Employment, 
competitiveness, and 
growth
Designed and promoted by 
sustainable firms with a focus on 
innovation and entrepreneurship
Coopted and marginalised by 
transnational conglomerates 
with little desire for social 
change
Source: Sovacool (2017)
Note: EV = Electric vehicle
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suggests several policies to prevent or at least minimise injustice in 
Table 7.3. Thus, our justice framework shows that policymakers need to 
think broadly when implementing EVs in order to avoid half-measures of 
energy justice.
In addition, many of the areas of contestation, or the issues of equity and 
vulnerability that arise, are not “new” to EVs or V2G—they likely exist with 
other low carbon technologies and also conventional cars and other forms 
of mobility. However, a lesson here is perhaps that changing the perfor-
Table 7.3 Policy mechanisms for more sustainable and just Nordic electric 
mobility
Area of 
contestation
Example(s) Policy response
Unfair access EVs only accessible by 
higher socioeconomic 
consumers
Avoid regressive EV subsidies, encourage 
lower-cost EV development, increase 
consumer knowledge of cheaper EVs
Elitism in 
planning and 
policymaking
EV policy determined in 
scope of higher 
socioeconomic consumers
Exclusion of other subsets 
of the population (low 
income, users of other 
mobility)
Better inclusion of the entire population in 
EV policies (e.g. public charging 
infrastructure coverage),
Broader electrification of public transport, 
more comprehensive transport policy, 
progressive EV, and V2G subsidies
Lifecycle 
externalities
EVs exacerbate other 
externalities (congestion, 
electricity-related 
externalities)
Global south excluded 
from EVs, instead get 
cheap petrol/diesel
Deployment of EVs requires deployment of 
other renewable electricity, transportation 
planning policies, internalising externalities, 
carefully managing battery and lifecycle waste 
streams
Shift international focus of EVs beyond 
global North, international mechanisms to 
shift technology and support small EV 
initiatives present in those countries (clean 
development mechanism policy)
Vulnerable 
groups
Conventional car industry 
job loss, particularly 
maintenance
Dealership resistance to 
selling new technologies
Implement job training programmes for new 
EV industry (e.g. battery specialisation, 
EVSE repair, V2G aggregation) similar to 
coal-to-solar transition
Consistent EV and V2G policy signals, 
allowing industry preparation and investment 
for EV transition
Source: Sovacool et al. (2019)
Note: EV = Electric vehicle, V2G = Vehicle-to-grid, EVSE = Electric vehicle supply equipment
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mance or engine of a vehicle, or introducing a new type of car such as an 
EV or an innovation such as V2G, does not necessarily change the underly-
ing political economy or power dynamics behind mobility or automobility. 
Systems of mobility themselves—involving multiple, competing and over-
lapping technologies, modes of mobility, and transport infrastructures—
can also be just or unjust, even if they utilise innovations such as EVs or 
V2G that have material potential to reduce environmental and social harms. 
There may be situations, practices, or socio-material configurations where 
V2G EVs meet principles of justice, sustainability, or sustainable develop-
ment, but also areas where they may not (such as when an EV reinforces 
automobility and merely represents an additional car, and thus becomes a 
net environmental burden, or increases the demand for motorised mobility 
at the expense of more active walking and cycling). The sociotechnical 
potential of electric mobility is, therefore, situational, relational, and con-
tingent. The answer to the question “Is it good?” will invariably be “It 
depends.” The chapter has aimed to provide an overview of what it depends 
on, to inform an accountable and sustainable energy transition.
7.6  conclusIon
To conclude, the inherent promise embodied in electric mobility is just 
that, potential not yet fully realised. Its regional and perhaps even global 
deployment pathways, its future potential or vision, will differ consider-
ably depending on context and policy. Electric mobility is at a pivotal 
moment in its development where it could merely reinforce aspects of 
conventional mobility—where society instead adopts more efficient con-
ventional cars, or other alternative modes and fuels such as biofuel or 
hydrogen. Or, electric mobility could remain trapped as a niche, an impor-
tant but by no means dominant system of mobility. Alternatively, perhaps 
electric mobility will reach high penetrations across a dirty grid, a 
 decarbonised grid, or a super-smart high-tech digitised grid. Which of 
these pathways becomes a reality is contingent and context-specific—
which reveals the promise, but also the peril, of electric mobility.
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CHAPTER 8
Accountability and the Regulation 
of Legitimacy: Biodiversity Conservation 
and Energy Extraction in the American West
Steven Wolf
Abstract Energy extraction in the western United States poses existential 
risks to sage-grouse, a charismatic ground-nesting bird. Study of how this 
concern is integrated into the governance of the sector can inform a 
broader analysis of sustainability transitions. I introduce a model of co- 
evolution of standards of legitimacy and material practices that highlights 
how emergence of new accountability ‘tests’ can potentially drive socio-
ecological transformation. This evolutionary model emphasises account-
ability and legitimacy as mechanisms of selection (demographic/
behavioural change). Because accountability mechanisms and selection 
pressures do not exist to transform the Colorado energy sector in a man-
ner that benefits sage-grouse, the assessment reveals that there is no sus-
tainability transition underway. As we focus on the broader analytical and 
practical challenges presented by sustainability transitions, attention to 
accountability, legitimacy, and selection mechanisms will be essential.
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8.1  EnErgy Production and Loss of BiodivErsity
The sage-grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus) is a ground-nesting bird 
dependent on sagebrush steppe habitat in 11 western states in the United 
States. The population is in marked decline, with the current range of the 
species reduced to 56% its historic distribution (Schroeder et al. 2004). 
Following formal petitions, US Fish and Wildlife Service concluded an 
assessment in 2010 (USFWS 2010) to determine if the sage-grouse should 
be protected under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In 2010, the fed-
eral government determined that protections were warranted based on 
population estimates and ecological modelling, but that it was not practi-
cal to implement protections under the law due to competing demands on 
the agency. The federal government invited the relevant states to develop 
conservation plans that would protect the habitat (and ostensibly the pop-
ulation) of sage-grouse. Inducing the creation of these conservation plans 
can be understood as a means of fulfilling obligations that flow from the 
Endangered Species Act.
In Colorado, oil and gas development is the leading cause of sage- 
grouse habitat degradation (Copeland et  al. 2009). A leading environ-
mental non-governmental organisation (NGO), Environmental Defense 
Fund (EDF), organised relevant stakeholders to develop the Colorado 
Habitat Exchange, a compensatory mitigation programme through which 
the oil and gas industry could purchase habitat credits to offset habitat 
degradation associated with their operations. The credits would be sup-
plied by farmers and ranchers who commit to conservation or restoration 
of land, thereby producing positive gains in habitat. In this way, energy 
development could be rendered compatible with a commitment to no-net 
loss of sage-grouse habitat.
In terms of socioecological interplay and feedbacks, energy demand/
supply causes land use disturbance, resulting in sage-grouse population 
declines and awareness of risks of ecological disturbance. This has the 
potential to drive social regulation (i.e., the introduction of accountability 
mechanisms that encourage firms to avoid destroying valuable habitat and 
to offset habitat loss when avoidance is not practical), which can, in turn, 
change land use patterns to stabilise populations of sage-grouse. As 
depicted, this dynamic can be understood as a transition from a situation 
in which the energy industry contributes in a significant way to risk of 
sage-grouse extinction to a situation in which the energy industry responds 
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to social demand for biodiversity protection and contributes positively to 
sage-grouse conservation success.
While energy transitions are generally understood to involve a shift 
from fossil fuels to renewable energy supply, it is useful to consider other 
challenges. Adaptations that address protection of wildlife, water quality, 
air quality, workers, and communities where extraction and processing 
occur all represent important challenges to the industry, the economy, and 
to social capacity for regulation. Studying the integration of biodiversity 
concerns into energy development can inform understanding of prospects 
for sustainability, broadly defined. More generally, this work can demon-
strate how attention to accountability and legitimacy can support analysis 
of environmental governance.
8.2  LEgitimation crisis, rEguLation, 
and socioEnvironmEntaL changE: an EvoLutionary 
modEL of EnvironmEntaL govErnancE
The framing of this volume places accountability and legitimation pro-
cesses at the centre of environmental governance (see Kraft and Wolf 
2018). Accountability mechanisms provide assurance against unacceptable 
behaviour and serve to regulate flows of legitimacy. Legitimacy is under-
stood to be a socially mediated resource that shapes the prospects of 
actors, rewards and constrains behaviour, and channels socioeconomic 
development (e.g., industrial organisation) and material practices (e.g., 
techniques for producing energy). As contributing authors to this volume, 
we are asked to analyse practices of legitimation that serve to disrupt—as 
well as conserve—business as usual in order to advance scholarship on 
sustainability transitions. At the same time, we are encouraged to identify 
opportunities to challenge and to change practices/relations of account-
ability and flows of legitimacy in order to advance sustainability transitions.
Habermas’ (1975) analysis of the legitimation crisis draws our attention 
to systemic dimensions of technical and institutional change within imag-
ined sustainability transitions. For Habermas, the crisis is a state in which 
there are no problem-solving pathways available to incumbent decision 
makers. The control/regulatory apparatus is perceived as not being capa-
ble of repair or renewal. The anticipated outcome is disruptive innovation, 
qualitative change; a shift to a different state. ‘To the extent that (ecologi-
cal) scarcity is a technical problem, this does not necessarily  constitute a 
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crisis. The crisis stems from lack of institutional alternatives. What is scarce 
is coordination capacity. We do not have proven, practical institutional 
responses to what ails us, or at minimum, the switching costs and the 
learning challenges make transition frightening’ (Wolf and Bonanno 2014: 
287). In these terms, a crisis of legitimacy has the potential to catalyse a 
transition, some forms of which might be called sustainable.1 This transi-
tion will entail both technical and institutional state variables. We have not 
advanced very far in some imagined transition towards sustainability (e.g., 
reduced reliance on fossil fuels and reduced CO2 flux and reductions in 
economic stratification), and so it is possible to suggest that there is no 
legitimation crisis. In other words, people do not interpret the situation in 
terms of institutional failure. Consumer capitalism appears quite sustain-
able, and core debates are framed in technical (i.e., post- political 
(Swyngedouw 2009)) terms. Dominant institutions, dominant actors, and 
dominant material practices are able to reproduce their legitimacy despite 
social and ecological contradictions (Piketty 2013; Rockström et al. 2009). 
For this reason, this book is focused on questions about how this legiti-
macy is maintained and how new accountability practices might alter flows 
of legitimacy and advance a sustainability transition.
Science and technology studies has developed the concept of sociotech-
nical systems, highlighting the mutual embeddedness of social processes 
and technology. This integrated perspective is rather central to the sustain-
ability transitions literature. In trying to make sense of sociotechnical 
change and processes of regulation, I identify flows of legitimacy and 
accountability ‘tests’ as essential considerations (see top right in Fig. 8.1). 
Such tests can take the form of laws, administrative rules, professional best 
practices, technical standards, cultural conventions, investment and con-
sumption behaviours, and other social processes that structure discrimina-
tion routines (i.e., processes of selection within an ecological model). 
Processes of selection, or regulation, are central to an analysis of mecha-
nisms that might produce a sociotechnical transition or rapid ‘flip’ (i.e., 
state change) into something we might identify as sustainability. They are 
also central to the analysis of how sustainability imperatives are blunted 
and co-opted. Blühdorn (2007) has emphasised the need to analyse how 
we ‘sustain the unsustainable’. The reproduction of selection mecha-
nisms/environments—that is, standards of legitimacy and mechanisms of 
1 Authoritarianism is a possible outcome, and the relationship between authoritarianism 
and sustainability requires reflection.
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accountability—that fail to change the distribution of relevant behaviours 
and outputs are a central mechanism for path dependence in socioecologi-
cal systems.
Selection is the process that drives demographic change and demo-
graphic stability (i.e., organisational ecology). Here, we can imagine a 
population of oil and gas firms with variable capacity to respond to new 
regulations, new eco-audits, or new consumer sensibilities (Wolf and 
Primmer 2006). In addition to demographic change, selection can alter 
the distribution of behaviours. Firms adapt more frequently than they dis-
appear. We can imagine the costs of offsetting the degradation of sage- 
grouse habitat as driving some firms out of business (i.e., churn in the 
population), and we can imagine such costs as shifting firms’ drilling oper-
ations to geographic zones outside of prime sage-grouse habitat (an adap-
tation of technical practices and outputs).
The co-evolutionary model sketched in Fig. 8.1 can help us make sense 
of incremental processes of socioecological change (adaptation) as well as 
rapid flips (punctuated equilibrium). Regardless of the pace of change, the 
analysis presented here emphasises linkages between socially mediated 
assessments, economic and technical development, and socioecological 
change (see Norgaard 1994).
Domain of assessment
Legitimacy/accountability
˝tests˝
Organizational ecology Organization/network/field (I)
Organizational
strategy &
competency
formation
Domain of action
Selection/Practice
Organization/network/field(II)
Innovation, reconfiguration,
performance
Socioecological
outputs/outcomes
Social regulation
Sociotechnical
development
Fig. 8.1 Co-evolution of nature and society mediated by accountability mecha-
nisms and legitimacy tests
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As represented in the model, standards of assessment emerge from cul-
ture, politics, and scientific interpretations of socioecological status and 
trajectory (e.g., changes in biodiversity and the stakes attached to it). 
Accountability represents a series of relational ties that position some 
actors to make judgements of others and impose sanctions when appropri-
ate (Bovens 2007). Judgements are based on assessments of how well a 
given practice or organisation conforms to norms that derive from deep 
structures of society (i.e., institutions such as family, community, market, 
state, etc.) (Kraft and Wolf 2018). Sanctions—penalties, taxes, withdrawal 
of subsidies, consumer boycott, investor flight—hinder performance and 
reduce competitiveness, by definition, and in this sense, they are an ele-
ment of selection processes (i.e., organisational ecology). At the same 
time, shifting standards of accountability and shifts in how legitimacy is 
produced/accessed gives rise to new organisational strategies and new 
competencies tied to emerging competitive strategies (Wolf and Primmer 
2006). Out of this adaptation dynamic, we observe innovation and recon-
figuration of material practices.
Changes in the institutional environment and the competitive land-
scape also give rise to gestures or performances that communicate engage-
ment with norms, but amount to little material change that can be linked 
back in any direct way to the new accountability tests mentioned earlier.2 
Note that these performances—for example, ways of talking about sus-
tainability concerns—can be an element of a new competitive landscape, 
and in this sense, they are not empty. This dynamic of adaptation—sub-
stantive and gestural—produces a newly configured population (i.e., 
organisation/network/field II), which is characterised by a different dis-
tribution of behaviours as well as the introduction of new material prac-
tices. These developments constitute socioecological change, and 
outcomes include changes in ecology and distributional shifts in the well-
being of people and ecosystems. These outcomes give rise to new ecologi-
cal risks and opportunities and new social values and politics. In this 
shifting cognitive and sociomaterial landscape, the stage is set for a new 
round of assessments and evaluations that constitute accountability prac-
tices and structure flows of legitimacy.
2 In addition to disappearing from the population and adaptation, actors also have the 
potential to shape the selection environment. Lobbying, constructing political coalitions, 
public relations, and efforts to reshape culture are active strategies relevant for understanding 
the co-evolution of sociotechnical systems.
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8.3  accountaBiLity tEsts and LEgitimacy fLows 
of thE coLorado sagE-grousE haBitat ExchangE
Accountability relations are socially mediated assessments that structure 
flows of legitimacy and channel sociotechnical development. In reflecting 
on how declining populations of sage-grouse might give rise to changes in 
the Colorado energy sector, we can identify a set of important actions that 
allow us to reflect on how accountability relations and practices of legiti-
mation are implicated in processes of social regulation. The analysis pre-
sented here is symmetrical. The aim is to highlight the potential for 
accountability relations to advance a sociotechnical dynamic that supports 
the sustainability of sage-grouse populations, and to highlight the poten-
tial for these same relations to legitimate and reproduce the sociotechnical 
dynamic responsible for the existing risk of extinction.
8.3.1  Construction of a Market-based Habitat Exchange
Applied to oil and gas extraction in Colorado and the fate of the sage- 
grouse, the construction of the habitat exchange is an important effort 
to introduce accountability for habitat loss and it is a key site of produc-
tion of legitimacy for a range of actors. The exchange is promoted as 
capable of producing no-net loss of sage-grouse habitat. By quantifying 
the habitat losses associated with specific oil and gas development proj-
ects and the habitat gains associated with conservation actions by 
Colorado landowners interested in selling habitat credits, the exchange is 
a platform buying and selling sage-grouse habitat offsets. These offsets 
are a form of compensatory mitigation. As imagined by designers of the 
exchange, firms seeking drilling permits from the state purchase the 
appropriate volume of habitat credits through the exchange, and this 
makes it possible to advance oil and gas production while safeguarding 
sage-grouse populations. Compensatory mitigation of habitat loss is the 
final element of the mitigation hierarchy—avoid, minimise, and offset. 
The design and administration of the exchange emphasises offsetting as 
a fallback option. Avoiding development projects that degrade habitat 
and altering projects to minimise disturbance to habitat advance conser-
vation directly, while offsetting can be understood as providing a more 
diffuse benefit to sage-grouse.
The Colorado Exchange was created by the Environmental Defense 
Fund (EDF), a New York-based NGO. EDF partnered with the Colorado 
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Cattlemen’s Association (representing landowners positioned to sell 
 credits to oil and gas firms) and co-solicited relevant Colorado state agen-
cies, and firms in the energy industry to participate in the creation and 
governance of the exchange (Large and Wolf 2018). The prospect of the 
sage- grouse gaining protection from the federal Fish and Wildlife Service 
through the ESA—and the political and economic fallout of regulation 
under the ESA—is generally understood as motivating this state-level 
cooperation. As a market-based approach to environmental management, 
habitat offsetting is linked to experience with the Clean Air Act, stream 
bank and wetlands mitigation banking, and the Clean Development 
Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. Reliance on market exchange to 
structure environmental management grants flexibility to individual firms, 
responds to criticisms of coercive bureaucratic controls, and ostensibly 
produces conservation at least aggregate cost. These traits lend habitat 
offsetting a modern and practical sensibility, which resonates positively 
with a broad range of relevant actors and varied logics of coordination.
Despite the elegance of the concept, after seven years of design and 
consultation, the exchange has not generated any habitat offsets. To 
repeat, the exchange has not supported any transactions that advanced 
conservation. Regardless of the capacity of the exchange to function, how-
ever, the concept of the exchange has produced a sustained dialogue 
among the central public and private sector policy actors in Colorado and 
nationwide.
Prospects for further development of the exchange were damaged in 
the summer of 2018 when the oil and gas industry formally announced 
that they were resigning from the exchange governance board and that 
they were not willing to play a further role in its development unless the 
expectations for offsetting were ratcheted downward. This announce-
ment was followed by EDF shifting their personnel away from develop-
ment of the exchange. The timing of this rupture was tightly linked to an 
announcement by the US Secretary of Interior ending mandates that sup-
ported compensatory mitigation under ESA.  This policy decision was 
explicitly tied to ambitions to promote ‘energy independence’. Over the 
past year, the Trump administration has continued to roll back legal pro-
tections for sage-grouse and, more broadly, to weaken ESA (Davenport/
NY Times 2019).
The habitat exchange was created to serve as a primary vehicle for hold-
ing the oil and gas industry accountable for sage-grouse habitat degrada-
tion, and it is a primary vehicle for demonstrating to federal regulators—and 
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a wide variety of other parties—that ESA protections for sage-grouse are 
not necessary. The exchange continues to be represented as relevant and 
vibrant,3 despite the fact that zero offsets have been created under this 
governance mechanism and the buyer of offsets has publicly announced 
their unwillingness to participate. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue 
that the exchange serves to legitimate business as usual. The exchange 
functions to sustain the cognitive dissonance—that is, capacity to recon-
cile contradictions—attached to existing socioecological relations (Walker 
et al. 2009). The capacity of the exchange to organise and sustain dialogue 
in the policy field appears to be sufficient to maintain the legitimacy of 
existing socioecological relations. According to the co-evolutionary model 
sketched above (Fig. 8.1), there are no accountability tests and no selec-
tion pressure to advance structural or technical changes that could be rec-
ognised as a sustainability transition. That said, if a significant political 
bloc were to commit to conservation, and federal and state regulators 
were to reverse their position and require firms to purchase offsets (Green 
2018), the exchange would be a critical element of the infrastructure sup-
porting governance and sage-grouse conservation. In this sense, it is pos-
sible to interpret the exchange as all of the following: a failure, a distraction, 
and an accomplishment.
8.3.2  Quantification Tools
The technical core of the Colorado sage-grouse habitat exchange is the 
Habitat Quantification Tool (HQT) sage-grouse exchange. This habitat 
suitability model produces an integrated assessment of how site-specific 
land use/land cover changes affect the productivity of land for sage-grouse 
feeding, reproduction, nesting and fledging. HQT scores specify the mag-
nitude of the habitat degradation (debits) associated with direct (e.g., oil 
and gas well pad and road and electricity service to the well) and indirect 
effects (e.g., spill overs from disturbed sites that degrade surrounding 
habitat values, measured through a distance-decay function) sage-grouse. 
The HQT also scores the positive contributions (credits) associated with 
conservation activities (e.g., ecological restoration, habitat enhancements, 
3 See, for instance, https://www.thepwc.org/habitat-exchangeexchange/ and https://
brianallmerradionetwork.wordpress.com/2018/12/21/12-21-18-co-governor- 
hickenlooper-signs-executive-order-furthering-conservation-and-clarifying-mitigation-of-
the-greater-sage-grouse/.
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transfer of development rights). This quantification is the basis for  asserting 
equivalencies across sites and projects, and it makes it possible to assign 
value and to conduct transactions through the exchange.
EDF convened a panel of scientific experts to produce the HQT, and 
there was an active effort to shield this process from political and eco-
nomic considerations. The HQT was peer-reviewed by a committee under 
the auspices of the Ecological Society of America, as well as by a 3rd-party 
reviewer selected by the oil and gas industry. The process of creating a 
science-based routine for accounting of habitat values and to assign rights 
(credits) and responsibilities (debits) are key practices of accountability 
advanced by the exchange. The elaborate process through which debits 
and credits are assigned, and the performances of rigour associated with 
the algorithm, legitimates the exchange. In fact, habitat exchanges were 
developed in response to perceived shortcomings of existing models of 
offsetting based on ‘conservation banking’ (Toombs et al. 2018; Barral 
2019). In conservation banking schemes, offsets are typically assigned 
based on ad hoc negotiations between administrators and buyers and sell-
ers of credits/debits. There is typically no standardised biological model-
ling, and rights and responsibilities are not specified a priori. Additionally, 
offsets in habitat banking programmes have largely been financed by insti-
tutional investors engaged in a form of speculation, and there have been 
limited opportunities for local landowners to participate as suppliers of 
credits. The HQT responds to concerns about transparency, consistency, 
and access, which bolsters its legitimacy as a conservation mechanism. In 
terms of accountability, the HQT is a technical standard that quantifies 
rights and responsibilities. In terms of legitimacy, this standard presents 
opportunities for efficient assessment of the extent to which an energy 
project or firm has internalised a commitment to no-net loss of habitat.
In reflecting on the development and the current status of the exchange, 
it is worthwhile to note that mobilising science and making significant 
investments in a standardised, transparent, quantitative approach to assign-
ing habitat values have not succeeded in advancing accountability applied 
to oil and gas firms’ degradation of sage-grouse habitat. From a biological 
perspective, the sage-grouse does not cope well with disturbance, and this 
is reflected in the debits assigned by the HQT. A firm building a four-acre 
well pad in sage-grouse habitat can be assigned as much as 800 acres of 
offsetting responsibility. Since the HQT was unveiled, the oil and gas 
industry has consistently raised critical questions about the magnitude of 
the debits assigned to specific projects. The oil and gas industry has stated 
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that they were willing to engage in offsetting, but not according to the 
terms embedded in the HQT.  Ecological discipline can be transmitted 
through metrics, but power lies elsewhere.
8.4  advancing a sustainaBLE EnErgy transition 
that suPPorts sagE-grousE
In reflecting on the Colorado Habitat Exchange as a vehicle to address 
conservation, it is worthwhile to reflect critically on the conflation of 
habitat conservation and security of the population of sage-grouse. It is 
quite possible for the population to collapse without a net loss of habitat. 
Climate change, invasive species, wildfire, and cumulative impacts from 
home building, road construction, infrastructure, recreation and other 
human activities, combined with questions about the fungibility of habi-
tats, raise questions about the coherence of this approach to conserva-
tion. Bracketing these issues, these concluding remarks focus on 
exploring the value of a co-evolutionary perspective for institutional 
analysis and design.
According to the co-evolutionary model presented here, a transition to 
a state in which energy supply does not undermine the security of the 
sage-grouse population requires new accountability tests that derive from 
new conceptions and new practices of legitimacy. These tests must channel 
selection in a manner that drives change over time in the distribution of 
relevant land use behaviours. The change in behaviours derives from a 
shift in the population of actors and the operational procedures, compe-
tencies, and strategies of those actors. Under existing political–economic 
relations, the exchange is not capable of introducing the required disci-
pline and/or rewarding relevant innovations.
Based on this analysis, research and practical interventions should focus 
on the potential for new politics and new dynamics in civil, market, and 
cultural domains that are capable of shifting how legitimacy is produced 
and accessed. With respect to accountability, there is a need to focus on 
sanctions (i.e., the imposition of costs and risks capable of reorienting 
behaviour and strategy). At present, the exchange does not work because 
there are no mechanisms to create demand for offsets through the 
exchange, premised on the HQT. Oil and gas firms are able to access drill-
ing permits from the state through other, less stringent regulatory 
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pathways.4 In the absence of leadership by the state—that is, willingness to 
impose sanctions on oil and gas firms that are heavy enough to change the 
extent of land use disturbance and sufficient to conserve sufficient and 
appropriately configured habitats—the exchange cannot function to con-
serve sage-grouse. Voluntary commitments by firms are insufficient and 
consumer preferences are not expressed in a manner capable of producing 
significant changes. Habitat offsetting, and perhaps most analogous 
market- based conservation strategies, rest on the existence or creation of 
demand for offsets. This demand rests on the legislative and judicial redef-
inition of rights and responsibilities. Unless consumers, investors, voters, 
and regulators hold these expectations and impose these duties, this envi-
ronmental governance strategy cannot sustain sage-grouse in Colorado 
and advance a sustainable transition.
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sector and focus modulates their relevance. This chapter summarises the 
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discernment of cross-cutting dimensions along which practices of legiti-
mation play out. These dimensions include spatiality, temporality, oppor-
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9.1  The Cross-CuTTing Dimensions Where 
LegiTimaTion is PraCTiseD in eaCh Case
What can be learned from summarising and consolidating the practices of 
legitimation encountered in the unpacking of five diverse energy transition 
cases? This chapter employs an abductive reasoning approach. The prac-
tices of legitimation that constitute the empirically informed point of 
departure in Chap. 2 are treated as an example of deductive reasoning 
here: it is possible to categorise practices along four registers (discursive, 
bureaucratic, technocratic and financial) that are overlapping (not mutu-
ally exclusive) and comprehensive (all practices of legitimation fit within 
their remit). These practices move from the general to the specific. The 
five cases that make up Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 hold examples of inductive 
reasoning. In each chapter, the author chooses a point of entry to offer a 
fine-grained analysis of accountability relations within their case of energy 
transition, moving from the specific to the general by means of analytical 
abstraction. Part III acknowledges that these analyses are limited by 
degrees of uncertainty—their knowledge base is necessarily incomplete. It 
seeks a pragmatic approach to characterise and inform decision-making 
despite uncertainty, and therefore applies abductive reasoning to settle 
upon the likeliest possible explanation in any given case.
In short, this concluding part works towards ways to characterise energy 
transitions as accountable to concerns of sustainability or not in disaggre-
gated, case-specific instances of decision-making that affect decarbonisa-
tion and social equity enhancement outcomes. Accountability relations are 
rarely fully legible since they comprise both formal and informal practices 
of legitimation that require empirical study with varying data access, hence 
any approach that analyses accountability must address uncertainty within 
its design. An abductive approach to accountability analysis opens up for 
empirical investigation, accommodates uncertainty, and retains focus on 
practical applicability and real-world relevance.
Part III proceeds step-wise. This chapter articulates how practices of 
legitimation along four registers (discursive, bureaucratic, technocratic 
and financial) are present in each case to extents that differ based on 
how each author’s choice of sector and focus modulates their relevance. It 
summarises the wide range of ways in which these practices uphold and 
challenge accountability crises in each energy transition case. Such juxta-
position and consolidation allow discernment of cross-cutting dimensions 
along which practices of legitimation play out. Proceeding sequentially 
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through the five cases, it draws out seven dimensions: spatiality, temporal-
ity, opportunism, prefiguration, performativity, power-play, political econ-
omy, and normalisation or routinisation. This sets up the concluding 
Chap. 10, which links the four registers of practices of legitimation and the 
structuring set of cross-cutting dimensions with broader environmental 
governance scholarship on accountability.
While each case treatment can be read in multiple lights, certain dimen-
sions stand out in each: spatiality and temporality in Timothy Moss’ his-
torical analysis of Berlin’s energy transitions over the past century; 
opportunism in Christian Lund’s study of attempts at the scalar reconsti-
tution of authority during land conflicts in Indonesia; prefiguration and 
performativity in Håvard Haarstad’s account of the role of target-setting 
in urban climate change mitigation efforts; power-play in the form of 
automobile incumbency, regime persistence and path dependence in 
Benjamin Sovacool’s unpacking of electric mobility in the Nordic coun-
tries; and political economy and normalisation or routinisation in Steven 
Wolf’s problematisation of the construction of a habitat exchange for bio-
diversity offsetting by energy extractive industries. The latter part of this 
chapter, Sect. 9.2, draws out these aspects case by case. It offers reflections 
in relation to which practices of legitimation play out within these dimen-
sions and in what way.
9.2  The regisTers aLong WhiCh LegiTimaTion is 
PraCTiseD in eaCh Case
9.2.1  For Timothy Moss
The case is three contrasting energy transitions at different historical 
moments in Berlin, each driven by the situated urges of a specific politics 
that evolves over time. Moss points out that there are different crises of 
accountability at each historical point, as the urban fabric of Berlin itself 
cannot be understood as the same space over the past century. In the 
1920s, this concerned who should supply energy to Berlin; during post- 
war division, it concerned self-sufficiency for West Berlin’s energy provi-
sion within city borders; and today it concerns ownership and control of 
the urban energy infrastructure. Each of these accountability crises fea-
tures corresponding practices of legitimation, and this historical contextu-
alisation (cf. Lockwood et  al. 2017) serves to caution against any easy 
9 PRACTICES OF LEGITIMATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY CRISES… 
108
assumption of interventions that can render energy transitions account-
able towards sustainable outcomes. Moss reminds us that sustainability 
itself is a relatively new concern in its current form, which came about 
during the 1970s. Drawing on earlier histories, he argues, requires 
acknowledgement of this limitation, but can generate a deeper apprecia-
tion of where sustainability thinking comes from, what echoes can be 
detected in the past, and how energy infrastructure legacies can frame cur-
rent visions and enactments of sustainability. He points out the danger of 
committing to a certain configuration of accountability that over the 
course of evolving politics and institutional structures might come to con-
stitute what Kramarz and Park (2017) call an accountability trap.
This case features a host of examples of discursive legitimation, for 
instance the local Communist Party’s criticism of the regressive effects of 
tariff increases in the early 1930s, the protest camp against the planned 
power plant in the Spandau Forest in 1976 (Fig. 4.2), the campaign poster 
of the Berlin Energy Roundtable for a referendum in 2013 (Fig. 4.3), and 
energy security arguments used during the Cold War. It also draws out 
legitimation practices along the bureaucratic register, for instance through 
the municipal imposition of city-wide unitary utility tariffs and uniform 
service standards in the 1920s, and the Allies’ insistence on high security 
standards for West Berlin’s urban energy system, including three months’ 
worth of primary energy reserves. Technocratic practices of legitimation 
are also in evidence in the large incumbent utility Vattenfall’s contempo-
rary emphasis on technical expertise and track record for managing the 
electricity and gas networks, and in cascading generating capacity require-
ments mandated during the security-oriented strategy during the Cold 
War. Finally, financial legitimation is visible in the pursuit of fair wages for 
employees at the city’s utilities and improvements to service quality used 
to justify massive urban infrastructure investment (partly based on foreign 
debt finance) in the 1920s. It is, however, notable that the need for finan-
cial legitimation at the urban scale is absent during the Cold War years of 
high-cost energy security and West German government subsidies 
to Berlin.
Moss’ historical analysis with its spatial and temporal purchase, then, 
offers rich insights into practices of legitimation along all four registers. 
Yet what is its import for interventions today in support of sustainable 
outcomes under transition? His analysis points to the articulation of 
demands for accountable remunicipalisation of energy infrastructure by 
contemporary social movements campaigning to prioritise  decarbonisation 
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and reduction in energy use over traditional criteria for urban energy man-
agement. This deconstruction and historical contextualisation of current 
trends that have brought about shifts in urban policy (in favour of a 
municipal utility and decarbonisation) is a demonstrably constructive out-
come of accountability analysis, in that it provides an evidenced basis to 
inform in situ decision-making as well as to discuss and debate Berlin’s 
energy transition at the present moment.
9.2.2  For Christian Lund
The case is changes in land use and in who has authority over land. This 
concern inevitably accompanies debates about energy transitions, as all 
energy sources have a land footprint, and most land use (in this case forestry 
or agriculture) has direct or indirect implications for greenhouse gas emis-
sions or carbon sequestration. The questions of accountability that Lund 
unpacks, however, are chiefly concerned with power and social equity, and 
competition over the legitimation of power by institutions at different scales 
and with various degrees of formality. The accountability crises at play in 
Indonesia’s hinterland are interrelated. On the one hand, there is the crisis 
of villagers who are being dispossessed of their land being hard put to hold 
a top-down state to account. The form of this state varies, as in 1978 when 
formal authority over large parts of land in West Java that was de facto used 
by agrarian villages shifted from the Provincial Forestry Service to the State 
Forest Corporation with uniformed parastatal police as part of an authori-
tarian regime. On the other hand, there is the crisis of what constitutes the 
state itself, with tussles over the scale at which authority is held. This surfaces 
in the villagers’ recognition of the Sundanese Peasant’s Movement in 2006, 
and more recently of the Village Office as the official local territorial admin-
istrative institution with authority over land, in order to counter the efforts 
of national institutions that sought to take over the land for forestry. Lund 
points out that the power to define subjecthood for oneself or to impose 
subjecthood on others is an integral part of accountability, and that this 
power is bidirectional (Fox 2018). Not only subjecthood, but also author-
ity, can thus be re-purposed; making them visible in a given configuration 
here becomes the relational work of politics over land.
This case features instances of discursive legitimation such as the State 
Forest Corporation’s announcement of a planting ceremony of 1,000 
mahogany seedlings in rows named after government institutions (which 
the villagers promptly uprooted overnight), and its invocation of military 
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terms such as ‘illegal loggers’ and ‘subversive’ to draw equivalence between 
the villagers’ land occupation and organised crime. It also brings out spe-
cific bureaucratic legitimation practices, most notably the villagers’ request 
(which was granted) for new ID cards from the Village Office as the offi-
cial local territorial administration, which rendered their settlements offi-
cial sub-villages within the territorial area claimed by the State Forest 
Corporation. Technocratic legitimation is also in evidence in the 1978 
transfer of nearly one million hectares of official forestland in West Java to 
the State Forest Corporation—centralising authority away from the prov-
ince—and in the latter’s formal use of the language and protocols associ-
ated with national security to evict villagers as ‘forest security disturbances’. 
Finally, practices of financial legitimation surface in the provisory system of 
payment (10,000 Rupiah per month) by villagers to the Sundanese 
Peasant’s Movement instead of paying a third of their rice production as 
rent illegally demanded by the State Forest Corporation. They are also 
visible in the annual contributions of a million Rupiah by each sub-village 
to the Village Office, in essence a tax which established the villagers’ claim 
as landholders.
Lund’s fine-grained study of conflicts over land in remote tracts not 
only offers striking instances of practices of legitimation along all four 
registers, but also points to clear arenas that require attention for sustain-
able energy transitions. These arenas include the relations between people 
and institutions at multiple scales, and the necessity to allow for the desire 
for change to express itself in democratic politics. In his case, both the 
top- down use of force and popular resistance are opportunistic. Each seeks 
to recognise and establish specific relations between people and institu-
tions in order to cement land claims in their favour. This reading of the 
shaping of accountability relations casts new light on the social contract 
and on authority and subjecthood.
9.2.3  For Håvard Haarstad
The case is how Norwegian cities set climate mitigation targets construed 
as reductions in carbon emissions at the urban scale. While these targets 
are seemingly ambitious and commendable, they encounter challenges of 
commensurability across cities, and often lack concrete strategies for oper-
ationalisation. Haarstad identifies an accountability crisis that the very 
presence of decarbonisation targets can serve to justify prolonged delay on 
actual climate mitigation, as targets allow cities to channel the discursive 
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power of the promise of laudable action at the expense of diffusing politi-
cal pressure over the urgency of substantive action to achieve these goals 
which remains both slow and insufficient. Yet he flips this to point out that 
target-setting itself is not only performative but can also be regarded as a 
form of prefigurative politics, whereby the apparent failure to meet targets 
that increasingly come to be seen as desirable can spark another account-
ability crisis, one that can drive necessary climate mitigation at the urban 
scale. The Zero Growth Objective for urban transport in Norway, argues 
Haarstad, has resulted in concrete agreements signed by its largest cities in 
2016 and 2017 that have not only committed to limit traffic but also 
delivered results by way of a reduction in private car traffic during 2018. 
Contra the techno-managerial apparatus of the post-political condition 
(Swyngedouw 2010) that simply supports the status quo, the carrying 
power of numbers may motivate action by working targets into routinised 
repertoires.
This case offers a slew of examples of discursive legitimation, starting 
with the White Paper on Norwegian Climate Policy from 2006 which 
articulated the need for a shift to public and non-motorised transport, the 
White Paper on Norwegian Climate Policy from 2012 which formulated 
this as a ‘goal’ or target, and the very statement of the Zero Growth 
Objective. This posits that all growth in personal traffic in Norway’s larg-
est cities must be covered by public or non-motorised transport. 
Bureaucratic legitimation is also at play given that these and other govern-
ment policies (such as the Climate Accord of 2008 in the Norwegian par-
liament) consistently reference a 2 °C target to limit global warming and 
have worked this into a broad range of national policy documents and 
strategies, including for urban transport in this specific case. The use of 
technocratic practices of legitimation is evident in the National Transport 
Plan Working Group’s reasoning that ‘zero’ is a very easy target to mea-
sure and thus useful in holding cities to account, and the subsequent 
agreements signed by the country’s largest cities with specific indicators to 
measure performance on urban car traffic. Crucially, financial legitimation 
accompanies the Zero Growth Objective through these Urban 
Environment Agreements, which tie the amount of central funding allo-
cated to cities for local transport infrastructure with their prowess in meet-
ing the target.
Haarstad thus constructs the use of metrics as more than simply a 
bureaucratic apparatus of governance that perpetuates accountability cri-
ses in the shiny guise of new mitigation targets. He argues that targets 
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perform work that helps enable sustainable energy transitions by working 
their way into specific policies and indicators within sectors such as trans-
port. They drive future priorities by linking them to concrete objectives 
that can be measured (zero growth) and punished or rewarded (through 
urban transport infrastructure budget allocation). This relational analysis 
of policy-making and the operationalisation of targets highlights the value 
of prefigurative politics. Accountability analysis of this case contributes a 
valuable reconsideration of the role of targets in legitimating gradual but 
incremental climate mitigation action. Rather than challenging the exist-
ing sectoral configuration outright, targets work performatively to reorient 
its workings through the very routine, normalised structures and processes 
that shape sectoral futures.
9.2.4  For Benjamin Sovacool
The case is the advent of electric mobility in the five Nordic countries. As 
power from the electric grid is based on renewable energy to large extents 
in these contexts, this shift from fossil fuel powered vehicles to grid 
charged ones constitutes a prima facie energy transition. But Sovacool’s 
analysis of electric vehicle roll-out problematises this assumption, and flags 
four crises of accountability. The first concerns inequitable access to elec-
tric vehicles, which so far largely remain the preserve of privileged people 
even in these relatively wealthy countries. The second points out that 
exclusion is reflected in national planning around electric mobility, which 
risks making people dependent on distant infrastructures (like electric 
charging stations) on terms beyond their democratic control. The third 
crisis is on multiple spatial scales and pertains to the creation of externali-
ties at remote sites of material extraction to build electric vehicles, as well 
as the risk of relocating pollution from cities to regional sites of electric 
power production. The fourth crisis features the burden on some sectoral 
stakeholders such as fuelling stations that might have to invest in costly 
charging station infrastructure or risk job loss and vehicle dealerships that 
might have to invest more time and effort into electric vehicle sales. 
Sovacool argues that these crises, while perhaps inevitable components of 
shifting sectoral regimes, stem from the uneven effects of transition 
dynamics on different actors, and from inequities that are deeply embed-
ded within existing systems of mobility.
This case draws out a host of instances of discursive legitimation, most 
notably from people challenging the roll-out of electric vehicles in terms 
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of its sustainability effects. These interviewees critique subsidies accorded 
to Teslas as luxury electric vehicles; equate this to 30,000 public transport 
tickets per beneficiary; are sceptical of hybrid vehicles as allowing owners 
to cash in on incentives without affording any means to monitor their 
actual usage of electricity rather than internal combustion engines; and are 
critical of political tokenism in public discourse around electric vehicles. 
Bureaucratic legitimation is evident to varying extents across Nordic 
countries, from Norway’s all-inclusive packages to incentivise electric 
vehicles (which are so far mainly cars) to Denmark’s reluctant extension of 
lower duties (40% instead of 150%) on electric cars, but by comparison 
comes far less into play in relation to the electrification of public transport. 
Practices of technocratic legitimation are presented generically to promote 
sustainable mobility through charging at off-peak times, mandating bat-
tery recycling to reduce externalities, emphasising the decarbonisation of 
electric grids and coordinating roll-out with planning that prioritises non- 
motorised transport forms and intermodal electric transport. Finally, 
financial legitimation is notable in the enormous support provided for 
private electric cars which has been used by relatively rich people, and in 
the absence of similarly strong support to rapidly build out public electric 
transport infrastructure or cushion vulnerable groups against regressive 
effects of national fiscal policies on electric mobility (for instance through 
free public transport).
Sovacool thus illustrates practices of legitimation along all four regis-
ters, drawing on a large body of empirical material to characterise the 
multi-sited, multi-scalar and polycentric nature of accountability relations 
in mobility systems under transition. His case surfaces instructive princi-
ples (Tables 7.2 and 7.3) across comparative country contexts (Table 7.1) 
for how to work towards sustainable energy transitions in electrifying 
mobility systems. Treatment underscores the importance of unpacking 
power-play to fathom automobile incumbency, regime persistence and 
path dependence. By studying the practices of legitimation that accom-
pany shifts to electric mobility, accountability analysis brings several crises 
to the fore. It provides a means to point out specific measures that can be 
undertaken in each context to overcome these crises.
9.2.5  For Steven Wolf
The case is the construction of a habitat exchange market that could 
enable habitat replacement for biodiversity conservation of the  sage- grouse 
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(an endangered ground nesting bird that depends on sage brush steppe 
habitat) in Colorado while permitting the expansion of energy extractive 
industries. On the one hand, this can be regarded as a complete non-
starter, as Wolf points out that over the course of seven years, the habitat 
exchange failed to record a single transaction—an apparent accountability 
crisis in that it fails to address sage-grouse population decline. He attri-
butes this to the lack of appetite of the oil and gas companies to stump up 
the expenses for the amount of scientifically requisite land to compensate 
for the loss of biodiversity habitat, and inadequate political will to force 
their hand. On the other hand, as the process unfolds, it does construct 
the numerical model informed by cross-sectoral concerns (land costs and 
requirements for the fossil fuel majors and sage-grouse habitats respec-
tively). Wolf argues that this is a step in the direction of accountable socio-
ecological regulation, as it has brought into being an accountability test. 
Given a different future political economic context, the very existence of 
this data infrastructure (the Habitat Quantification Tool) and market 
infrastructure (the Colorado Habitat Exchange) increases its likelihood of 
eventual insertion into pertinent bureaucratic routines, and normalisation 
into decision-making around land allocation and habitat exchange.
This case draws out numerous instances of discursive legitimation, 
including the United States federal administration’s explicit linkage of 
‘energy independence’ with its ending of mandatory compensatory miti-
gation under the Endangered Species Act in 2018, and the continued 
representation of the habitat exchange as relevant and vibrant despite its 
never having executed a single transaction. Ironically, the habitat exchange 
was instrumental in arguments against protecting sage-grouse populations 
under the Endangered Species Act. Practices of bureaucratic legitimation 
are visible in the non-governmental organisation Environmental Defense’s 
efforts to set up the Colorado Habitat Exchange and orchestrate partici-
pation in its creation and governance by various relevant actors (including 
a cattlemen association, state agencies and energy extractive industries), 
layering this effort on experience with habitat offsetting under the Clean 
Air Act and the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism. 
Technocratic legitimation in this case pertains to the strategy of champi-
oning a market mechanism to avoid critique of coercive bureaucracy and 
to benefit from efficiencies such as low transaction costs, and to associated 
innovations such as the Habitat Quantification Tool to calculate compen-
sation amounts for replacement of sage-grouse habitats. Financial legiti-
mation, while present in the very logic of a market mechanism for carbon 
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offsetting of habitat loss, remained absent in practice. As the subject of 
controversy when the oil and gas industry protested the debits assigned to 
them based on the modelled cost calculations, as also when it resigned 
from the exchange’s governance board, questions of finance were used to 
delegitimate the whole exercise.
Wolf articulates accountability relations as a hollow performance in his 
case, where practices of legitimation along the four registers serve to per-
petuate a crisis of accountability. He emphasises that what remains missing 
is sanction, an imposition of requirements that would drive demand for 
offsets, even when the calculation and market infrastructure are put in 
place. These latter developments represent the innovation of mechanisms 
that can be used to routinise and normalise accountability if society mani-
fests the political economic will to demand a sustainable energy transition 
that must necessarily support sage-grouse as well. Thus, accountability 
analysis enables a clear account of what remains lacking to render this 
energy transition case sustainable.
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mechanisms that constrain or enable accountability to decarbonisation 
with social equity enhancement. The versatile analytical application of 
these practices can advance environmental governance research on steer-
ing energy transitions towards sustainability. This chapter explicates seven 
cross-cutting dimensions and indicates how practices of legitimation play 
out within them in five cases related to energy transitions, drawing on 
contextualised examples from two cases for each dimension. This illus-
trates how practices of legitimation (discursive, bureaucratic, technocratic 
and financial) can reframe wide-ranging cases from diverse perspectives, 
fields and disciplines. Applied researchers can choose customised dimen-
sions and enlarge this indicative set to identify situated mechanisms that 
modulate accountable energy transitions.
Keywords Accountability • Governance • Legitimacy • Energy 
transitions • Sustainability
What is the collective takeaway from our exploratory analysis centred on 
accountability? Defined as accountability to decarbonisation with enhanced 
social equity, the concept is analytically generative for characterising com-
ponents of any given energy transition as contributing to sustainability or 
not. Operationalised as four registers of practices of legitimation, account-
ability can be profitably applied across a wide range of cases. This applica-
tion can emphasise specific cross-cutting dimensions based on which 
accountability relations are of contextual interest. The five cases highlight 
grounded practices of legitimation, whether discursive, bureaucratic, tech-
nocratic or financial, that relationally produce accountability. The dimen-
sions that surface in these cases link accountability with other environmental 
governance concepts that are useful for advancing critical analyses of 
energy transitions. While provisional, this synthesis constitutes a basis that 
future research is invited to adapt and employ.
Section 10.1 furnishes a brief description of each of the seven indicative 
dimensions that are embodied in the five cases related to energy transitions 
in this book. Using illustrative examples from two cases for each of these 
dimensions, Sect. 10.2 demonstrates how practices of legitimation can be 
applied within each dimension. Finally, Sect. 10.3 summarises the 
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 significance of the five cases for future environmental governance scholar-
ship on accountability in energy transitions.
10.1  AccountAbility, RegisteRs, cRoss-cutting 
Dimensions AnD PRActices of legitimAtion
Analyses focused on accountability relations can demonstrably construe a 
wide variety of cases in energy transition terms and pinpoint a range of 
accountability crises. Such reframing can help articulate how specific 
accountability crises are being maintained or challenged through practices 
of legitimation along registers of discourse, bureaucracy, technocracy and 
finance. This book has presented and consolidated a variety of case treat-
ments—historical, conflict-centred, comparative, multi-scalar and cross- 
sectoral. This foray has surfaced a number of cross-cutting dimensions. 
Sareen (2019a) argues in Chap. 9 that our case studies span and equip us 
to discern seven indicative dimensions that can serve to structure our 
insights and guide future application. Within each such dimension, it is 
possible to identify practices of legitimation that are at work to contest, 
uphold or produce new specific outcomes in relation to accountable 
energy transitions.
Table 10.1 plots the registers along which the practices of legitimation 
play out against each of the cross-cutting dimensions that come up due to 
case selection and approach, which are choices guided by analysts’ contex-
tual knowledge. This makes the practices of legitimation pliable and ori-
ented at situated analyses of accountability. They can inform interdisciplinary 
analysis and identify interventions that can enable sustainable outcomes 
Table 10.1 Practices of legitimation with indicative dimensions for five wide- 
ranging cases
Registers/Dimensions Discursive Bureaucratic Technocratic Financial
Spatiality Berlin’s historical energy transitions, Nordic electric mobility 
transitions
Temporality Berlin’s historical energy transitions, Indonesian land conflict
Opportunism Indonesian land conflict, Norwegian zero growth target-setting
Prefiguration Norwegian zero growth target-setting, Colorado habitat exchange
Performativity Norwegian zero growth target-setting, Colorado habitat exchange
Power-play Nordic electric mobility transitions, Indonesian land conflict
Routinisation Colorado habitat exchange, Nordic electric mobility transitions
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during energy transitions in a given context. The four registers along 
which legitimation is practised—discursive, bureaucratic, technocratic and 
financial—play out within each dimension represented in the rows. These 
dimensions include spatiality, temporality, opportunism, prefiguration, 
performativity, power-play and routinisation (or normalisation). The table 
indicates two main cases which concern each dimension, but aspects cer-
tainly surface in other cases as well. The dimensions structure our descrip-
tion of how practices of legitimation can be applied to analyse accountability 
in energy transitions governance. Despite the wide range of these five 
cases, future work along these lines will doubtless generate additional 
dimensions. Whereas the four registers along which legitimation is prac-
tised are elaborated in Chap. 2 (Sareen 2019b), the cross-cutting dimen-
sions are explicated below with summary reflections on how each one 
manifests in two of the five cases.
10.1.1  Spatiality
Legitimation plays out simultaneously at and across multiple spatial scales 
during an energy transition. At stake are questions of distribution—where 
are benefits and burdens relocated from any sectoral changes, where are 
winners and losers based—and of the locus of decision-making and the 
sites that it affects across the spatial scale. In Berlin’s historical energy 
transitions case, the spatial dimension appears pertaining to where energy 
is generated, where energy infrastructure is financed and where energy 
infrastructure is controlled and owned. This varies in relation to Berlin’s 
territorial boundaries as well as the political economy of its geographical 
context. In the Nordic electric mobility transitions case, the spatial dimen-
sion relates to material decoupling in terms of where energy is produced 
to power the electric grid and where vehicles are manufactured. It also 
relates to where energy infrastructure like charging stations comes up, 
which jobs this creates and displaces, and what siting implies for which 
actors control electric mobility. Similar multi-scalar issues come up con-
cerning material inputs (such as cobalt and lithium) as well as waste flows 
(especially electronic waste).
10.1.2  Temporality
Legitimation plays out differently over time, both during the same energy 
transition and during sequential ones. The temporal dimension directs 
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attention to how sociotechnical and political economic configurations 
evolve within the same spatial context. This concentrates power at differ-
ent spatial scales and makes different societal choices politically viable. It 
opens up new technological possibilities through arenas of innovation 
where timing and concomitant infrastructural investment dynamically 
determine energy futures. In Berlin’s historical energy transitions case, 
these transitions are refracted by changing mores of political pressure 
interwoven with societal expectations and the material evolution of energy 
infrastructure. This includes the intergenerational equity aspects that 
underpin current campaigns to climate-proof Berlin’s energy infrastruc-
ture. In the Indonesian land conflict case, citizens squeezed off their land 
by an authoritarian regime are forced to adopt new tactics to retain land 
control over time. This brings about new competing recognition of insti-
tutional authority by subjects. They seek to strengthen the state at the 
local scale where it is more responsive to their needs, creating new govern-
mental configurations over time.
10.1.3  Opportunism
Legitimation plays out in powerful ways at specific conjunctures that can 
be definitive for a given energy transition. These moments of rupture or 
leverage points can be understood through the cross-cutting dimension of 
opportunism. Opportunistic or ad hoc legitimation capitalises on a cir-
cumstantial opening to wrest control of new possibilities and establish 
them in sociomaterial form through informal but rapidly formalised means 
rather than through existing formulae or behavioural patterns. It thus 
constitutes a quantum change in how society is configured with regard to 
a particular energy transition. In the Indonesian land conflict case, West 
Javanese villagers exercise their right to pay rent with discretion, recognis-
ing a local authority in the form of the Village Office rather than the cen-
tral government. This in turn shapes relations of authority in favour of 
their recognition as landholders. In the Norwegian zero growth target- 
setting case, a global 2  °C climate mitigation target is translated into a 
Zero Growth Objective to limit car traffic.
10.1.4  Prefiguration
Legitimation plays out in premeditated ways, where actors strategically 
manoeuvre energy transitions to secure advantageous new sectoral 
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 configurations. In contrast to opportunism, the dimension of prefigura-
tion highlights how particular choices are orchestrated and made seem-
ingly inevitable, despite having been initiated in a circumstance where they 
were highly contingent. This dimension enables us to trace how specific 
pathways are brought into being out of a wide array of possibilities. In the 
Norwegian zero growth target-setting case, setting a highly ambitious tar-
get that curbs any future increase in car traffic in Norway’s largest cities 
puts a literal brake on this hitherto growing sectoral segment within a 
short span. In the Colorado case, the failed attempt to secure habitat 
replacement for the sage-grouse from land takeover by energy extractive 
industries nevertheless creates infrastructures for data (Habitat 
Quantification Tool) and markets (Colorado Habitat Exchange) for future 
habitat exchange.
10.1.5  Performativity
Legitimation plays out as farce that can risk perpetuating the status quo 
and supporting energy transitions that lead to unsustainable outcomes, for 
instance decarbonising without enhancing social equity. The dimension of 
performativity draws attention to this tendency of employing rhetoric to 
obfuscate the absence of sufficient substantive action. Legitimation can 
thus become a clever and attractive but ultimately hollow performance, 
where new accountability relations to transition in a sustainable manner 
are not shaped for a different energy future, despite fanfare. In the 
Norwegian zero growth target-setting case, the Zero Growth Objective 
can be read as an ambitious target that, without a slew of accompanying 
sectoral policies, would simply remain unattainable; more critically, it 
could be argued as a means of distracting attention away from the carbon- 
emitting aviation sector which continues to grow. In the Colorado case, 
the expectation that a habitat exchange market would work (despite its 
subsequent failure) is implicated in the removal of compensatory mitiga-
tion mandates stemming from the Endangered Species Act.
10.1.6  Power-play
Legitimation plays out in uneven topographies of power, where outcomes 
are not shaped in a vacuum of fair decision-making processes, but socially 
modulated by influential actors within evolving institutional structures 
with specific historical legacies. The dimension of power-play highlights 
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the role of both inequitable power relations and more structural factors 
such as path dependency and regime persistence during energy transitions. 
It directs attention not only to overt confrontation and contestation but 
also to the absence of important deliberations where power grabs or 
incumbency prematurely close particular energy futures. In the Nordic 
electric mobility transitions case, the automobility regime and existing 
biases of systems of mobility are reproduced in the roll-out of electric 
mobility to a greater extent than the adoption of public and non-motorised 
transport solutions. In the Indonesian land conflict case, West Javanese 
villagers are unable to even consider recourse to authority at the national 
scale for their marginalised concerns and resort to the local scale.
10.1.7  Routinisation
Legitimation plays out through enactment within the existing sociopoliti-
cal fabric, at times achieving incremental change with greater ease and 
effectiveness than through more disruptive attempts at energy transitions. 
Through routinisation or normalisation, practices of legitimation work 
their way into the bureaucratic and banal decision-making apparatus of 
existing, often powerful institutions. Rather than subjecting these institu-
tions themselves to scrutiny, such legitimation reorients and repurposes 
their internal functioning. In the Colorado case, the choice of a habitat 
exchange is seen as a workable middle ground that can plausibly bring 
energy extractive industries on board in a politically feasible and efficient 
manner to replace sage-grouse habitats and conserve the declining popu-
lation; Environmental Defense focuses its efforts not on protesting fossil 
fuels but on assembling requisite data and market infrastructure. In the 
Nordic electric mobility transitions case, while the roll-out of electric 
mobility might suffer from existing problems of mobility systems, policies 
to encourage and coordinate it have made the Nordic countries global 
front-runners in electric mobility adoption.
10.2  APPlying PRActices of legitimAtion AcRoss 
RegisteRs AnD Dimensions
Having defined the dimensions, the next section illustrates how the regis-
ters along which legitimation is practised can be applied within each 
dimension. We draw on the five cases whose practices of legitimation have 
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been deconstructed and consolidated in Chap. 9 (Sareen 2019a). As illus-
trated above, multiple cases feature legitimation within each dimension; 
for clarity, we only present practices from two cases for each dimension.
10.2.1  The Spatiality Dimension
Within this dimension, discursive legitimation plays out at specific sites in 
situated ways, with consequences for what kind of energy transition is 
legitimated. In Berlin’s historical energy transitions case, discursive legiti-
mation appears spatially in the use of energy security arguments during the 
Cold War to push for self-sufficient energy production within city limit. It 
is also illustrated by the protest camp against the planned power plant in 
the Spandau Forest in 1976 (Fig. 4.2), which signifies contested territori-
alisation under energy transition. In the Nordic electric mobility transi-
tions case, spatiality is implicit in people’s critique of subsidies for luxury 
electric cars, which are equated with 30,000 transport tickets for each 
beneficiary, drawing attention to the spatial concentration of privilege and 
elitism, and its equity effects during transitioning mobility systems.
Bureaucratic legitimation is spatially expressed in the Berlin case as the 
municipal imposition of city-wide unitary tariffs across utilities and uni-
form service standards in the 1920s. This constitutes a smoothening and 
unification of urban territory for energy service delivery. Technocratic 
legitimation manifests spatially in the same case: the large incumbent util-
ity Vattenfall’s contemporary emphasis on technical expertise and track 
record for managing electricity and gas networks is a mode of ensuring 
continued relevance for actors with large spatial coverage, despite sectoral 
shifts towards openness to new small-scale actors. Financial legitimation 
also operates spatially in this case, as revealed in the adoption of city-wide 
fair and equal sectoral employee wages and service quality improvements 
to justify massive urban infrastructure investment (partly financed through 
foreign debt) in 1920s Berlin.
10.2.2  The Temporality Dimension
Here, discursive legitimation shows temporal significance in the Berlin 
case, pinpointed as discursive shifts from criticism of the regressive effects 
of tariff increases (by the local Communist Party during the 1920s) to a 
distinct emphasis on ownership in the campaign poster of the Berlin 
Energy Roundtable in 2013 (Fig. 4.3 shows this proclaiming ‘Our 
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 municipal utility, our power grid, our Berlin’ for a referendum). Priorities 
and their discursive justification change over time in ways that reveal an 
evolving basis for accountability claims. Bureaucratic legitimation also 
makes sense of temporal patterns such as in the Berlin case with high secu-
rity standards built into the urban energy system in the 1970s, including 
three months’ worth of primary energy reserves. This artefact of geopoli-
tics has temporal legacies that shape subsequent energy infrastructure.
Technocratic legitimation exhibits a temporal dimension in the same 
case with Berlin’s requirements for cascading generating capacity during 
the security-oriented strategy of the 1970s. These embed particular proto-
cols into energy infrastructure that extend into current sectoral standards. 
In the Indonesian land conflict case, the transfer of nearly one million 
hectares of official forestland in West Java to the State Forest Corporation 
in 1978 centralises authority away from the province in a manner that 
gains significance during land ownership conflicts three decades later. 
Financial legitimation expresses temporally as a highlighted singularity in 
the Berlin case where, in contrast to urban politics shaping energy infra-
structure investments, financing simply did not require validation at the 
urban scale during the Cold War years of prioritised energy security and 
West German government subsidies to Berlin.
10.2.3  The Opportunism Dimension
Within this dimension, discursive legitimation comes into play in the 
Indonesian land conflict case when the State Forest Corporation announces 
a planting ceremony of 1000 mahogany seedlings in rows named after 
government institutions, as well as when the villagers promptly uproot 
them overnight, both channelling the occasion into the purposive refram-
ing of where authority rests, through imposition and resistance. 
Bureaucratic legitimation is notable within this dimension in the same case 
when the villagers request (and are granted) new ID cards from the Village 
Office as the local territorial administration, which renders their settle-
ments official sub-villages in the territorial area claimed by the State Forest 
Corporation.
Technocratic legitimation exhibits an opportunistic dimension in the 
Norwegian zero growth target-setting case, when the National Transport 
Plan Working Group reasons that ‘zero’ is a very easy target to measure 
and thus useful in holding cities to account, and in subsequent agreements 
signed by Norway’s largest cities with indicators to track performance on 
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urban car traffic. Financial legitimation comes up in the Indonesian land 
conflict case by way of the provisory system of payment by villagers to the 
Sundanese Peasant’s Movement, rather than paying rent illegally demanded 
by the State Forest Corporation. It is also present in each sub-village’s 
annual contributions to the Village Office, in essence embodying a land 
tax to establish the villagers’ claim as landholders.
10.2.4  The Prefiguration Dimension
Here, discursive legitimation is apparent in the Norwegian zero growth 
target-setting case, where the White Paper on Norwegian Climate Policy 
2006 articulates the need for a shift to public and non-motorised trans-
port, the White Paper on Norwegian Climate Policy 2012 formulates this 
as a ‘goal’ or target, and the Zero Growth Objective states that all growth 
in personal traffic in Norway’s largest cities must come through public or 
non-motorised transport. Bureaucratic legitimation also takes on a pre-
figurative dimension in the same case, where Norway’s policies (such as 
the Climate Accord of 2008) consistently reference a 2 °C target to limit 
global warming and work this into a range of national documents and 
strategies, including for urban transport. This imbrication of a broad goal 
into concrete policies firms up the possibility of a stronger basis for ambi-
tious energy transitions in urban mobility.
Technocratic legitimation is instantiated as prefigurative in the Colorado 
habitat exchange case in the innovation of the Habitat Quantification 
Tool, which can calculate compensation amounts for replacement of sage- 
grouse habitats. This paves the path for biodiversity conservation mecha-
nisms in circumstances of greater political will. Financial legitimation is 
evidently prefigurative in the Norwegian target-setting case, where the 
Urban Environment Agreements under the Zero Growth Objective tie 
the central funding allocated to cities for local transport infrastructure 
with their prowess in meeting the target. This linkage moves future incen-
tives for the sectoral evolution of urban mobility into closer alignment 
with accountability to sustainable energy transition targets.
10.2.5  The Performativity Dimension
Within this dimension, discursive legitimation is evident in the Colorado 
case, where the state habitat exchange was represented as relevant and 
vibrant despite never recording any transactions, and was used to argue 
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against protecting the sage-grouse under a federal Endangered Species 
Act. The habitat exchange served as a mechanism to perform and uphold 
hollow accountability without changing substantive relations on the 
ground. Bureaucratic legitimation plays a performative role in the 
Norwegian case, where Norway’s policies consistently reference a 2  °C 
target to limit global warming and have worked this into a range of 
national documents and strategies; this can also be seen as prefigurative in 
Sub-Sect. 10.2.4.
Technocratic legitimation is at work within the performative dimension 
in the Colorado case in terms of the strategy of championing a market 
mechanism to circumvent critique of coercive bureaucracy and benefit 
from efficiencies like low transaction costs. This strategy brings the Habitat 
Exchange and Habitat Quantification Tool into being. Financial legitima-
tion is performative in the same case: questions of finance are used to 
delegitimate the whole exercise as the subject of controversy when the oil 
and gas industry protests the debits assigned to them based on the mod-
elled cost calculations, as well as when it resigns from the governance 
board of the habitat exchange.
10.2.6  The Power-play Dimension
Here, discursive legitimation is in evidence in the Nordic electric mobility 
transition case. People’s scepticism about hybrid vehicles surfaces in con-
cerns that these allow their owners to cash in on incentives (for adopting 
low-emission vehicles) without affording the means to monitor their 
actual usage of electricity rather than the internal combustion engines. In 
the Indonesian land conflict case, the State Forest Corporation invokes 
military terms such as ‘illegal loggers’ and ‘subversive’ to draw equivalence 
between the villagers’ land occupation and organised crime, another 
instance of power-play through discursive delegitimation. Bureaucratic 
legitimation operates as power-play in the Nordic case, when Norway 
offers all-inclusive incentive packages and Denmark maintains lower duties 
(40% instead of 150%) for electric vehicles, but incentive schemes to elec-
trify public transport remain far less substantial.
Technocratic legitimation manifests within the power-play dimension 
in the Indonesian land conflict case, where the State Forest Corporation 
uses the formal characterisation and protocols associated with national 
security to evict villagers as ‘forest security disturbances’. This legitimation 
allows the state to levy its might against claim-making subjects. Financial 
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legitimation embodies power-play in the Nordic electric mobility transi-
tions case. Enormous support is provided for private electric cars used by 
relatively rich people, without similarly strong support to rapidly build out 
public electric transport infrastructure or cushion vulnerable groups 
against the regressive effects of fiscal policies on electric mobility.
10.2.7  The Routinisation Dimension
Within this dimension, discursive legitimation is in evidence in the 
Colorado habitat exchange case. The federal administration puts an end to 
mandatory compensatory mitigation by drawing explicit links with energy 
independence to make energy extraction an issue of national security. In 
the Nordic electric mobility transition case, protest against discursive legit-
imation to routinise inequitable transition surfaces as people’s critique of 
political tokenism in public discourse around electric vehicles. Bureaucratic 
legitimation is expressed as routinisation in the Colorado case, where 
efforts by Environmental Defense, layered upon prior experiences with 
habitat offsets, orchestrate participation in the creation and governance of 
the Colorado Habitat Exchange by various relevant actors.
Technocratic legitimation appears as routinisation in the Nordic case, 
which identifies dynamics such as promoting off-peak charging, mandat-
ing battery recycling to reduce externalities, emphasising the decarbonisa-
tion of electric grids and coordinating electric vehicle roll-out with 
prioritised non-motorised and intermodal electric transport. Financial 
legitimation manifests as routinisation in the Colorado habitat exchange 
case. Finance remains absent in practice, but present in the very logic of 
markets as mechanisms for the efficient implementation of accountability 
on which the market-based offsetting of habitat loss is premised.
10.3  enviRonmentAl goveRnAnce ReseARch 
on AccountAbility in eneRgy tRAnsitions
Not all cases of energy transition necessarily feature practices of legitima-
tion across all dimensions. The dimensions are partly an artefact of each 
author’s strategically chosen focus and partly reflect data availability. 
Thinking in terms of accountability and legitimation does not supplant 
other methods and common sense, but rather offers diagnostic value. It is 
purposely pliable; the dimensions are overlapping, not mutually exclusive, 
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nor comprehensive. Applied researchers and analytically oriented practi-
tioners can apply the practices of legitimation to fit situated needs, mobil-
ising the four registers within strategic dimensions of their choice. This 
analytical approach to accountability is based in abductive reasoning to 
settle upon the likeliest possible explanation in any given case of energy 
transition and pragmatically inform decision-making despite uncertainty. 
Such analysis can characterise disaggregated components of any energy 
transition case as accountable to concerns of sustainability or not. 
Scientifically evidencing both the formal and informal practices of legiti-
mation that are at work during energy transitions can aid decision-making 
towards outcomes that decarbonise and enhance social equity. This 
approach can thus combine analytical rigour with practical applicability 
and real-world relevance.
The five cases in this book show that energy transitions are many things 
and involve not only changing energy sectors but also cognate sectors such 
as land, forest, transport, biodiversity, markets and political economies of 
multi-scalar contexts. Our practically oriented vision of enabling account-
able governance for sustainable energy transitions represents a program-
matic task across many sectors. To inform practical decision-making of 
various energy transitions and their constituent parts in contextually 
informed and responsive ways, applied researchers can operationalise an 
accountability-based approach in their respective fields within broader 
environmental governance scholarship. Their domain knowledge and dis-
ciplinary sensibilities will help them customise this approach to suit 
their purposes.
The illustrations in this book aim to aid such intellectual uptake and 
cross-fertilisation, and thus pave the path for situated efforts to study prac-
tices of legitimation. To demonstrate the generative potential of an 
accountability-based analytical approach to energy transitions governance, 
we offer closing reflections by working sequentially outward from the 
five cases.
In the Berlin case, Timothy Moss shows the relevance of historical 
accounts focused on accountability analysis to inform our understanding 
of energy transitions today by deconstructing assumptions along spatial 
and temporal axes. His overarching point is that histories of energy provi-
sion and use can be instructive sources of inspiration. The issue of account-
ability is not the preserve of present-day energy governance. It has been 
invoked in myriad ways in the past to justify energy solutions in certain 
places at certain times. History helps us understand accountability, 
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 therefore, as a situated political construct. This sensitises scholars not only 
to the variety of justifications that have been mobilised in the name of 
particular purposes and beneficiaries in the past but also to the ephemeral 
nature of accountability criteria. What today may seem self-explanatory, 
may tomorrow be questioned.
History can point us to times and places when crises of accountability 
did challenge prevalent logics, policies or practices of energy provision. 
Such critical junctures can reveal past attempts to delegitimate a hege-
monic sociotechnical configuration and assess their achievements with the 
benefit of hindsight. At the same time, history can generate an apprecia-
tion of the obduracy of argumentative tropes enrolled to legitimate the 
predominant system. As the Berlin case illustrated, institutional norms can 
prove just as path dependent as the material structures they regulate. The 
fixation on energy security—and the capacity reserves this engendered—in 
West Berlin during the Cold War era created a legacy of insularity with 
which the city is still struggling to cope even 30 years after reunification.
Finally, history can direct attention to the roots of sustainability think-
ing in a particular space-time context. Sustainability as we know it was not 
a term in use before the 1970s, but its origins can be instructive, such as 
past efforts to save energy, use renewables or challenge supply-driven log-
ics of supply. The social movements pioneering novel modes of account-
able energy governance in Berlin today cannot be comprehended fully, 
Moss argues, without reference to their forebearers and the historically 
constructed sociotechnical regimes they challenged in bygone decades.
Christian Lund employs a conflict-centred approach anchored in a 
reading of classic texts within development studies, political science and 
political ecology to show how empirical examination of accountability is 
linked with the constitution of authority and subjecthood. Lund’s (2016) 
overall argument is that to treat the ‘state’ (or any other institution) as a 
finished product gets in the way of understanding it. It is always in the 
making. Political authority is (re)produced through its successful exercise; 
especially when exercised over important issues in relation to the social 
actors concerned.
Arguably, when institutions recognise claims to rights, they themselves 
become recognised by the claimants of these rights. That is to say, rights 
and authority are mutually and simultaneously established. Claims there-
fore invoke public authority and governing capacity in different institu-
tions, be they statutory or not. And, conversely, those who can claim to 
authorise people’s claims to rights acquire and exercise political authority. 
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This dynamic is garnered with attempts at legitimating the claims to rights 
and authority. However, just as the institutions are never truly settled but 
are, in fact, processes, the repertoires of legitimation are also contingent. 
To understand these dynamics of institutional formation requires 
grounded, empirical research allowing us to go beyond state theories 
modelled after ahistorical ideal types.
Lund’s argument thus points to directions where fieldwork-based anal-
yses of accountability can attend to indirect and under-attended aspects of 
energy transitions.
Håvard Haarstad brings a human geography and urban planning lens 
to bear on accountability along with a science and technology studies con-
cern with metrics, revealing the relational modulation of energy transi-
tions across multiple scales. His chapter deals with the question of whether 
climate targets matter for actual policy implementation. He observes that 
climate-related targets are all around—countries have them, regions have 
them, cities have them. Does this have any effects on how practical politics 
proceed, on what happens in practice? Much of the social sciences would 
take a sceptical view. Swyngedouw’s (2010) popular rendering of the 
‘post-political condition’, for example, describes climate targets as part of 
a techno-managerial apparatus that shifts rhetoric towards climate change 
but at the same time makes sure that nothing actually happens. While 
recognising the merits of a sceptical view, Haarstad aims to look at the 
other side of this coin. Is it possible that targets, even seemingly overly 
ambitious ones, may have real and substantive effects contributing to a 
sustainable transition?
He starts from the basic idea that there is power in numbers. As many 
social scientists have pointed out, quantification makes nature knowable 
and controllable (Miller 2005). This could mean that reducing a sustain-
able transition—a messy, complicated and multifaceted process—to a 
quantifiable target can have powerful effects. In fact, While et al. (2010) 
argue that, by lending itself to quantification, climate change becomes a 
potentially powerful target of political action and regulation. Haarstad 
points to one instance of how a quantified goal (zero) becomes enrolled 
and legitimated in political practice and, arguably, effects substantive 
change. Since 2006, the goal of having ‘zero growth’ in private car traffic 
has worked its way into Norwegian policy-making across a range of areas, 
particularly transport and urban development. It affects flows of funding 
from the national government to the major cities. It has become a major 
condition for urban policy-making.
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This illustrates how a quantified target has the potential to work its way 
into the ‘techno-managerial apparatus’ (Swyngedouw 2010) and inflect 
material change. This particular case entailed a combination of involved 
soft mechanisms, as the target gradually inserted itself in the discourse on 
urban policy and moved its goal posts, and hard mechanisms, namely 
national-to-urban funding flows. The takeaway message is that climate- 
related targets can play an important role in legitimating practices that 
advance sustainable energy transitions.
Benjamin Sovacool demonstrates how a political economic, multi-sited 
comparative deconstruction of sectoral change from a public policy and 
social justice perspective can surface uneasy questions about accountability 
even in progressive energy transitions. Such an analysis offers a compelling 
antidote to the optimism inherent in much current discussion and debate 
about the desirability of electric mobility as a pathway for environmental 
sustainability. In this context, due to the transportation sector’s depen-
dence on fossil fuel energy sources and the monumental negative conse-
quences for climate change, air pollution and other social impacts, 
countless researchers, policymakers and other stakeholders view a wide-
spread transition to electric mobility as both feasible and socially desirable 
(Mitchell et al. 2010; Tran et al. 2012). The International Energy Agency 
(2017) projects under the ‘Sustainable Development Scenario’ that 875 
million electric vehicles (EVs) will need to be adopted by 2040. Mitchell 
et al. (2010) call EVs nothing short of ‘transformative’ and ‘revolutionary’ 
for their potential effects on mobility patterns. Turton and Moura (2008, 
p. 1091) add that when EVs are placed in a vehicle-to-grid configuration, 
their transformative potential multiplies, representing ‘a paradigm shift in 
how the energy and mobility markets are related’.
However, the Nordic transition to electric mobility when viewed from 
a framing of sector-wide multi-scalar linkages, questions this so-called rev-
olution. It underscores how wedding accountability to analyses of vulner-
ability and justice in energy transitions can fruitfully change the frame and 
criteria by which we examine mobility transitions. In addition, many of the 
injustices identified, or the issues of equity and vulnerability that arise, are 
not ‘new’ to electric mobility—they likely exist with other low-carbon 
technologies and also conventional cars and other forms of mobility. 
However, a lesson here is perhaps that changing the performance or 
engine of a vehicle, or introducing a new type of car such as battery elec-
tric vehicle, does not necessarily change the underlying political economy 
or power dynamics behind mobility or automobility. Systems of mobility 
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themselves—involving multiple, competing and overlapping technologies, 
modes of mobility and transport infrastructures—can also be just or 
unjust, even if they utilise innovations such as electric vehicles. The justice 
potential of electric mobility is therefore situational, relational and 
contingent.
Steven Wolf develops an environmental sociology framework to address 
dynamics in biodiversity conservation. The case of the sage-grouse, a 
ground-nesting bird imperilled by energy development in Colorado, USA, 
offers a window onto broader challenges of energy transitions and socio-
ecological regulation. The chapter pursues a general, abstract analysis of 
accountability within environmental governance. Accountability mecha-
nisms are identified as ‘tests’ of conformity with institutionalised norms. 
These tests mediate access to legitimacy and other resources that structure 
competition and organisational ecology dynamics (i.e., shifts in the popu-
lation of actors and behaviours) (Kraft and Wolf 2018). The co- evolutionary 
model of socioecological regulation that is presented seeks to offer an 
integrated, dynamic treatment of accountability (e.g., social controls 
developed to regulate land use changes that reduce sage-grouse habitat), 
standards of legitimacy (e.g., prevailing norms regarding the appropriate-
ness of accountability mechanisms), sociotechnical practices (e.g., oil and 
gas drilling activities) and environmental quality (e.g., health of sage- 
grouse populations). This theoretical treatment highlights opportunities 
for research on accountability to inform general analyses of governance 
and regulation.
The empirical analysis highlights how efforts to advance habitat offset-
ting (i.e., market-based approaches to conserving land in order to com-
pensate for degradation of sage-grouse habitat) have served to maintain 
the legitimacy of existing models of oil and gas development. More spe-
cifically, Wolf’s analysis highlights how multi-stakeholder dialogue around 
construction of habitat offsetting mechanisms and mobilisation of scien-
tific expertise and quantification routines are implicated in performing 
conservation without producing measurable protections for sage-grouse. 
To date, after seven years of engagement, no habitat has been conserved 
in Colorado through the habitat exchange. Yet the public construction of 
elaborate new accountability routines and promises of future capacity to 
achieve ‘no-net loss’ of habitat seems to function adequately to legitimate 
existing socioecological relations. In this sense, accountability processes 
are a central mechanism through which we sustain the unsustainable 
(Blühdorn 2007).
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To conclude, we come full circle to the urgency of the climate change 
challenge, the need for sustainable energy transitions, and the conundrum 
that such sociotechnical transitions are feasible and desperately needed 
despite which they are held back in a wide variety of ways. The response 
unpacked by means of an accountability-centred analytical approach is that 
a dynamic configuration of legitimation practices that constrain and enable 
sustainable energy transitions manifest this conundrum. Identifying and 
evidencing these practices as applied researchers and analytically oriented 
practitioners, we can unravel the present conundrum and advance account-
able governance for sustainable energy transitions. We trust that the point-
ers and reflections offered in this book will motivate and equip colleagues 
to support this endeavour.
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A Workshop, pArAllel exhibitions And AssociAted 
events
Several factors ensured a productive and convivial writing process, and 
made this book possible. The conditions of its production also served a 
further purpose through their own ontology, embodying its intent of 
being accessible to a wider audience. This appendix tells the story of much 
of what went into the making of this book and the collaborations that 
inform it.
Stemming from concerns of social and environmental equity and jus-
tice, my interest in accountability has been informed by instruction from 
and engagement with the co-authors. Christian Lund’s work on how 
authority is produced in reflexive relation with claims over rights moti-
vated a focus on relational practices. Steven Wolf’s work, drawing together 
accountability, legitimation and empirical artefacts—captured in Kraft and 
Wolf (2018)—shaped thinking around practices of legitimation as an entry 
point to the empirical study of accountability. Håvard Haarstad’s work on 
relational ontology and the networked governance of efforts to decarbo-
nise informed the development of a relational approach. Benjamin 
Sovacool’s work on energy justice was instructive in determining how to 
engage decarbonisation and social equity enhancement as twin aspects of 
accountability in governing energy transitions to sustainability. Timothy 
Moss’ work, deepening historical understandings of energy transition 
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drivers, nuanced views on the basis for and implications of contemporary 
energy sector accountability relations.
These scholars generously agreed to engage and contribute insights 
based on their empirical work to collectively consider an analytical 
approach centred on the study of practices of legitimation. Featuring their 
work from fields as varied as human and economic geography, develop-
ment studies, energy studies, environmental sociology and history enables 
the book to speak to colleagues across wide-ranging disciplines and applied 
research traditions. This aims to catalyse a greater analytical focus on 
accountable energy transitions within environmental governance 
scholarship.
In addition, vibrant fields of social science research on the governance 
of energy transitions and cognate subjects furnished arguments to engage 
with and concepts to inspire and direct critical thinking. A workshop grant 
enabled the co-authors to come together in Bergen during 14–17 May 
2019, along with authors of 15 manuscripts prepared for a special issue of 
the Global Transitions journal on a closely related theme, for two days of 
discussions amongst over 20 scholars. For this opportunity, I am grateful 
to the Strategic Programme for International Research Collaboration, and 
to the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Bergen. In parallel 
with this workshop, I co-organised two public exhibitions. The first was 
built around the concept of an ‘Idea box for energy transitions’, and the 
second was a collaboration within a show titled ‘Potential exceeds the 
demand’ by textile artist Margrethe Brekke.
The idea box for energy transitions was a physical invitation to the pub-
lic to contribute their solutions for energy transitions by putting sheets 
with their writing into a slot in a box painted in the yellow colour of the 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 7. This SDG aims to achieve clean 
energy for all. I designed the idea box largely from upcycled materials, and 
with the assistance of several colleagues, curated workshops to collect 
solutions. The idea box was launched at the opening weekend of the 
European Green Capital 2019 in Oslo, from where people posted ideas to 
Bergen. It was then installed at the Bergen Public Library from January to 
March 2019, and carried around to workshops during this period. These 
included a workshop on the accountable governance of sustainable energy 
transitions during the National SDG Conference 2019, workshops with 
teachers and citizens interested in energy, and an event integrated into the 
Klimathon (an annual national event on climate adaptation). A group of 
colleagues at the Centre for Climate and Energy Transformation built an 
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exhibition around the ideas that came in, which ran during 10–20 May 
2019 at the Bergen Public Library. This included a selection of books 
related to energy transitions as well as prints of 17 motifs from a 6.25 
square metre textile art from the other exhibition, alongside the idea 
box itself.
The collaboration with Margrethe Brekke’s exhibition emerged organi-
cally during late 2018. Hosted at the Hordaland Kunstsenter art gallery 
during May–July 2019, this exhibition provided visual portrayals of exist-
ing possibilities for energy transitions. We discussed ways of depicting a 
future energy system powered largely by renewable energy, with her visu-
alisations and my technical inputs. This resulted in her textile piece titled 
‘Rhythmic energy mixes: Days and years with Dr. Siddharth Sareen’, 
which emphasised flexible daily and annual cycles of such energy systems. 
Details of the motifs she developed for this large piece were part of the 
parallel idea box exhibition. The Hordaland Kunstsenter exhibition also 
featured a poem I wrote and performed during an event called ‘Fest for 
Fesken’ (party for the fish) organised by the people’s campaign for a fossil- 
free Arctic (Folkeaksjonen oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja) at 
Bergen’s Café Opera on 14 November 2018, reflecting on my time spent 
engaging with climate activism in the sister city of Seattle during 
September–October 2018. This poem, ‘The case for hope amidst climate 
change catastrophe’, was recorded and displayed on headphones with 
accompanying visuals that featured Brekke’s textile art, and the book con-
cludes with it.
During the mid-May workshop, I anchored a discussion between 
Margrethe Brekke and Benjamin Sovacool on the ‘Imaginaries of energy 
transition: Public, artistic and academic’ at the art gallery. Judith Dalsgård 
developed this into a podcast as part of a series at the Centre for Climate 
and Energy Transformation. Workshop participants and interested local 
residents toured Brekke’s exhibition and were also given a tour of the idea 
box exhibition. These activities constituted a form of engagement with 
various publics beyond academia, including Bergen’s cultural and artistic 
community. They also enabled two-way engagement rather than outreach, 
providing a window of insight into what people think about energy transi-
tions and inviting them into a sustained exchange with energy scholars. 
The exhibitions built a basis for collaboration with public institutions such 
as Bergen Public Library and Hordaland Kunstsenter. Opening and clos-
ing sessions as well as six keynote talks (five of them based on the case 
chapters and a sixth by Sunila Kale) during the mid-May workshop were 
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livestreamed and made permanently available on the Youtube channel of 
Bergen Public Library. Children from the International School of Bergen, 
directed by Annie Sareen, contributed short thematic theatrical perfor-
mances during the workshop.
As with many things, it is possible to say that ‘it takes a village’ to gov-
ern energy transitions to be accountable to public interests like decarbon-
ising while enhancing social equity. The ontology of producing the content 
of this book, by way of the workshop and these parallel events, took many 
parts of the city of Bergen. Along with any influence it might have on 
wider audiences, this local effect of connecting people and institutions 
constitutes a key outcome of the book project. Such efforts are vital for 
building a platform to nurture greater public awareness regarding the 
accountable governance of energy transitions. Documenting them as part 
of this book closes the circle and hopes to encourage others to undertake 
similar efforts customised to their local contexts. Appendix B comple-
ments this textual narrative with a photographic essay that captures some 
key details of the events that took place in Bergen during May 2019.
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photos from the events in bergen, mAy 2019
This appendix, a photo essay, documents visual details from two exhibi-
tions that ran in parallel with the mid-May workshop in Bergen, and from 
the workshop itself.1 It is divided into four sections: photos from the ‘Idea 
box for energy transitions’ exhibition at Bergen Public Library, photos 
from the ‘Potential exceeds the demand’ exhibition at the Hordaland 
Kunstsenter art gallery, photos from the workshop titled ‘Accountability 
analysis: Enabling sustainability under energy sector transitions’ and a 
poem that was part of the art gallery exhibition. All photos were taken 
during 9–17 May 2019 in Bergen.
 The Idea Box for Energy Transitions—An Exhibition at Bergen Public 
Library
Several colleagues associated with the Centre for Climate and Energy 
Transformation at the University of Bergen helped me curate the ‘Idea 
box for energy transitions’ exhibition—Judith Dalsgård, Thea Gregersen, 
Tshin Ilya Chardayre, Gregory Ferguson-Cradler and Amber Nordholm—
along with collaborating artist Margrethe Brekke and the director of 
Hordaland Kunstsenter, Mathijs van Geest. Several of us are pictured here, 
1 Except Figs. B1.2, B1.3 and B1.7 where the Hordaland Kunstsenter art gallery is duly 
credited, all photos used were taken or arranged by the author.
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right after having finished installing the exhibition a day prior to its open-
ing on 10 May 2019 at Bergen Public Library.
The exhibition featured a selection of solutions for energy transitions sub-
mitted by the public through various workshops, as well as an assortment 
of thematically pertinent books, and motifs from a large textile piece at the 
parallel exhibition at Hordaland Kunstsenter. It was placed in a central 
room at the Bergen Public Library to share the crowd-sourced social 
imaginary with people in Bergen.
 Fig. B1.1 Setting up the exhibition at Bergen Public Library
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Fig. B1.2 The ‘Idea box for energy transitions’ exhibition. (Photo credit: 
Hordaland Kunstsenter)
The exhibition was installed in a manner that invited engagement, and 
designed to be approachable from any direction. People could leaf through 
folders with ideas, take a brochure with background information about 
the initiative with them, and pick up a flyer of the workshop held in the 
same building during the exhibition. The idea box itself, which collected 
ideas during January–March 2019, is also visible as part of the exhibition. 
The exhibition was listed as an Energy Days event and associated with the 
European Union Sustainable Energy Week.
144 APPENDIX B
 
Fig. B1.3 The idea box as part of the exhibition at Bergen Public Library. (Photo 
credit: Hordaland Kunstsenter)
During the workshop, 20 researchers from abroad spent three days dis-
cussing analytical approaches centred around accountability for the gover-
nance of energy transitions towards sustainability. On the afternoon of 15 
May, they stepped out of the auditorium at Bergen Public Library to take 
a look at the exhibition in the main space of this century old institution.
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Fig. B1.4 Workshop participants browse the idea box for energy transitions 
exhibition
Those associated with the exhibition, including collaborating artist 
Margrethe Brekke, shared reflections on the process with workshop par-
ticipants. Here, the art gallery director is explicating connections between 
the two exhibitions.
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Fig. B1.5 Bridging the exhibitions at Bergen Public Library and Hordaland 
Kunstsenter
 Potential Exceeds the Demand—An Exhibition at Hordaland 
Kunstsenter Art Gallery
The title of Margrethe Brekke’s art exhibition emphasised the fact that we 
already have technological potential for low-carbon transitions far in excess 
of what is currently taking place. Our collaboration on one of her textile 
pieces revolved around visualising a future renewable energy system. The 
circular pattern with motifs representing many energy generating tech-
nologies highlights possibilities for flexibility, both daily and annually, in 
future energy systems with high levels of penetration of renewable sources 
of energy. It depicts the potential of technologies like agri-photovoltaics, 
concentrating solar power and reverse hydro pumping for a sustainable 
energy transition.
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Fig. B1.6 ‘Rhythmic energy mixes: Days and years with Dr. Siddharth Sareen’ 
by Margrethe Brekke
Margrethe Brekke’s exhibition at Hordaland Kunstsenter featured 
three textile pieces of 6.25 square metres each, accompanied by some 
smaller works and two audio recordings with videos. The three large pieces 
dominated the art gallery space and conversed with each other. Each spoke 
to a wider audience based on scientific understandings of potential energy 
transitions, with basic shapes, colours and patterns representing specific 
volumes, proportions and time.
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Fig. B1.7 Margrethe Brekke’s ‘Potential exceeds the demand’ exhibition at 
Hordaland Kunstsenter
Margrethe Brekke gave a guided tour of her art exhibition to workshop 
participants and interested people in Bergen to kick off a collaborative art 
and academia evening event on 14 May 2019. This brought together 
those familiar with the city’s cultural scene and several international visi-
tors with insights from research on environmental governance and energy 
transitions.
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Fig. B1.8 Margrethe Brekke reflects on her art exhibition while giving a guided 
tour
Margrethe Brekke after giving a guided tour of her exhibition, with 
Annie Sareen, who directed a thematic performance by the children of the 
International School of Bergen the next day. In the background is Kristin 
Frøya, energy director at the University of Bergen, who also collaborated 
with Brekke for the exhibition with an audio recording that connected 
energy transitions with lived experience in Norway, and Timothy Moss, a 
keynote speaker at the workshop the rest of the week. The headphones on 
the wall featured an audio recording of my poem ‘The case for hope 
amidst climate change catastrophe’, whose text is included at the end of 
this appendix.
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Fig. B1.9 The forces behind the artistic events
A large, engaged audience filled Hordaland Kunstsenter for the collab-
orative evening event. Here, they listen attentively to Magrethe Brekke’s 
reflections on the role of the arts in enabling energy transitions, and expe-
riences during her own journey from engaging utopian ideals to channel-
ling scientific knowledge in her textile art. Benjamin Sovacool, a keynote 
speaker during the workshop and photographed here, followed Brekke’s 
presentation by drawing from his research on energy justice and humanis-
ing energy transitions along lines of gender, labour and geographical 
topographies of power. Their talks and a discussion I moderated between 
them is available as an hour-long podcast, the sixth episode in the CET 
Climate Talks series.2
2 Available online at https://www.uib.no/en/cet/124342/podcast-cet-climate-talks.
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Fig. B1.10 ‘Imaginaries of energy transition: Public, artistic and academic’ with 
Margrethe Brekke and Benjamin Sovacool
The discussion between Brekke and Sovacool was followed by a social 
evening and continued discussions on the theme amongst the audience, 
which included residents of Bergen and workshop participants who had 
just arrived in the city.
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Fig. B1.11 Exchanges between the arts, academia and the public
 Workshop on ‘Accountability Analysis: Enabling Sustainability Under 
Energy Sector Transitions’
During the opening session of the workshop on accountability analysis 
and sustainable energy transitions in the main auditorium of Bergen Public 
Library, children from the International School of Bergen did theatrical 
performances on related themes, including climate change, deforestation 
and biodiversity, which they spent months preparing for as part of their 
classes on performing arts.
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Fig. B1.12 Theatrical performances by International School of Bergen students 
directed by Annie Sareen
The workshop participants and other interested people in Bergen 
joined two intensive days packed with six keynote talks, 15 paper discus-
sions and opening and closing sessions about practices of legitimation and 
accountability analysis for energy transitions governance towards sustain-
ability. These discussions, which included all the co-authors of this book, 
were invaluable towards finalising this manuscript, as well as airing and 
providing feedback on articles that were subsequently submitted to a spe-
cial issue of the Global Transitions journal on the same theme.
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Fig. B1.13 The accountability analysis workshop at Bergen Public Library
The five case chapter authors of this book gave keynote talks during the 
workshop, as did Sunila Kale of the University of Washington-Seattle. 
Here, Timothy Moss gives the first of these keynotes, historicising account-
ability through Berlin’s energy transitions, based on his argument in Chap. 
4 of this book. These talks as well as the opening and closing sessions of 
the workshop were live-streamed and are available on the Youtube channel 
of Bergen Public Library.3
3 Available online at https://www.youtube.com/user/bergenpubliclibrary/videos (dated 
15–16 May 2019).
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Fig. B1.14 Timothy Moss gives a keynote talk at the workshop on accountabil-
ity analysis
The workshop keynote talks were followed by lively discussions where 
participants took the stage along with the speakers. The 15 paper presen-
tations were presented by discussants based on pre-circulated manuscripts, 
with authors subsequently responding to these interpretations and leading 
into a discussion with the workshop participants. Here, Christian Lund 
poses a question to Håvard Haarstad about his analysis of target-setting 
for climate mitigation, which comprises Chap. 6 of this book.
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Fig. B1.15 Christian Lund and Håvard Haarstad during a workshop keynote 
session
The workshop also served as an occasion for researchers in many coun-
tries to become better acquainted and discuss their work on the gover-
nance of energy transitions and cognate themes in a relaxed social setting 
outside the academic sessions. At the end of the first of two days packed 
with sessions, participants gathered at the Bergen Public Library restau-
rant, Amalies Hage, for a long meal.
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Fig. B1.16 Discussions among the workshop participants continued over 
dinner
At the end of two days of sessions, the workshop keynote speakers and 
some accompanying family members gathered over a closing dinner at the 
local restaurant Colonialen 44. Pictured from left to right are Steven Wolf, 
Annie Sareen, myself, Peter Andersen (head of the Department of 
Geography at University of Bergen), Christian Lund, Håvard Haarstad, 
Timothy Moss and his wife Ulrike, and Shobha succeeded by her daughter 
Sunila Kale.
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Fig. B1.17 Closing workshop dinner with keynote speakers
The workshop was planned to end with Norwegian Constitution Day, 
the national day of Norway, on Friday, 17 May 2019. This started with a 
traditional breakfast at the hotel where the keynotes stayed, by Bergen’s 
central lake. Visible in the window is a passerby in her national dress, a 
bunad. Later in the day, workshop participants joined in the traditional 
parade through the city streets and spent a day enjoying Bergen at its best 
in glorious spring weather with happy people out and about.
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Fig. B1.18 Starting festivities on the national day of Norway
Some workshop participants joined the traditional closing procession, 
carrying torches from the thirteenth-century Bergenhus fortress past the 
famous Bryggen harbour and into the centre of Bergen where many resi-
dents had gathered for the annual public fireworks show to close the cel-
ebrations. In the middle is Lakin Anderson, a doctoral candidate at 
Uppsala University who participated in the workshop as part of his field-
work to research the practices of climate and energy scientists at the Centre 
for Climate and Energy Transformation as a case study for his dissertation.
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Fig. B1.19 A traditional torchlight procession through Bergen
The workshop ended with a bang with the annual fireworks show at the 
central lake in Bergen, called Lille Lungegårdsvannet (or Smålungeren in 
the Bergensk dialect). A viking boat mock-up is visible, and behind the 
fireworks one can discern the tallest of Bergen’s seven mountains, Ulriken. 
With that, three intense and productive days of academic and wider col-
laboration drew to a close.
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Fig. B1.20 The annual fireworks on 17 May in Bergen
The final section of the appendix ends this book with a poem that 
makes the case for hope amidst climate change catastrophe. The poem 
embodies an extension of the book’s main line of argument. It gently but 
firmly states that, while enabling sustainable energy transitions is hard and 
prospects can at times look bleak, the stakes to ensure accountability are 
high, and we do have the tools and means at our disposal.
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 The Case for Hope Amidst Climate Change Catastrophe
Is hope apocalyptic after all?
Does it let us wait, twiddling our thumbs,
In between bursts
Of furious
Activity?
Do we find kindred spirits
In our search for salvation and think
We are closer
To accomplishment?
When in fact, loss follows loss,
Wildfires burn,
Countries drown,
Species disappear.
Or would that be an unkind misconstrual?
Do times like this
Render us in need
Of friends, now more than ever?
Is compassion our mast
Hope our guiding star
And empathy born of friendship
The wind in our gutsy sails?
Who loses? What prevails?
We fought for Initiative sixteen thirty-one
The Pacific Northwest
The first frontier
Of hope for change to a politics of trying
Of recognising
What times call on us to do.
To make polluters pay, to compensate
Victims of fossil fuels and give a chance
To an energy sector powered by renewables
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In the here and now
Rather than
A decade hence.
But Big Oil poured in millions
Money talked and people listened
The Initiative took a beating.
Opportunities are fleeting
And it’s already
Out of sight, out of mind,
All that we must leave behind.
No time to mope, the only way
To cope is to return to hope.
Or is it? Does hope motivate
Here in Seattle’s sister city
Connected by a totem pole
Down at Nordnes in Bergen?
Or does remoteness obfuscate
While hope simply distracts,
Sustaining the unsustainable
Regurgitating facts
About one point five degrees
While delaying acts
That would keep it all in the ground,
Firmly under the sea
Out around Lofoten
Where our politics are floundering
Much like Pacific island states?
What scope is there for hope
When murder merely agitates
Blinded by greed? A world that’s rigged
To keep expanding drilling.
Pumped by oil, we grease the wheels
And keep the coffers filling.
Softly we murmur “We are better
Than others at not spilling.”
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The most majestic icebergs thaw
Glaciers are melting
New trade routes emerge
As opportunity.
That submerges hope.
It is a more powerful motivator.
What about the opportunity
To save hundreds of millions,
Entire coastal cultures from submergence?
When debate is anchored in opportunism
Hope is reduced to a spectacle.
We must defy and contest such
Imaginaries. Call them out
Consistently
As misleading hopemongers.
Hope is not Janus-faced, it does not look away
When counter-arguments are deposited.
Hope rests in respectful judgement,
In rooting for measured deliberation.
With no respect, no room for basic dignity,
No recognition of the right to life
In all its fullness
And diversity
It is apocalypse now.
Channel hope
To resist the dislocation
That perpetuates fossil fuel hegemony
And paves the way
For regulation to depoliticise
What is the most political thing of all:
Our future, our here and now,
The right to echo the call
Championed by Greta Thunberg.
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Hope is a tool to levy
Reasonable demands in unreasonable times
Expecting power to yield to truth.
We live in an apocalyptic moment
That empathy and friendship help us recognise.
Solidarity is our vessel of choice
And on these tumultuous waters under
Cloudy skies, hope is our guiding star.
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